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JOHN ~· BUCHANAN, Af pellee. 
l 
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of 
the Supreme Cou1·t of .Appeals of Vtginia: 
Your Petitioner, Ruth Lester Buchanlan, who sues on be-
half of herself, and all other persons hj1terested in the con-
tracts hereinafter mentioned, shows un!o your Honors that 
she is aggrieved by a final decree of the Circuit Court for 
Fauquier County, entered on the 7th ~.y of April, 1939, in 
a chancery cause instituted therein by lier on behalf of her-
self and all other persons interested in said contracts, includ-
ing the two infant children of herself an John R. Buchanan, 
the appellant and appelle.e, which decre dismissed the said 
Bill upon· a Demurrer thereto filed. 
This suit is an aftermath of Buchan. v. Buchooan, de-
cided by this court on March 10, 1938, 170 Va. 458, Record 
No. 1885, which record was made part of the. bill by 
2• reference, and •upon wnich many f the allegations of 
the bill are based and there by sup orted, and which is 
asked to be inspected herewith. 
r110 save confusion the petitioner, Ruth Lester Buchana.n, 
the appellant herein, will be ref erred tq throughout this pe-
ti~ion as the "appellant", and John ~- Buchanan, the de-
fendant below, as" a.ppellee ". I 
A transcript of the record is herewith P,resented, from which 
the following facts appear: J 
2 Supreme Uourt of .Appeals of Virginia. 
1. The appellant and the appellee married and parents of 
three minor children, to-wit: Helen Warren Buchanan, now 
over 21 years of age and married ; James A. Buchanan, IV., 
about 19 years of age, and John R. Buchanan, Jr., about li, 
were living separate and apart on May 18th, 1931 (Tr., p. 1). 
2. On May 18th, 1931, they signed a contract in writing, 
under seal ( Record No. 1885, pp. 65 to 69), by which the oc-
eupancy of the matrimonial domicile in Fauquier County, 
"Leny Manor", was g-ranted to the appellant as a place of 
residence for herself and three children for a term of five 
years; the appellee to pay all repair bills and taxes (par. 1). 
In addition he was to pay appellant $1,500.00 per month to be 
used at her discretion in the maintenance of said home, includ-
ing foodstuffs, servants, clothing and ordinary dental and 
medical bills, during said term, and after its expiration to 
be by her applied for the support and maintenance of the three 
children. He was to pay in addition all bills incurred for 
their board and tuition in connection with their education, 
either at boarding schools or at college, and all extra-
3* ordinary *'medical bills or dental bills '' incurred in be-
half of said children", with a. proviso that if either child 
should cease to reside with the appellant other than at board-
ing· school or college the $1,500.00 payments were to be propor-
tionately reduced (par. 3, Record #1885, pp. 66-67). Since 
June, 1933, and until her majority and marriage the daugh-
ter lived with her father. The appellee was also to pay, and 
did pay, to the .appellant the sum of $25,000.00 in cash, and 
to execute, and did execute, · to her his promissory notes in 
the sum of $125,000.00 at six per cent interest, payable quar-
terly (par. 3, pp. 66, Record #1885). Appellant agreed to 
and did execute as requested such further conveyances as 
might be necessary to vest in the appell~e absolute fee simple 
title to certain valuable property in Canada (par. 4). There 
was reserved to the appellee (par. 6, Record #1885, p. 68), the 
right to occupy the matrimonial home f ~r a period of one week 
in each year, during· which period the appellant was to ab-
sent herself therefrom (par. 8). It was also agreed that 
beginning in the Fall of 1931 the children should be placed 
in boarding schools mutually agreed upon by the parents, and 
· in the event of their inability to agree the schools to be selected 
by some party to be agreed upon by them (par. 8). 
3. A few days after this contract was signed the husband 
went to· Reno, Nevada, and after a stay of barely six weeks 
filed on July 25th, 1931, a divorce bill against appellant con-
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cruelty on the part of the appella!t towards him. He 
4* *exhibited with his bill a copy of tlie contract aforesaid, 
alleged its justness; that it was fajr, just and equitable 
in all respects ; was not made for the J>iUrpose of expediting 
or facilitating a divorce, but for the sole and only purpose 
of settling· property rights, making provision for the future 
support and maintenance of the defendalnt and of said minor 
children, and for agreeing as between ~aid parties, with re-
spect to the custody of said minor children, and further 
alleged: 
'' And plaintiff is desirous of having the court adopt, ap-
prove and confirm the same, and by reference made a part 
of the decree to the same extent as th~mgh said a·greement 
were fully set forth in said decree." 
and prayed that an absolu_te divorce be rranted, and 
"for a further order, adoptinlJ, approviJ,o and con.firming the 
written memorandum of agreement behVicen the- parties *' * * 
and that 'the same may be adopted as the· order of this court 
concerning the fu.t1.tre support and malntenance of the de-
fendant and of the minor children of the plaintiff and de-
fendant and the award of custody made therein'' (Record 
#lss5, p. 55). I . 
Your Petitioner appeared by counsel bnly and filed an an-
swer to this bill, denying the allega tiqns of domicile and 
cruelty, but admitted the marriage and birth of the children. 
On July 27th, 1931, the Nevada Court, alter hearing at which 
the appellee alone testified as to the m,rits of his case, en-
tered a decree granting the appellec a d~'vorce and further 
"ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DEC!t:EED that the agree-
ment dated the 18th day of May, 1 1, *settling and ad-
5* justing their respective property r ghts, and providing 
for the fu,ture su,pport and m.ainte1 amce o'f the def end-
ant ( the appellant here) and of the min r children * * * and 
providing for the custo!ly of said min children ~ *" * be, 
and the same is hereby adopted, app oved and confirmed 
to the same extent as th()ttgh fully set f rth herein." 
The appellant was never -in Nevada, :nor did she or her 
counsel participate in said hearing. 
4. Immediately thereafter the lmsba d returned to the 
4 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
State of Virginia and has remained a resident therein ever 
since. . 
5. This contract and decree was performed by the appel-
lee up to and including May 1st, 193-3 (par. 6), when default 
was made in the payment of the $1,500.00 installment. During· 
this period by mutual consent of the parents, one son, James 
A., was entered at Fay School and John R., Jr., at Fessenden 
School. , 
6. On June 27th, 1933, the husban9- filed in the Circuit Court 
for Fauquier County a petition alleging the divorce and the 
contract, made a part of the decree of divorce, but denying 
the enforceability of the decree ( though incorporated therein 
at his instance), on the ground that it was invalid, null and 
void in that respect, because the court did not have jurisdiction 
~f the subject matter, and further alleged that appellant was 
not a fit or proper person to have the custody of the children, 
the only specific ground alleged being that she was not ap-
plying the $1,500.00 fund as contemplated, and prayed for a 
writ of habeas corpus ad s.ztbjicienditm against appellant as 
their custodian (Tr., p. 7). ' 
. 7. The appellant- answered this petition denying all the 
allegations ·reflecting upon her. She also denied the validity 
of the Nevada divorce on the ground that the court was 
without jurisdiction of their status in that neither the de-
fendant •nor the respondent was ever domiciled in that 
6• State, but insisted on the validity of the contract as 
adopted and decreed by the Nevada Court and that 
he was es topped to deny it ( Tr., p. 8). 
8. Before the issue thus made by this pleading was brought 
to trial the parties, subject to the approval of the court, agreed 
upon certain modificatfons of said contract and decree de-
signed to remove the specific ground of complaint alleged in 
the petition, which approval in its entirety was an essential 
and necessar:lJ eiement of said agreement to modify as follows 
(Tr., p. 8) : · . 
(a) The appellant surrendered the,occupancy of Leny Manor 
as of January 1st, 1934 (Tr., pp. 8,:10). 
(b) Partly in lieu thereof and of the payment to the appel-
lant of the $1,500.00 monthly, which she also released, appel-
lee agreed to pay her $375.00 per month toward the main-
tenance of a home for herself and two sons (par. 8) and as-
sumed responsibility for and in addition agreed "to pay 
promptly as they matu.red all bills incurred, or to be incurred 
for the proper clothing, support, maintenance and education 
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including their traveling e~penses to a~d from schools and 
colleges and to and from their respectiv<t parents''; that the 
interest on the promissory note, agg~-egating $125,000.00, 
above mentioned, should be paid montnly instead of quar-
terly, with a renewal privilege never avail~d of (pa.rs. 2 and 3). 
( c) Par~. 4 and 5 were not amended. I 
( d) (Par. 6) that during t.he infancy pf the children, and 
during all vacations the appellant and ~ppellee should each 
have the custody of said children for one-half of each 
7"" •vacation period (par. 6) ; that co~encing in the Fall of 
1933 the daughter should be placed in the school .she was 
· then attending until she was prepared fqr co11ege and there-
after in such college as she should select; and the two sons 
should be placed in schools they then attended or such other 
school as the parents should agree on, uµtil they were ready 
for college, respectively, after which they should be placed 
in such colleges as they the sons .should s~lect after consulting 
with their respective parents, and in addijtion to pay to appel-
lant the $375.00 per month, above mentioµed, on the first day 
of each and every montp towards the I maintenance of '' a 
home suitable for herself and children pther than the said 
. · Leny Manor'', and to pay certain outstanding bills of the 
appellant already incurred for her and their support and 
maintenance. ! 
( e) That the said agreed modifications ,should be submitted 
to the court for its approval, and a consent decree should bP 
entered by the court ratifying and confi~ming. the same, and 
ordering and directing the performance :Of the said contract 
as so modified. ! 
(f) That the question of the validity of the Nevada decree · 
should be passed on by the court on its !merits, inde.pendent 
of· agreement (Tr., pp. 8-10). - I 
9. That said original agreement andj the said proposed 
amendments were all reported to th~ court in said •pro-
s• ceeding on the 29th day of Septemb r, 1933, when, at a 
hearing on said petition and answ r and the evidence 
offered, including the cQntract of May 18th, 1931, and the 
record of the decree of the Nevada Co rt entered on July 
27th, 1931, granting the divorce, the auquier Court held 
the Nevada decree of divorce to have een rendered under 
conditions "making it valid in the State: of Nevada and en-
titled to recognition in this jurisdiction,! which was .thereby 
'accorded it by the court', and by consen~ of parties the court 
approved all of said proposed amendm~nts, and in accord-
ance with said agreement, directed that the said contract be 
so amended in all respects, and that as at~nded said contract 
I 
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is hereby ratified and confirmed, and the said parties thereto 
are directed to per/ onn the same", all as agreed on, and 
directed the case to be placed on the stet docket (Tr., pp. 
10-11). 
10. That the said original agreement and the modification 
thereby evidenced constituted an entire and indivisible con-
tract; that the principle and controlling consideration there-
for moving to appellant was a valid ratification of said con-
tract, as modified, by the court and its judgment, that the 
parties should be '' directed to perform the same'', and that 
without compliance with this stipulation and agreement1 and 
its ratification as aforesaid by the court, that she never would 
have agreed thereto (par. 11, Trans., p. 11). 
11. That immediately after said consent decree, to-wit: 
on the day of October, 1933, the said defendant *re-
9* married and left said sons as contemplated in the cus-
tody of appellant, and each was continued at the schools 
they had been attending (Tr., p. 11). . 
12. That although appellee made the monetary payments 
of $375.00 per month to her as contemplated thereby, until 
March 1, 1937, he refused to dlsciess with JJ01tr petitioner 
any question touching what schools his sons should thereafter 
attend, or the courses to be followed therein (par. 12, Tr., p. 
11) ; that he constantly showed himself wholly disregardful 
of his obligations for the tuition, education and proper main-
tenance of his two sons under said modifications, though 
then attending schools originally agreed to by both parents ; 
that he had repeatedly subjected them to great mortification 
and shame by reason of his failure to meet their tuition bills 
at" maturity; failed to respond to letters from his children 
and from the school authorities calling his attention to his de-
linquency in that regard to such extent that during the 1933-34 
school term his sons were denied credit in the school stores 
for supplies, necessities and conveniences that other boys in 
their station in life attending said schools were permitted 
and expected to have, and were threatened with denial of 
scholastic scpres and honors won by them, and that he failed 
and refused to meet their necessary dental and medical bills 
all to the constant shame, mortification, mental suffering and 
injury of the said boys, as well as the appellant (Tr., p. 12). 
13. That this course was carried to such an extent that tho 
appellant was compelled to give her personal assurances as 
to the ultimate payment of these bills in order to continue 
them at such schools, and thereafter the •appellee re-
10• fused to discuss with the appellant any future plans for 
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the court, though by reason of his negllct in those· respects, 
as well as by their advance in years, [it was necessary to 
make changes in the schools they were ·lthen attending (Billt 
par. 13, Trans., p. 12). , 
14. That certain of these bills are stm unpaid. 
15. That after it became essential thatlarrangements should 
be made for the entry of the elder son ( J~mes A., IV) at some 
school other than at Fay, where he wa~ then attending with 
his father's original approval, while co~tinuing the younger , 
son, John R., Jr., at Fessenden, where [he had already been 
entered by mutual consent of both parties; in the Summer 
and Fall of 1934 appellant attempted to take this up with the 
a ppellee ; he again failed and refused ~o make to her any 
response to her suggestions in that rega1d, and appellant was forced to proceed to make tentative 31rrangements herself 
for the entry of James at the Hill Schopl at Pottstown, Pa., 
which she communicated to the said appellce, through said 
son James; that appellee led both of his children, and through 
them appellant to believe that he had ~cquiesced in the ar .. 
rangements that she had so arrived at, hut at the last moment, 
without foreknowledge or notice to the !appellant and while 
the children were temporarily visiting iim he undertook to 
force them to remain at his home under confinement, and 
attend a school at Warrenton daily fro~i his home as their 
residence, well-knowing that this arrangement would not be 
satisfactory to the appellant; was contra~y to the terms of the· 
said. agreements 'and to the best interes~s as well as the de ... · 
sires of both of said boys, with t~e result that •these 
n• two sons, without her knowledge or advice, escaped from 
their father's home in the rain, where he was holding 
them under confinement, and went in al bedraggled and un .. 
kemp condition to the home of a neighlfor, expressing their 
distress and dissatisfaction with the tr~atment proposed by 
their father; that this neig·hbor, after f rnishing them with 
dry clothing, telephoned appellant of the r presence and con-
dition, and she promptly drove to this h me, found her sons, 
who appealed to her to save them from 
1
these plans. After 
consulting counsel and others, in whose jt dgment she had con .. 
ficlence, she deemed it to be her duty, and o their best interest, 
in the exercise of the rights and duties a. cruing to her under 
the judgment of the court aforesaid, and he surrounding cir-
cumstances, took the matter up further ~iwith the authorities 
of the Hill school and succeeded in gett ng· them to consent 
to the entry therein of James A. Bu cha . an, IV, without the 
prepayment of tuition, as required of ot:her pupils, upon her 
assurances that she would present the fars to the cc;mrt, and 
I 
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use her best endeavors to secure an order -from the court 
ratifying her action and requiring the said John R. Buchanan 
to make the requisite payments, and John R., Jr., was con-
tinued ,at Fessenden, where he had previously been entered, 
with the initial consent of both appellant and appellee, which 
facts were later reported to the court, and each child remained 
at such schools for the sessions 1934-1935. (See par. 116, 
Trans., PP: 14-15.) 
. 16. That under the conditions thus existing in the Fall 
of 1934, arid complying with the assurances given the 
1241<' *Hill School, appellant on November 24th, 1934, filed in 
the Fauquier Court a petition setting out all the matters 
and things hereinbefore mentioned, as well as other derelic-
tions showing necessity for some action by the court in the 
protection of the children, and the fact that the appellee was 
in receipt of a princely income, arising from an estate of 
about a million and half dollars left by his father, about $500,-
000.00 of which belonged to him outright, and about $1,000,-
000.00 of which was left for his benefit for life ( under a spend-
thrift trust), with remainder to his and her children, who 
would ultimately inherit the principal; that the provisions of 
the will of the father of the defendant explained that '' the 
trusts created in and by this paragraph of this my will are 
. created by me for the express purpose of protecting my chil-
dren and descendam,ts from want and inconvenience by reason 
of the vicissitudes of life so far as reasonable foresight can 
prevent it'', she prayed that the proceedings instituted by 
appellee and the order of the court of September 29th, 1933, 
thereon first above mentioned might be restored to the active 
docket and be treated as a cross complaint therein, and that 
a ''proper order be entered making more flexible the pro-
visions of said decree for the·custody of said children during 
their vacations,. directions by your Honor for their proper 
· education and training, and that the said defendant be re-
quired to adopt a course to secure the prompt payment by 
him of all proper obligations and expenses incident to the 
proper education,. training, clothing and mai~tenance of his 
said children, as contemplated bJJ said contract as modified, 
according to their stations in life present •and prospec-
13•. tive. (See par. 16, Trans., pp. 14-15.) 
17. That appellee .appeared and waived service. of 
process and was· directed to answer, which he did without 
objection and prayed therein that his answer be treated as a 
cross petition, after admitting the truth of·many of the alle-
gations, denying some and attempting to excuse some .. By 
· consent of parties the cause was again set for hearing in 
i 
' i 
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chambers on March 21st, 1935 (pars. 13 a~d 17, Trans., p. 104) ; 
that it was so heard pursuant to this o der at ·Warrenton-
three days being taken in the presentat on of oral evidence, 
following which the court took the case under consideration 
until June 15th, 1935, when an order iwas entered, as the 
Transcript shows, pursu.ant to a suggestion erruvnating from 
counsel for appellee, that . exclusive cu~tody of each of the 
children should be given to one parent Ojl' the other, and also 
suggesting that the exclusive custody of ffiie daughter be given 
to the father; the exclusive custody of the elder son be given 
to the mother, and that the exclusive cuitody of the younger 
son be given as the court might think] best. (See Record 
#1885, p. 130.) I 
18. That following this, and a tall~ with each of said 
children by the court, out of the presence of their parents 
and of counsel, the court awarded the exclusive custody of 
the daughter to the a.ppellee, and of th¢ two sons to appel-
lant, with provisions for visiting theirj respective parents, 
and further directed, still following sug~stions of appellee 's 
counsel, that instead of the father paytng the maintenance 
and educational bills of the child~n, assigned •to the 
14* custody of their mother, as they ma ured, that he should 
pay specific sums 1n.onthly to the other for those pur-
poses, from which she should be require to pay their tuition 
and maintenance bills, in pursuance of which the court directed 
that in addition to $375.00 monthly the~ being paid her for 
the maintenance of a home under the consent order, that an 
additional sum of $375.00 be paid her ea~h month by appellee 
to cover the maintenance and educational expenses of the two 
boys until the further order of the coutjt, and that John R. 
Buchanan was responsible for all tuition o.ills already properly 
incurred and not paid by him. j 
19. That an order was accordingly entered on June 24th, 
1935 (Record #1885, p. 104), directing t e appellee to pay to 
appellant the sum of $375.00 per montl ion the first day of 
each and every. month thereafter until e further order of 
the court, to be applied by her at her di pretion in providing 
proper tuition and all scholastic expen es incident thereto 
for her two sons at such schools as 'she :may select; and all 
usual but not extraordinary medical a 'd physician's bills, 
according to their and their father's st tion in life, and in 
addition "all outstanding bills properly incurred since Sep-
tember, 1933, whether by the said John R. Buchanan or by 
Ruth Lester Buchanan, or otherwise, in connection with the 
education of the two boys and their att ndance at the Fes~ 
sen den or Hill Schools * '"' '"' , for their I clothing as well as 
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all medical, hospital, dental, physicians, surgeons and like 
bills properly and reasonably incurred in protecting and pre-
serving the health of· said boys to the extent not already 
paid by the said John R Buchanan. * • • •but :11r • * not 
15• being sufficiently advised as to the amount of such bills 
outstanding", and to whom they are due, referred the 
case to- W. N. Tiffany, a special commissioner for that pur-
pose t9 inquire into and report to the court the amount of 
all such bills after notice to the parties (Record #1885, pp. 
104 to 106). 
20. That appellee com.plied with this order from July 1st, 
1935, until March 1st, 1937, in so far as it directed the pay-
ment of $375.00 per month to your petitioner for the educa-
tion and maintenance of her two sons, in addition to paying 
her $375.00 per month towards the establishment of a home 
-for them, during which period, to-wit:. on September 11th, 
1935, Commissioner Tiffany returned his report showing out-
standing bills incurred between the dates mentioned, as fol-
lows: 
The Fessenden School, West Newton, Mass. 
The Hill School 
,Jasper J. Stahl, a tutor, 
Athletic Supply Stores, Pottstown, Pa. 
William Cabell Moore, Washing-ton, 
Charles D. Cole. of Washington 
Dr. Arthur L. Morse of Boston, Mass. 










the latter for "miscellaneous expenses and purchases made 
to and for her two boys" (Tr., p. 24). 
21. That this report was made after notice to the parties 
at which all appeared and testified, and but one exception 
was taken to it by appellee and that only to the debt re-
ported in the favor of the Hill School and upon grounds go-
ing to its merits which were _ overruled. This report con-
firmed by order of the court on October 15th, 1935, and 
16,ffr *judgments then awarded in fa.vor of each of the credi- · 
_ tors therein mentioned for the sums stated with interest 
from July 1st, 1935, until paid. No appeal was ever taken 
from either of these judgments, and as above stated John R. 
Buchanan complied with the decree of June 24th, l 935, from 
,Tuly 1st, 1935 to March 1st, 1937, inclusive, but never com-
plied with the order of October 15th, 1935 (See pars. 20 and 
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defan!t in the payment of both the in~tallments of $375.00 
accrurng under the consent order of S~ptember 29th, 1933, 
as well as a like amount accruing under tlie order of June 15th, 
1935 (Par. 21, Tr., p. 25). i · 
22. That thereafter appellant secured a rule against the 
appellce to show cause wl1y he sho1:1ld \not l?e attached for 
his contempt. in those regards. At a : hearing thereon on 
May 14th, '1937, in which the entire pro~eeding herein]?efor~ 
recited was introduced in evidence, and !the only defense of ... 
f ered was that the consent order of September 25th, _ 1933, 
and the judgments of .. Tune and October, 1935, were all ab.-
solutely null and void because of lack o~ jurisdiction of the 
subject matter by the court, the Circuit Court entered an 
order upholding the validity of all of th~ judgments and at-
taching the appellee herein fo_r his co~tempt in failing to 
pay said installments of $375.00 each p~r mo.nth. To which 
judgment the appellee applied for and seoured from this court 
a_ writ of error and s1.tpersedeas. · I 
23. That after hearing this court held (170 Va. 458), 
first, that the consent judgment of S~ptember, 1933, was 
void in so far as it undertook to alter the property rights 
17• *of the parties thereto, but that '!' it was evidence of 
binding contractural obligations", but it also treated the 
petition of November, 1934, in said cause I" as an independent 
action at law instituted bv minor chi.ldlren and a divorced 
wife to compel a :father to' pay out of ¥s income a definite 
sum · each month for the future suppout, maintenance ancj 
education of his minor children''; that it'. was 
I 
I 
'' an a~tion at law to recover necessaries furnished by a thir~ 
party to a father's minor children, basedi on the common law 
obligation of the father.'' ! 
that it is "not an action at law to recJver damages for a 
breach of contract"; that ''the contract etween mc;,ther and 
father was not before this court for onstruetion" (page 
477); that though the trial court had j risdiction up~>n the -
petition filed by the mother, even if im roper parties were 
joined to determine the custody of the :hildren "it had no 
juriE'diction or power in the proced11,re a opted to determine 
the question of compensation for, f,ttt1.1, e maintenance and ...._ 
education of the two boys", and without fas sing on the ''va-
lidity of the judgments against him fo unpaid accounts,, 
(170 Va. 458-471) held, page 473: 
"The judgment of the court on its common law .c;ide so far 
as it attempted in this case by minors to !compel their. father 
I. 
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to provide them an income out of his estate for their future 
support and education is void.'' 
24. That under these circumstances appellant as sole 
custodian of said children, imposed on her under and by 
virtue of a valid decision, thus affirmed by this court, ancl 
the rights and interests accruing to both herself and to them, 
was uncertain of her own right, duties and obligations 
18* in *the premises as affecting herself and/or her chil-
dren, and her former ·husband; that she needed the 
g'Uidance, direction and protection of a court of equity and 
conscience in all of the respects (par. 23), and charged (Tr., 
p. 28)-
( a.) that the agreement of May 18th, 1931, was a subsist-
ing and binding contract between herself and her said hus-
band; that as recog·nized, adopted and decreed by the Nevada 
Court it was a binding adjudication in respect to said con-
tract, and the custody of said children, and as such entitled 
to full faith and credit and enforcement in this state and be-
fore its courts under the Constitution of the United States 
(Art. IV, .Sec. 1), as well as the rules of comity as a valid 
judgment and entitled to specific enforcement under the laws 
of Virginia, independent of the Federal Constitutional pro-
visions in that respect, or the rule of comity, as a valiq con-
tract for the common benefit of herself and children and those 
furnishing· materials or services thereunder and was still so 
binding except to the extent that it may have been validly 
amended by the consent decree aforesaid of Sept. 29th, 1933, 
which latter she alleged evidenced an entire contract entered 
into between the parties for the benefit of each of their chil-
dren one of the essential elements of which was its valid rati-
fication in its entirety by a valid order of court, and a valid 
direction therein imposing on appellee, as well as herself, 
the decretal obligation to perform it under the order and 
supervision of the court (Par~ 24). 
(b) That she gave her consent to the order of Sept., 1931, 
in the utmost good faith and under the firm conviction 
19* •induced by advice of her counsel that said decree would 
be binding and enforcible by the court in its enfirety 
at the instance of either party thereto, or any bene.ficiary 
thereunder, and that the a.ppellee also consented to said con-
sent decree under the same conviction and belief (Par. 25-
Tr., p. 29). 
(c) (Par. 26) That after the appellee had failed and 
refused to comply with said supposedly amended contracts 
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in certain vital respects, set out in para aph 16 thereof, and 
while he continued to comply with some of the other provi-
sions thereof she, acting on the belief f oresa.id of. the va-
lidity of said decree in its entirety, filed her petition of No-
vember 26th, 1934, on behalf of herself a d her children, and 
others who had furnished them necessit es. for their educa-
tion, maintenance and support on the fa1th of said contract 
as modified, to which the appellee, actipg under the same 
belief, filed his answer and cross-bill thereto and prayed re-
lief thereunder against the appellant (Tt, p. 29). 
( d) (Par. 27) That neither party hat ever doubted the 
validity or binding effect of the consent rder of Sept. 29th, 
1933, either in so far as it was based on c. nsent, or so far as 
independent of consent, it recognized the validity of the 
Nevada. decree, nor the power of the court! to order or enforce 
it, until long aft.er the orders of June 15th, 1935, and Octo-
ber 1st, 1935, were entered (Tr., p. 30). 
( e) That it was only after the ·Court at the suggestion 
of counsel for appelle(~ made to the court in appellee 's pres-
ence, had determined to vary the terms of the consent or-· 
der as to the custody of the children, by giving the sole 
custody of the daughter and control of hrr education to the 
· appellee, and he had availed hims;f thereof, and by 
20* giving the *like custody of both bo s to the appellaµt 
and that he be required to pay st ted sums monthly 
thereafter for that purpose to appellant for expenditure at 
her discretion in, providing· proper tuition, clothing and sup-
port '.' according to their station in life,'' !s suggested by the 
a ppellee 's orig'inal counsel, after the def eiidant had employed 
new counsel, and after such new counsel had attended · the 
hearings before the Commissioner, Tiffanj', and had excepted 
to his report on other grounds, and had so~ght unsuccessfully 
to prevent its confirmation as aforesaid, had either the ap-
pellee or any of his counsel entertained or expressed any 
doubt as to the binding authority of sai orders in any re-
spect, .nor had appellant entertained sue doubt until after 
this court so dec]ared and refused a reh aring (Tr., p. 30)~ 
(f) (Par. 28) That the provision of t e decree of June 
24th, 1935, for the payment of specific sums 'pf $375.00 monthly 
to appellant, though for less amounts, w s but a reversion 
to the plan underlying the original contra t of 1931, wherein · 
the defendant had agreed to pay and had p id to the petitioner 
specific sums at the rate of $500.00 per m nth for each child, 
($1,500.00 per month for all) to be applie at her discretion 
for the maint~nauce, support and clothi of each of .said 
children, which later provision, in lieu the : eof, was not only 
much more favorable to the appellee than, the first, whether 
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singly or in combination, but in addition insured the father 
against all expenses incident to theh- education, which under 
the original contract of 1931 and the Nevada decree, and 
the consent decree, the defendant was to pay in addition to • 
the sums so required to be paid for mere clothing sub-
21 * sistence •and maintenance of a home (Tr., pp. 31 an,l 
32). 
(g) (Par. 30) That the purpose in calling attention to 
the repeated and long continued acquiescence of the appellee 
in performing· these several judgments, springing from the 
agreement to modify the contract of 1931, evidenced by the 
consent order of September 1933, was not to assert the 
validity of those orders, contrary to the decision of this 
Court, but to show, first, that the contract evidenced by it 
being entire, and the vital element that the Court should di-
rect its performance being eliminated the contract if void 
. was· void in its entirety, and resulted in such a material mis-
take of law and fact, mutual and continued, on the part of 
both the appellant and the appellee until April 1st, 1937;' at 
least, and on the part of the appellant until the final de-
termination otherwise by this court in its refusal to rehear 
the cause on ,June 18th, 1938, as to require its annullment 
and the·revival of the contract and Nevada decree thought to 
be amended thereby, and, second, to show that independent 
of mistake and as more clearly charged by the amendment 
to said paragraph (Tr., p. 33) that even though valid in all 
respects the repeated failure and refusal of the_ said appellee 
to perform any of the terms of the said contract had amounted 
to a. repudiation thereof by the appellee and itself constituted 
such a failure of the consideration as to necessitate the 
·. 22• · •cancellation and rescission thereof, and the revival by 
the court of the contract of May 18th, 1931, and the 
decree of the Nevada Court irrespective of the void attempt 
to amend it. 
(h) (Par. 31) That pending that litigation, between April 
1st, 1937, and September 1st, 1938, there had been incurre4 
by her debts due and unpaid, to those furnishing them, for 
goods or services in the amount of $3,077.75, represented by 
unpaid bills in addition to those decreed to be paid under 
the October, 1935, order; that she had paid from her personal 
· funds for the same purposes $3,224.13, all as set out in an 
itemized statement thereof filed as Exhibits "A" and "B". 
and that there was due under the agreement, evidenced 
by the consent decree of September, 1933, for the mainte-
nance of a home for herself and her sons the additional sum 
of $6,750.00 as of September 1st, 1938, if the agi~eement 
thereby evidenced is subsisting, TI?aking a total of $9,974.13 
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plus interest, due lier personiilly undJ the provisions o:I' 
said consent decrM, and its subsequent lmodification~ as in-
cident to the change of custody and exclusive or the bills i11-
c~rred, and being incurred since for their!\maintenance, educa ... 
tion and support (Tr., p. 34). · 
(i) (Par. 32) That doubt existed as to! wh'ether the mutual 
mistakes and misapprehensions, both of !Jaw and fact, under· 
which the agreement aforesaid of Septepiber, 1933, was en-
tered into; or t~e- failure of the consid~ration. i~ducing ap-
pellant to enter mto the same, resulting ! 
. I 
(a) from the nullity of the order evid~ncing it and direct• 
mg its performance, or ! 
(b) from its repudiation by and reftjsal of the appellee 
to perform it, said agreement had been invalidated, or should 
be cancelled, or whether it and f,e said order ··are 
23* •void in their entirety, with the result in either case 
that the rights and liabilities of all parties revert to 
and must be settl~d under and accordink to the provisions 
of the original contract of May, 1931, as ~dopted and decreed 
by the Nevada Court of July, 1931, or ~ndependent of that 
decree should it be held that the Nevada decree is null and 
void in any respect for lack of jurisdicltion of the subject 
matter (Tr., p. 35). '. 
(j) (Par. 33) That in the latter case tlie item of $6,750.00, 
last above mentioned, (being· for sums dtle her for defaulted 
. installments of $375.00 per month accruing under the con-
sent decree for maintenance· of the home) (should be increased 
to the sum of $48,625.00-that being th~ aggregate- of the 
monthly installments at $1,000.00 per mohth accruing to 'her 
under the contract of May, 1931, from .f une, 1933, to Sep-
tember, 1938,-after giving the appellee c edit for the install_. 
men ts of $375.00 per month actually _paid between November 
1st, 1933 and March 1st, 1937, for the s e purpose as set 
out in detail in exhibit "C" :filed with tl e Bill (Tr., pp. 35; '. 
36, 41-48). 
(k) (Par. 34) That in addition to the liabilities incurred 
by her under the circumstances aforesaid, 'nd set out in para-
graphs 30 to 33, and whether the unpaid ills should be paid 
to her by the appellee and she be permi ted or required to 
pay them to the creditors to whom they! are justly due, or 
whether the appellee sl10uld be required to pay them to the 
,parties to whom they are now due, that in addition ther.eto, 
and independent thereof the bills afor 1said, - specified in 
paragraph 20, for which judgments were ntered on the 15th ' 
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day of October, 1935, are now good and valid debts of 
24~ the said ~appellee, and that he should be required to 
pay them and discharge her from the moral, if not the 
legal obligations which she assumed in respect thereto in 
order to continue the proper education, maintenance and care 
of his and her children, all as contemplated by all of said 
contracts, however evidenced (Tr., p. 36). 
(1) (Par. 35) That owing to the delay heretofore incurred 
lJy those who have supplied her and her said children with 
the necessary facilities for the proper education, maintenance 
and support of her said children, that her resources, as well 
as her credit, has been exhausted; that she has no source 
of income except the monthly payments of interest made 
by the appellee, and the income arising from a remnant of 
about $5,000,00 of the $25,000.00 in cash paid her by the ap-
pellee at the signing of the contract of May, 1931; that such 
income is wholly insufficient to meet the bills necessary to 
be incurred at this u most important and crucial period in 
the life of each of her sons, all to their irremediable injury 
and damage throughout their respective live (Tr., p. 35). 
(m) (Par. 36) That an actual controversy touching all the 
matters and things aforesaid existed and the necessity for a 
declaratory judgment in respect to them; the absence of 
any adequate remedy at law, and the necessity of a mul-
tiplicity of suits at law to settle the various questions at issue 
if any remedy at law existed (Tr., p. 38). 
The prayer of the Bill '' on behalf of herself and all other 
persons interested in said contracts, and any modifications 
thereof", was :-that the said infant children be taken un-
der the care, supervision and protection of the co1,1rt; that 
appellant be accorded the right to apply to the court 
25* · from *time to time for such care, protection and guid-
ance; that the court determine which of said contracts 
and agreements, or what parts of either, contain and embody 
the present and subsisting contracts, or evidence the same, 
and the extent to w·hich they or either of them have been 
validly amended; that the said appellee be required to per-
form the same as so ascertained in its entirety, and provide 
for the proper care, maintenance and education of the cl1ildren 
committed to her care and custody, all to the end that the 
appellee be required to perform all his obligations to her, 
her said children, and their said creditors whether arising 
under said original contract, or any modifications thereof, or 
by operation of law; that a declaratory judgment be entered· 
fi:x;ing the rig·hts, duties and obligations of all the parties, 
I 
'I 
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the one to the other, past and future ; iat the same as so 
ascertained be declared a lien on all of his property, real 
and personal, and especially on all of his right, title and in-
terest in the Leny Manor property, as 'fell as in any other 
real estate of which his father died seisec"f: and possessed, and 
in which he had an interest; that from tjme to time, and as 
necessity therefor arises, compliance with such judgment be 
required and enforced by appropriate orders and proceed-
ings and pending final ascertainment a~ adjudication that 
the appellee be required to pay to the !appellant a specific 
sum sufficient to enable her, under the di~ections of 'the court 
to provide the adequate and proper education, maintenance 
and support of her. said children for the maintenance of a 
home for herself and said children ! in accordance with 
26* their station in life, *present and !prospective, all ·as 
contemplated in said contracts, or\ a.rising under tho 
law; that all necessary inquiries, accouits and reports. be 
taken and reporte.d to the court, and for general and special 
relief including attorney's fees (Tr., ppi 39-40). 
Fo11owing the filing of ·this bill the appellant filed a mo-
tion for a pendente lite order for paymeJit to her or to such 
other depository as the court may designate sums sufficient 
to enable her under the direction of the cpurt to provide for 
the adequate and proper education, maint~mance and support 
of the infant children, including costs and proper attorneys 
fees (Tr., p. 49). l 
The appellee appeared and filed writte:q objections to such 
an order, upon the g-rounds (Tr., pp. 50-5i). 
I • 
(1) that the matters set up in the bil\ of complaint had 
been adjudicated adversely to the appell~nt in the final de"" 
cree and judgment of this court of March 10th, 1938, 170 Va. 
478· · J (2) That the appellant was estopped by the aforesaid final 
decision from attempting to compel appe ee to pay periodic 
sums for the education, support and m intenance of the 
two sons, and 
(3) That under the facts set forth the ourt was without 
power to afford the relief prayed in sue ! motion, and that 
any order or decree directing such pay ent would be null 
and void. 
The appellant moved to strike from the re ord these grounds 
of objection (Tr., p. 51). 
The court by its decree of October 12th, 1 sustained the_mo-
tion to strike the first and second groun,s, and denied the 
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appellant's motion for the pendente relief 011 the third ground 
stated, to which respective rulings the appellant and the ap-
pellee each excepted. 
27* *Thereafter the appellee filed a demuner and a spe-
cial plea to said bill (Tr., pp. 52-55), and by decree en-
tered November 28th, 1938, both were set down to be argued 
on December 19th, 1938 (Tr., p. 61), on which day they were 
argued and taken under consideration by the court until April 
7th, 1939,. when, after permitting the appellant to amend her 
bill (Tr., p. 62), and the appellee to amend his demurrer (Tr., 
p. 63), the court sustained the demurrer without written 
opinion and without specification of any particular groul'ld 
other than to state orally that whether the existing rights of 
th~ parties arise under the origfoal contract or the amended 
contract that the court could not enforce either specifically 
and dismissed the plaintiff's bill (Tr., p. 64). 
To the action of the court in so susta.ining the demurrer 
and dismissing the bill the appellant excepted upon the 
ground that none of the grounds of demurrer assigned were 
well taken. · 
Though the grounds of demurrer stated in writing by the 
appellee are ten in number they really present but three 
gTound~, which may be summarized as follows: 
(1) That the appellaht has an adequate remedy at law: 
(a) Because any decree rendered could only be for money, 
and hence an action at law would afford an adequate remedy, 
and therefore no necessity for cancellation or specific per-
formance or a declaratory judgment. (First four grounds 
of demurrer.) 
(b) Because a prayei· for a declaratory judgment does 
not constitute basis for equity jurisdiction. (Grounds 
28* *5 and 6). 
(2) Because the bill is multifarious in that it combines 
claims of other persons with the claims of the defendants 
will no common interest (Ground 7). 
(3) Because appellant is without right or remedy, either 
at law or in equity 
(a) to assert that the contract evidenced by the consent 
decree is vitiated, and the pre-existing contract and decree 
be restored in its entirety on the ground that the decree evi-
dencing the amendment is void, because the amending contract 
contains no provision to that effect, and such a- provision 
cannot be supplied by oral testimony ( Ground 8) .. 
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(b) Because even if the contract, evi Jenced by the consent 
decree is vitiated for failure of consi)f eration equity can• 
not restore the first contract, because ,t was itself vitiated 
by the void agreement ( Ground 8 (a) ) . I · 
( c) That the mistake alleged is one of law and therefore 




ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
I 
1st. The Court erred in dismissing tl:ie motion of the ap-
pellant for temporary allowances pendepte lite for the sup ... 
port and education of the children and ~or attorneys fees. 
2nd. The Court erred in dismissing the bill on demurrer. 
I 
These assignments will be- taken up in the inverse order. 
29• * ARGUMENT*. 
Without discussing each ground of qemurrer, it will be 
helpful to review the legal ~md equitabl1situation resulting 
from the original maintenance contract of May, 1931; its 
incorporation into the decree of the Ne, ada Court; its at-
tempted amendment by the consent order 1pf September, 1933; 
the ultimate refusal of the appellee to c~mf orm thereto; the 
attempted enforcement of the consent decree; the attempted 
cha.nges in the method of financing and ct-istody, suggested by 
appellee 's counsel, for a period partially acquiesced in by 
him; the ad in.terim furnishing of necessary maintenance, 
educational and medical supplies and selrvices to the bene-
ficiaries by the mother and others on the f ith of such modify-
ing· decrees ; the subsequent absolute ref sal of the appellee 
to further abide by either of said con tr . ts, or' any of said 
decrees; his final repudiation of all lia ility under any of 
them, and the nullification by this court .f all orders of the 
court so far as they purported to give ju icial force to modi-
fications of property rights, and thereby t . ascertain to what 
extent all or any of these things and the acts of the parties 
thereto have brought the resulting situati n within the orbit 
of the jurisdiction of a court of equity. 
Not pausing to discuss whether equit is only a system 
of remedies for rights already existing t common law or 
in addition creates and enforces rights a w~ll as remedies· 
I 
*(Italics are supplied throughout this discussion unless o herwise indicated.) 
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. not known to the common law, it is contended *thaJ the 
ao• · following conditions and rights resulted from the facts 
alleged in the bill, each and any of which bring this case 
within the orbit of equitable jurisdiction. 
1st. That the Original Con.tract for Separate Maintenance 
Was for an Annuity the Mai'li Purposes of Which .Were to 
Secure -(a) The Prope·r Maintenance of Appellant and Her 
Children, and (b) Their Proper Education. in Accordance 
With Prescr·ibed Standards Therein Stated, and 11' as En-
/orcable ·Only in Equity Independent of Statute. 
'' .An annuity in strict sense, is a yearly payment of a cer-
tain sum of money granted to another in fee or for li.f e or f o·r 
y~(JJrs, and chargeable only on the person of a grantor. ~ 
Cyc. 459; 2 Minor Real Estate 31 ". Dula1ney v. Dulaney, 105 
Va. 429, 433. 
Equity has · always exercised its jurisdiction to enforce 
specific performance of contracts for an apnuity, presumably 
upon the ground that the remedy at law was in adequate, and 
the equitable remedy avqided a multiplicity of suits, espe-
cially where liability has been renounced by the grantor. 
Marshall v. Thompson, 2' Munf. 412. , 
In that case a bill in equity to enforce payment of an an-
nuity accruing not to a wife from a husband but to a fe'Jne 
sole, not secured' by a lien but' in arrears was enforced in 
equity by the trial court by a decree only requiring payment 
of arrears to the date of the decree . 
. On appeal by the defendant therein this court ruled (p. 
413): 
"If the agreement stated * • * has not been relinquished 
"" * • she should not have been limited bv the decree of the 
court below to the -·annuities which had already actually 
fallen due before the date, but liberty ought to have been re-
served to her thereby to apply to the court from time to time 
to extend its decree so as to embrace all the annuities there-
after falling due during her life.~' 
31 r.1jc *This case was cited with approval by the Supreme 
Court of Illinois in P1leming v. Peterson, 167 Il1. 456, 47 
N. E. 755, involving a separate maintenance agreement made 
-between a divorced husband and his former wife after a final 
divorce decree which allowed alimony and permitted the 
· ,wife to resume· her maiden name. .Afterward and 'in reliance 
Ruth L. Buchanan, v. J. R .. Buchanan. 21 
on the post divorce .contract the decree jor alimony was sat-
isfied, and released. After def a ult in )he annuity specific 
performance was ordered. The appell~te court examined 
all the authorities, English, Irish and .Almerican then avail-
able, and said p. 755: l 
I 
'' The only question * * * to consider ~s whether * * * the 
case is one for equitable jurisdiction. .Appellant insists that 
a bill in equity cannot be brought in such a case, but that there 
is an a.dequate remedy at law. The contfact, like the decree, 
provided for the payment of permanent 11 limony in the form 
of quarte1·ly installments. It was to all i tents and purposes 
an annuity, as that term is used in its .roader sense. The 
fact that these installments were secured ~y the deed of trust 
is immaterial, as appellee was not bound to rely upon the 
security. But little authority on the que~tion is to be found 
"' * * in this country, but the English re·borts contain many 
cases in point, and show that it has be~n held almost uni-
formly that a court of equity has juriscllction in such cases 
to decree the specific performance of th~ contract. In the 
case at bar the contract provides for per~odical payments as 
alimony during the uncertain period of the life of appellee, 
or until she s\1all remarry. If she were tp proceed at law to 
recover the installments as they become! due, she would be 
compelled to bring· f o'Ur suits each year, 8Jlld a· remedy which 
would subject her to the necessity of bringing so many suits, 
and to the expense and delays which wquld be incident to 
ihem, to recover that u,hich from its very 1iat1.1,re was intended 
to ·be paid to her at regula-r stated perio¢s for he_r support 
and maintenance, could hardly be called !complete and ade-
quate. .Appellant says it cannot be preslljDled that he would 
continue his refusal to pay, and thus m~ke so many suits 
necessary. We must take the case las the record pre-
32* sents it. He has refu .. c;ed *to pay ithout any reason 
or excuse for such refusal. At the ime of the decree 
there were five quarterly installments · ich were unpaid, 
and we know of no reason why it can be [ presumed that he 
will voluntarily pay hereafter. · 
"It is urged * • * that the present va uc of the annuity 
may be ascertained in an action at law, a U she may recover 
such present value in a lump sum, and tha in such an action 
her legal remedy is adequate and complete. I It may, we think, 
well be assumed the contract for alimony . following the de-
cree which it satisfied, makes a more app : opria.te and valu-
able provision for her support and mainte ance than a judg-
ment for its present value in a lump sum 
I 
ould prove to be, 
and she ought not to be compelled, at the el ction of the party 
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in default, to accept something in satisfaction so different in, 
its nature, and possibly in value as well, simply because the 
law, in its unbending forms of procedure have· no other 
remedy * ~ *; still it is clear from the Gases that the equitable 
jurisdiction of the court was based on the broader ground 
that a complete and fully adequate remedy could, as a gen-
eral rule, be had in such cases only in courts of eqit.ity. Thus 
in Keenan v. Hmidley, 2 De Gex J. & S. 283 * * * which was 
approved on appeal, upon a bill to enforce an agreement to 
make a deed g-ranting- an annuity, it was said that 'a court 
of equity, if there wa-s no agreement to execute a deed, bid only 
an agree1nent to pay woiild make an order not only of arrears, 
but of the fiiture instaUrnents as they become due' ", "and 
so in Carberry v. Weston,, 1 Brown Parl Case 429, an old 
case brought in the court of chancery in Ireland affirmed by 
the High Court of Parliament, the defense was that there 
was an adequate remedy at law; but it was held otherwise, 
and it was decreed that the defendant should pay the com-
plainant the arrears of the annuity, and also the growing 
annuity according· to the covenants of the deed, with liberty 
to resort to the court for such further directions as should 
from time to time be thought necessary. See also Manley v. 
Hawk-ins, 1 Dry. & ·war. 363; Cupit v. Jackson, 13 Pric. 721. 
In Marshall v. Thonipson, 2 Munf. 412, the only American 
case to which our attention has been called as bearing directly 
upon the question-it does not appear that the question of 
equity jurisdiction was raised, and there was some question 
in the case as to whether or not a receipt of a release given 
by the annuitant was or was not obtained by fraud or mis-
·take. The court, however, in the opinion said that 'she should 
not have been limited by the decree of the court below to the 
annuities which had actually fallen due before the date, 
33* but that liberty ought to have been *reserved to her 
thereby to apply to the court from time to time to ex-
tend this decree, so as to embrace all the annuities thereafter 
falling due during her life'''. ''Swift v. Swift, 3 Ir.iEq. 267, 
decided by Lord Chancellor Plunket in 1841, was a case very 
similar to the one at bar, one of the principal grounds of the 
defense being that there was an adequate remedy at law, but 
it was held that equity had jurisdi~tion. Among other things, 
in the opinion, it was said: 'The plaintiff here seeks not an 
indemnity against any contract she entered into; she seeks 
the perfor-mance of a personal contract entered into with her 
by the defendant; and the relief which she seeks is that which 
can be afforded her onl11 in. a court of equity, namely, the per-
formance of that contract in its very terms by the def en-da;nt. 
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this contract, and that therefore, this <'<>Ji.t should not inter• 
fere. Now, the remedy at law could only be obtained in Qne 
of two ways, either by at once recovering[ damages for all the 
breaches that might occur during the j-oint lives of her~elf 
.and the defendant, or by bringing four aJctions· in ~ach year, 
and recovering in each the amount of a( quarterly payment 
of the annuity. These are the two modes of redress open to 
the plaintiff at law. I am called on to refuse relief here on 
the ground that such remedies are equa~y as beneficial and 
effectual for the plaintiff as that which the court could ·afford. 
To refuse relief on such a ground would inot, in my opinion, 
be a rational administration of justice. 1 I do not see that 
there is any authority for refusing relief, i and certainly there 
is no foundation in reason for doing so • iw •. Applying this 
to the present case, leaving the plaintiff\ to proceed at law, 
and ~o get dama,qes at once, for all the Qreaches that might 
occur during the joint lives of her and th~ defendant; would,· 
in effect be altering the entire nature of tje contract that she 
. entered into. It would be compelling· her I to accept a certain 
sum; a sum to be ascertained by the co·njecture of a jury as 
to what was the value of the annuity. '];his would be most. 
unreasonable and unjust. Her contract W¥ for. the periodical 
paynient of certain sums during an uncertain period. She 
was entitled to a certain sum of money, \and she agreed to 
give up that for an annuity for her own and the defendant's 
lives; and to insist on her now accepting a certain sum of 
money in the shape of damages for it would be, in effect, to 
make her convert into money what she,! having in money, 
exchanged for an annuity. As to her r~orting four times 
every year to a court o:f law for each quarterly payment or 
this annuity, it is a man,ifest absurdity to call that a bene-. 
ficial or effectual remedy for the plaintif; and resting the 
case on that ground, alone, I think I am warranted by 
34• ,the big·hest ""authority in granting 'he relief sought'. 
And further: 'the contract is for p yment by install-
ments of a. sum the amount of which it is i possible ,to ascer--
tain, depending, as it cloes, upon the conti uance 9f the lives 
of the plaintiff and of the defendant. I a warranted, there-
fore, by the high authority of Lord ~ard eke in saying that 
the circumstance that the contract betwee the parties is to 
have continuance during the joint lives o. the plaintiff and 
the defendant is sufficient to authorize mego entertain a bill 
for its performance in specie. Such a ·urisdiction, Lord 
Hardwicke says, ought to be exercised wi · great caution in 
cases of personal chattels-an observatioi in which I fully 
concur-but the present appears to me t be a case calling 
. . 
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for its exercise'. We are of the opinion that the general 
principle announ~~d in these cases is applicable to the case 
at bar, and that the case does not lie beyond the bounds of 
equity jurisdiction .. '' 
It is difficult to conceive of. a precedent more fully parallel-
ing the circumstances of the case at ha r. 
That was a case in which a purely legal right was enforced 
in equity by a purely pecuniary decree, and for which the 
plaintiff had an unquestioned legal remedy, of which equity 
took jurisdiction for reasons identical with the reasons here 
existing, in that from its very nature the installments there 
as here ''were intended to be paid at regular stated periods 
for her support and maintenance", and that the relief she 
seeks and was entitled to "is that which can be afforded her 
only in a. court of equity, namely the performance of that con-
tract in its very terms''. Is it not apparent that such per-
formance is the very essence and life blood of the contract? 
In the court below appellee relied on a New York case, 
Thlomtpso·n v. Thompson., 165 N. Y. 892, which though recog-
nizing that at common law courts of equity would enforce 
such contracts between husband and wife whether entered 
into before or after divorce at the instance of a former wife 
yet refused specific performance there because under 
35* the New York State *Statute a married woman could 
contract with her husband and sue.him; that there was 
no longer any necessity for specific performance. The only 
party and beneficiary under that contract was the wife her-
self. No notice was there taken, of the facts, (a) that the 
grantee of an annuity contracted for support and maintenance 
was entitled to its performance in the 'lJery manlfl,er it was 
contracted for, or (b) that a mere action at law for damages 
in such case was not adequate, or ( c) that the actions for 
the installments as they matured were not so adequate and 
complete as the remedy in equity; or ( d) that such action 
would involve a multitude of suits all of which were pointed 
out in Fleniing v. Peterson, supra, 167 Ill. 465; 47 N. E. 755, 
fallowing Marshall v. Thompson, 2 Munf. 412, supra, nor ( e) 
the rule consistently followed in Virginia that statutes re-
quiring or permitting· law courts to exercise jurisdiction over 
cases previously cognizable in equity alone did not in the 
absence of express words or necessary implication deprhre 
equity of its pre-existing jurisdiction, nor that a statute was 
ever necessary to enable a divorced wife to sue at law a 
former husband. . 
The New York case so relied on did not cite a single au-
thority to sustain its conclusion, and mentioned only Flemin.lJ 
.j 
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v. Peterson, 167 Ill.; as holding to the coptrary, with no ref-
erence to the cogent reason assigned the~efor, nor any of the . 
cases cited in that opinion and contented itself with only 
stating· " we do not approve it". 1 
The correct and generally recognized I rule is thus stated· . 
in 9 Ruling Case Law, Section 353 Divo;ce and Separation: 
36"" ~''From an early date courts of equity assumed juris-
diction to enforce separation ag-reements- between hus-
band and wife by which the husband w4s to pay a certain 
amount for the wife's separate maintenance. ·while courts of 
equity will not decree the specific perfonpance of the agree-
ment to live apart, they will enforce the payment of the allow-
ances stipulated in such in~truments to ~e paid by the hus-
band to the wife, and other covenants entered into by him 
in -consideration of the separation. A third party to whom 
the payment is to be made for the wife's \benefit is a trustee 
and as such entitled under the code pracltice to maintain in 
his own name an action to enforce the \ trust. Where the 
trustee refused to sue, the wife had beqn permitted to do 
so. If husband and wife are sepafated urnfler a mutual agree· .. 
ment providing for the monthly payments of money by him 
for her separate support in consideratiop of his becoming 
possessed of her property, payments ac~rning under such 
agTeement may be decreed in equity on behalf of the wife 
on the gTound that the husband's possessibn of her property 
for the purpose of support fastens upon\ him the duty and 
ob1iga.tion to maintain her. In such a case the husband may 
be required to satisfy out of the income dt his business and 
property any deficiency arising in the a~ounts received by 
him from her property, required to meet liis agreed monthly 
payments to her. On the question whet~er the court may 
make an allowance to the wife for attorner fees in an action 
based on a separation agreement, the cas s in this country 
are not in accord.'' 
This rule was recog·nized and followed ,
1 
by this court in 
E'.CJdltner- v. Eschner, 146 Va. 417, 423, an by necessary im-
plication in this case when dealing with th i case at bar when 
it was here previously 170 Va. 458, it said, . 4 70: 
. ''The allegations in the petition do no conform to alle-
gations of a bill in equity by a divorced wife to compel specific 
performance, by a for1ner husband, of a c ntract to pay the 
1.vife an· annuity as was the case in Eschn r v. Eschner, 146 
Va. 417, 131 S.- E. 800." 
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Counsel for appellee attempted in the lower court to 
37* ~distinguish Esclvne-r v. Esch.1/'1,er on the ground that the 
question of jurisdiction was waived in that case. It 
was waived after it was raised, doubtless because counsel 
came to the conclusion it was without merit, and the court 
of course concurred therein. Otherwise under the doctrine 
enforced in this case when here before that waiver of con-
sent cannot confer jurisdiction the court would have been 
forced to dismiss the bill notwithstanding the waiver. 
Moore v. Crutchfield, 136 Va. 24, relied on by appellee in 
the court below is not contrary to these principles and does 
not deal with the real questions here involved. · 
The contract there in question was not for an am,nuity or 
for installment payments of any kind, nor was it adopted or 
.incorporated into the divorce decree. It only approved a 
contract entered into between the parties settling their prop-
erty rights, and which bound the divorced husband to pay 
the wife a single lump sum to be paid on a future indefinite 
event which did not occur until after the wife's death. The 
lower court had apparently held that such was not a decree 
for alimony, and could not be enforced in the divorce suit. 
This conclusion was never appealed from and never pre-
sented nor passed on by this court, though apparently 
·acquiesced in. i'he plaintiff later sued at law on the stipu-
lated sum. No question of the power of a court of equity to 
enforce a separate mainteria.nce agreement was raised in 
either suit. ·The action was at law and the court held that 
the settlement was binding though the wife died before it 
matured, and coi1U be enforced at law. There was no occa-
sion or necessity for equitable interposition and the question 
was never raised. 
The same is true of McComb v. Newman, 112 Va. 408, also 
cited by appellee in the court below. That was f,simply 
38~ an action of assumpsit ~t law on an agreement for prop-
erty settlement out of court involving the payment of 
stated sums and attorneys fees, and the court held that a 
law ·court could entertain the suit. 
The question of equitable jurisdiction was in no way in-
volved. 
Winter v. Winter, 191 N. Y. S. 462, citecl by appellee in the 
court below was a suit at law on a contract for installment-
payments past due under a separate maintenance agreement 
between husband and wife. Tlie suit at law was dismissed by 
the trial court on the ground that the contract was void un-
der a New York statute, prohibiting contracts releasing hus-
bands from all obligations to support his wife and children, 
·- .. ,._ . i . 
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and second, that even if enforceable th! jurisdiction was in 
equity alone. The case was reversed o1 both grounds, hold ... 
ing first, that the contract was not contrary to a New York 
statute prohibiting contracts to dissolve! marriage or releas ... 
ing the husband from his obligation th support, and that 
under another statute the wife could su~, the· husband at law, 
and M to the second point said: ' 
·"It is contended • * «< that even if th~ contract is valid it 
can be enforced only in a court of equity, but since a mar· 
ried woman can now contract directly ~th her husband and 
is made liable on such contracts as if she was unmarried re-
sort to equity is no longer necessary or ~easonable. '' 
1 · . 
This is a far cry from holding that eg_uity was the ref ore 
deprived of the jurisdiction previously exercised by it ex• 
elusively. 
39* •2nd. ']'hat the Monthly Installments!and the Specific Ea;;. 
pense Bills Agreed to be Paid bYj the .Appellee W et·e 
in Part for the Benefit of Persons Not 
1
P.arties to the Co'lt--
tra.cts, To-wit : 1st the Children, Plainly Indicated Th.ereit1, 
As Beneficiaries, and ~nd, Those Thqreafter Furnishing 
Educational and Medical Supplies to fhe1n, All of Which 
the .Appellee Bound Himself to Pay. ! · 
. I 
. I 
Aetna Casualty q,nd. Sitrety Compan'Yi v. Earle-Lansdell 
Oo., 142 Va. 435; Fidelity, etc. Co. v. Mas~n, 145 Va. 138, 142. 
In both of these cases the rights of the parties unnamed 
to enforce benefits accruing to them thhreunder when not 
prohibited by statute is upheld, if it is manifest that such 
benefit was intended. l -
I I , 
Aetna, etc. Company v. Ea-rle-La.nsde,; Co., 142 Va. 4:35, 
involved the right of unnamed parties t enforce against a 
·surety a contract to pay all labor and s pply bills incurre_d 
in performing certain work in the absen .e ·of statutory au-
thority to require such liability. One D, nald made a con-
tract w~+l\ the State Highway Oommissi h to build a road-
way, and entered into a bond for the perf 'rmance of the con .. 
tract. It contained provision among oth '.r things that '' the 
principal shall· in all respects comply with the terms and con-
ditions of said contract * ~ t{c including th · 'specifications' ''; __ 
**•''to insure the.faithful performance ·••,including pay~. 
ment for aU labor mid rna.terials p11,rchasfd by the party _ of 
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The Aetna Company became the surety for Donald; Donald 
became indebted to Earle-Lansdell Company for materials 
and labo1· supp~ied under the contra~t, but Jn the meantime it 
was adjudged .a bankrupt. Earl-Landsdell Company recov-
ered a judgment at law for $5,464.00 against the surety, 
40* based on th~ ·*.obligation to : 
"in all respects comply with the terms and conditions of 
said contract, and his obligations thereunder including the 
'specifications' and save harmless the said owner against 
or from all costs, etc.'' 
The defendant, surety, denied liability on the ground that 
such a bond was personal to the obligee only, was not re-
quired by the statute and that under Pratt v. Wright, 13 
Gratt. 175, and similar cases it was void to the extent it ex-
ceeded the provisions of the statute. This Court said: 
"This contruction, however, would defeat its purpose. The 
words quoted are expressive merely of the result of the con-
tract-the completed road. As the securing of materials is 
an essential part of the contract to do the work, failure or 
delay in securing them would prevent or retard performance, 
and the ref ore, if so construed, the statutory condition would 
partly fail of its purpose, which certainly is to assure the 
performance of the contract in every essential particular." 
And after citing paragraph 4 of the contract, at page 448 
said: 
'' So the promise to pay for 'all labor and materials' con-
tained in the bond sued on merely aff ectuates this specifica-
tion of the contract''. 
'' There is no statute providing for uniform contracts, plans 
or specifications* * * for the building of highways.• * * Hav-
ing broad general powers to construct highways and to re-
quire bonds for the faithful performance of the work, im-
plies the authority to do everything which is essential thereto 
in order to accomplish the main purpose-that is, the doing 
of the work. * * * It is thus impossible to divorce the worli 
from the CO'lifract, or to conceive of work to be done except 
as required by the contract to do it. It would be 'sticking in 
the bark' indeed to hold that when the statute requires a bond 
. 'for the faithful performance of the work in strict conformity 
with the plans and specifications for the same' we would 
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contraJCt for the performance of thi work; but to this 
418 we would be driven if we were to f construe this bond 
as to relieve the defendant surety in this case.'' 
I 
I 
The court, noting· that an administratiye. board, unlike· an 
individual, must show authority expres~y given or neces-
sarily implied for any authority in attempts to execute, and 
having determined that ''the general language of the statute 
was broad enough to 'cover all the incideptal provisions em-
· bodied in1 the contract' and in the bond ~med on, which_are 
clearly promotive of the main purpose'i, and having thus 
.placed the Highway Commissioner quoaa. this contract on 
the same footing as an individual dealing with his individual 
rights, concluded, p. 451: 
"Having determined this question, it is unnecessary to d.o 
more than refer to Code Section 5143, w~ich authorizes the 
plaintiff to sue upon a bond, so made in p~rt for its benefit.'' 
Sm.okeless Fuel Co. v. C. db 0. R. Co. .A1nfi, 355. 
I 
It is to be noted in this connection thtit but for this sec-
tion the appellant's only remedy would h!a.ve been in equity 
as Section 5143 imposes no additional obligation on the par-
ties or bene.:ficiaries under such contract$. It merely gave 
the injured party a right of action at law,\ a right he did not 
have, or a right, while existing was notjrecognized by law 
courts, independent of statute, which ri hts had been uni-
versally recog·nized and enforced in eq~ty because courts 
of law had declined to enforce any righ~I for anyone claim-
ing under such a contract who was not ani actual party to it. 
I 
· In Fidelity, etc. Company v. Mason, 145 \va. 138, this Court 
supplemented the language last quoted frpm Aetna, etc. Co. 
v. Earle-Lansdell Co., by adding theJ·to the following at 
42* page *143: , . 
'' and it would seem to follow, that if fro · the facts and cir-
cumstances of a particular case, equity co ld best administer 
justice, this is a matter of defense, and th~ appropriate steps 
to invoke equity should be taken by the defendant.'' 
I 
thus recognizing the continued jurisdictibn in .equity in a 
proper case even after the law court hattaken jurisdiction 
under the statute. Surely this bill presen s such a case, and 
if equity could assume jurisdiction at th ; instance of a de-
fendant after suit at law was instituted it · can take jurisdic-
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In the la;tter case this court, quoting from Jones v. Thoma..i::, 
21 Gratt. 96, 98, says at page 389: 
"* * * 'When a debt exists from one person to another 
and an obligation or bond is given to the debtor to discharge 
such debt, he alone can maintain an action for the breach 
of such oblig·ation. In McAlister v. Marb·ury, 4 Humph R. 
426, A. bound himself by covenant to pay for B certain debts 
due by B to C. C. instituted an action of covenant against A 
on the instrument. It was held that he had no legal interest 
therein, and that an action in his name would not lie. It is 
laid down in 2 Tucker's Com. 209, and the proposition is sus-
tained by numerous authorities there cited, that when ·a 
covenant is made with A to pay him or a third person a sum 
of money for the benefit of the latter, the action must be 
broug·ht in the name of A.; and the third persons cannot even 
release the demand. See also Millard v. Baldwin, 3 Gray's 
R. 484, Watson v. ln,q of Cambridge, 15 Mass. R. 286, 3 Rob. 
Prac. 15.'' 
'' .Such was the state of the law at the time of the revision 
of the general statutes of the state of 1849." 
Surely the prompt payment of an annuity stipulated for 
support of wife and child and of bills stipulated for educa-
tion are as essential to such a contract as is the payment for 
supplies to build a road. 
43• *3rd. That Tlntil the Enactnient of the Statute Now Va. 
Cod'<! Section .5143 the Rights of Beneficiaries, Not 
Part-ies. Under Such Contracts Were Equitable Only_, Not 
Legal; Were Not Recognized at Law, Bu.t Only in Eqi1,ity, 
and Constituted One of the Groimds of Exclitsive Equitable 
.Ju,risdriction, Thacker v. Hufford, 122 Va. 379. 
That statute, now Sec. 5143, has repeatedly been held to 
be merely cumulative and as not depriving· equity of any of 
its preexisting jurisdiction. 
This rule was thus recognized by our court in Hoge v. 
• Fidelity Loan and Trust Company, 103 Va. page 1, where 
in discussing a case in which by virtue of such a statute con-
current jurisdiction had be~Ii conferred on the law court, and 
a law court had already assumed jurisdiction, which waet 
sought to be ousted by injunction. It was said: 
'' The learned counsel for the appellant has invoked with 
great earnestness the doctrine that equity once having juris-
diction of a subject matter, because there was no remedy at 
I 
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law, or because the remedy at law was jl).adequate, does not 
lose such juriscli~tion merely fro1? ~he I fa~t that courts ~f · 
law afterwards give the same or similar relief, and that this 
original jurisdiction to grant relief by I courts of equity is 
neither impaired by the assumption of ihe same powers by 
<murts of law, nor by the extension to those courts of such 
powers by the Legislature, unless the .statute conferring such 
jurisdiction uses restrictive or p1·ohibito~y words. 
'' The doctrine contended for is as wel\ established as that 
we have been discussing. Porn. Eq. Juris (1st Ed.), Vol. l, 
Section 182; Barton's Chy. Prac., Vol. i, Section 16 p. 60; 
Steinman v. Vicars, 99 Va. 595; 357; Kel~y v. Lehib, M. db M. 
Co., 98 Va. 405, 406; 81 Am. St. 763; Hv,ll v. Watts, 95 Va. 
10-lB; 27 S. E. 829; Filler v. Tyler, 91. Va. 458, 465, constru-
ing· Secs. 6151-2; but it has no applicatipn to a case where 
the jurisdiction of the court of law and I the court of equity 
is concurrent, and where the litigant has peen first impleaded · 
in a court of law, and the machinery of 'tihat court is as ade ... 
quate to afford the defendant a full andl unembarrassed de-
fense as a court of equity would be.'• I 
44* *This prineiple has never been ii:t any way qualified 
by any of our later decisions. I 
"The statutory remedy by an action I at law under this 
section is cumulativ~ only in such cases, 1 and does not oust 
courts of chancery from the juriRdiction i they have long ex-
ercised.'' · I 
I 
Sheild v. Como., 4 Rand. 54.l; B(anton r-lv. l(neipp, 155 Va. 
668. ,, 
I 
The most recent recognition of this rule ~s found in Nicholas 
v. Nicholas, 169 Va. 399, where, quoting· f om Filler v. Tyler, 
91 Va. 458, Mr. Chief Justice Campbell sad at page 404: 
'' Courts of equity, having· such jurisdi tion before the en-
actment of the statute, still retain it altho, gh the statute may 
furnish a complete and adequate reme y at law. Courts 
of equity, having once acquired jurisdfotion, never lo'se it 
because jurisdiction of the same matted are given to law 
courts, unless the statute giving such jutisdiction uses pro-
hibitory or restrictive words. 1 ·Barton fs Ch. Pr. 60, 61 ". 
'' See also Beverly v. Rhodes, 86 Va. 415, 0 S. E. 572; Shield 
v. Brown, 166 Va. 596; 186 S. E. 33, 34; H ge v. Fidelity Loan, 
0,1nd Tritst Co., 103 Va. 1, 48 S. E. 494." 1 
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45* •4th.· All of · the Foregouig Propositions Apply with 
Eq'ltal Force to the Contract Resulting from the At-
tempted Amendment of the Original Contract by the Voided 
Consent Order of September 29th, 1933, to the Extent That 
It Has Any Validity Because That .A.mendm,ent to the Ex-
tent It Opet·ated at All Ct·eat'e~ lAke Beneficiaries, Not Par-
ties to It. The Only AlteratiQns Were in Va.rying Not the 
Purpose or Beneficiaries, But Only the Amounts to be Ap-
plied, and the Conduits Through Whmn They were to be 
Applied for the Same Purposes, How lJlea.mred and When 
,to be Paid. 
The original contract and the amended contract were for 
the benefit of the same identical beneficiaries, both ascer-
tained and unascertained.. The $500.00 per month per child 
. to be paid the appellant under the original contract was di-
vided under the second, and the annuity to be paid the ap-
pellant directly under the first reduced to $375.00, but still 
subject to the trust of maintaining a home suitable for the 
occupancy of herself and children, but she was released from 
the obligation of applying any portion of it to the clothing, 
maintenance or medical care of the children, and all was to 
be applied to the maintenance of a home. All such bills '' in-
curred in accordance with their stations in life" the appellee 
bound himself to '' pay promptly as they matured''. The 
bills incurred for their education were also to be paid by him 
as before except under the further stipulation that they were 
to be "incurred", "in accordance with their station in life" 
· and be "paid promptly as they mature", obligations uot 
previously so specifically imposed on him. 
I 
46* •5th .. That Though the Annuity Instalments, Whether of 
$1,500.00 Per Month Under the Original Contract Re-
duced to $1,000.00 Per Month by Reason of the Daughter's 
Support by the Fathe·r After June, 1933, if That Cot1,tract is 
Subsisting, or $376.00 Per Month Under the Attempted 
A.mendment, Are Payable to the Appellant, But in Trust 
for Certaiin Specific Purposes, and for Certain Beneficiaries, 
Including Her self, as a Common Beneficiary, and Also for 
Dther Then Unascertained Persons Thereafter Furnishing 
Services and 'JJ[aterial and Facilities for the Sustenance of 
the Children, Their Clothing, ·Medical Oare and Education, 
With the Result That She Became at Least a Beneficiary 
o;nd a Quasi Trustee in Respect Thereto, and as Such En-
titled to the Aid, Assistance a.nd Guidance of a Court of 
Equity, in the Ascertainm.ent of .All Such Expenses to be 
i 
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so Incurred and the Enfor..cement of th~ Rights of Hers,elf 
and Her Cestui Que Trust in Those If,ega-rds. 
I 
i 
It will be, observed that a charged viol~tion of the original 
trust by the appellant here was the onlyj specific reason as-
signed for the appellee's original petitio:p. in habeas corpus. 
'' Wherever there is any bona fide doubt as to the true mean-
ing and intent of provisions of the inst~ument creating the 
trust, or as to the particular course whiQh he ought to pur-
sue, the trustee is always entitled to main1jain a suit in equity, 
at the expense of the trust estate, and o~tain a judicial con-
struction of the instrument, and direction$ as to his own con-
duct. Such directions he must, of course, (aithfully obey, and 
if he does so, he will be relieved from all iresponsibility there-
for. Wherever any snit .or proceeding & instituted by the 
beneficiary or other person interested, aiid the court by its 
decree or order therein directs anything t~ be done or omitted .. 
by the trustee, such directions- are imperative, and must be 
implicitly obeyed. A refusal or neglect tp obey may render 
the trustee liable to summary punishment, as for a contempt 
by fine and imprisonment.'' l 
"Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, vJ1. 3, Section 1064, 
Third Edition.'' J 
I 
'' See also Sections 1155 to 1157.'' 
The bill sets out the appellant's doubts! and difficulties, in 
respect thereto, resulting. from the repu~iation of all __ con-. 
tracts and decrees by the appellee, ,nd the subsequent 
47• *credit for the children on the faith] of such contracts; 
and the necessity for guidance and~instruction by the 
court under the circumstances. 
In addition to interests and property o • children in vol. ved, 
quasi trusts were created by these cont acts. The infant 
children take beneficial interests thereun er which when de-
. nied as here of itself gives equity jurisdittion. 
"Any matter affecting a child may become a subject of 
chancery jurisdiction; and it is immaterial whether it is 
~ro.ug~t to the at~ention of the court by bi~, p~tition .or appli-
·cation for the writ of habeas aorp'lts. The rehef desired gen-
erally indicates the form of the applica, on which will be 
t>aried by the co'IJ.rt to suit the circumsta~ces developed. In 
this case the mode of proceeding is adequ lte for the purpose 
I 
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designed and is proper and right. Woodruff v. Conley, 50 
Ala. 304.'' 
The same principle was again recognized by the Alabama 
Supreme Court in 111 urphee v. Hans on (VYl,d others, 197 Ala. 
246, decided in 1916, when, after quoting the foregoing from 
,Woodruff v. Conley, it stated that: 
'' * * * a court of equity is the general guardian and pro-
tector of all infants within its jurisdiction as forcibly ex-
pressed by Chief Justice Bricknell in Lee v. Lee, 55 Ala. 
590. 
'' "" • * 'Whenever a suit is instituted for the vrotection 
of the infant, either in person or estate, the infant becomes 
a ward of the oourt, and the court exercises over him and his 
estate a general supervision and control. In this sense it is 
true here as in England that the court of chancery is -the 
general guardian and protector of all infants within its juris-
diction.' 55 Ala. 595.'' 
48* *6th. The Nevada Divorce Decree Which: '' Fitrther 
Ordered, Ad.fudged and Decreed That the [ Original] 
Agreement * * * Settling and Adjitstvng the Respective 
· Property Rights and Providing for the Futitre Suppo1·t m·id 
Maintenance of the Defendant, and of the Minor Chilifren. 
of the Parties I! ereto, and Providing for the Cu,stody of 
Sa.id Minor Children as Between, Plaintiff and Defendant 
be and the Sam~ is Hereby Adopted, Approved and Con-
firmed to the Sanie Extent a.~ Thoit.(Jh Fully Set Forth 
FJ.erein" Which Decree Notwithstanding the Avpellant's 
Objection to Its YaUdity as a Divorce and the AppeUee's 
Objection to Its Enforcement as a Property Settlenient, was 
Given Recognition -in Its Entirety by the Voided Decree 
Independent of Such Recog11,ition was a Valid Judgment 
Entitled to Full Fa·ith and Credit and to Enforcement in 
the Coitrts of Thi.c; State, so Far as It Concerned Property 
Ri,qhts Under Article 4, Section 1, of the United States Con-
stitution. 
Restaire v. Sestaire, 218 U. S. l, 54 L. Ed. 905; Lynch v. 
Lynah, 181 U. S.184, 45 L. Ed. 810; Barber v. Barber, 21 How., 
p. 582, 16 L. Ed. 226; Gloth v. (J/,oth, 154 Va. 511, 554. 
This was true as to the Nevada decree so far as it awarded 
custody and adopted the provisions of the original contract 
for the support of appellant and her children, even though 
that court was without jurisdiction to award the divorce, 
thoug·h as alleged in the bill here the appellant for reasons 
Ruth L. Buohamm, v. J. ,. Buchanan. ~5 
there stated does not now wish to f urthcir question its validity 
even in that regard. 11 
Anderson v. Anderson, 75 W. Va. 1$6; ·Wilson v. Elliott, 
96 Tex. 472; 97 Amer. St. Rep. 928, · a,d note on page 931; 
State v. Fergus, 46 Mont. 425; Americal[l Cases, 1916 B. 256; 
K enn,er v. Kenner, 139 Tenn. 211, L. R. A.No. 1918 E., p. 587; 
State Ex Rel. Nipp v. Dist. Cou,rt of Feirgus County, 46 Mont. 
425; American and Eng. Ann. Cases 19]16 B. 25C. 
Anderson v. Anderson, 75 W. Va. 13,, 81 S. E. 706, is di· 
rectly in point. I 
The father and mother resided I in Indiana with two 
49* *children. The wife sued there fof divorce and secured 
service of process upon the husbaitd. He appeared and 
moved for a more specific statement. Ile later withdrew his 
appearance by leave of coitrt, and mad~ no further defense. 
A decree for divorce and custody of thel!children was granted 
to the mother. Before the suit was br ught the father sent 
the child into West Virginia. Later h went there himself. 
The wife followed and there sued out hapeas corpus. His re· 
turn to the writ denied the validity of the Indiana decree fO't 
custody On jurisdictional grounds (just $S appellee did here) .. 
The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the wife's right to cus ... 
tody, said : ! 
I 
'' The argument in support of the w~·i t of error fails to 
note the distinction between jurisdiction to decree a divorce 
and jurisdiction to award the custody. I Thoit,qh the divorce 
ma11 be invalid for lack of residence o.f !the plaintiff for 'the 
requisite stat'lttory period and proof of the fact by competent 
witrwsses, or may be voidahl-e by appellate procedure, inva-
lidity of the judgment awarding the cu~tody of the children 
may not necessarily follow. Undoubtedly the court had juris.,, 
, diction of the parties to the cause, and !power to make pro .. , 
vision for the welfare of the children~ between them, not 
only by way of final decree, and during the pendency of the 
suit as well, muler its _qencra! equ.ity ~owers. And having 
shown the prima facie rig·ht of the fathe to have the custody 
of his minor children, Dr. Minor says ( in. Inst., Vol. 1, p. 
428): 'It is competent to a court of ch~ncery, in pursuance 
of its _qeneral power to interpose for the ~e'liefit of such as are 
wnable to protect themselves, to deprive )him of such custody 
and control for sufficient reasons,' and cites abundant au-
thority to sustain the proposition. * • * (\Citing cases).'' 
'' Even though the Indiana Court may ~ave erred in award-
ingi the custody of the children to the !aaintiff, viewing the 
case from the standpoint of its merif , or respectinp.- the 
procedure, there could have been no wa. t of jurisdiction, no 
I 
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lack of power in the court to act, it being one of general jutis-
diction, and having the parties and cause of action before it 
by process and pleadings. The jurisdiction of a court to ren-
der an erroneous decision is as full and complete as its 
50* jurisdiction to render •a proper one. Powhat011i Coal 
, Co. v. Ritz, 60 W. Va. 396; 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1225. '' 
'' That the children may not have been within the jurisdic-
tion of the court at the time of the institution of the suit or 
entry of the decree is immaterial, since the parties litigant 
were the father and mother, and the cause of action, the right 
of custody, in so far as it 'affected the children was between 
them, and the court had full jurisdiction over them with power 
to render a personal decree. Webb v. Ritter, 60 W. Va. 193, 
54 S. E. 484. '' 
In State Ex Rel. Nipp v. District Court of Fergus County, 
46 Mont. 425;. A. & E. Ann. Cases 1916 B., page 256, it was 
held: 
· "The court will, as required by the Constitution of the 
United States, Art. 4, Section 1, give full faith and credit to 
a judgment of a sister state granting a wife ~ divorce and 
awarding the custody of the children of the parties rendered 
after personal service of summons :on an appearance and de-
fense by the husband, and the judgment is conclusive in the 
absence of proof of a change in the :fitness of the custodian or 
the circumstances affecting the condition of the children sub-
sequent to the rendition of the judgment.'' 
In Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 347, 47 L. Ed. 1084, cited by 
this court in B1,chanan v. Buchan011i, 170, Va. 458, and re-
markably like the case at bar, in its essential facts, a husband 
married in Massachusetts,' abandoned his wife and went to 
Ohio, leaving the children in her custody; after the lapse of 
several years he notified her that he desired a divorce; of-
fered. to make provisions f.or the support of herself in one 
form, and for the support of the children by other stipulations, 
with '' such extra allowance as will giye them an education 
until each attains the age of twenty-one years". After pay-
ing for some years·the husband ceased and sought a discharge 
. -in. bankruptcy of both. This discharge was denied in both 
aspects. 
51 * · •The Supreme Court, at page 351, L. Ed. 1092, said: 
"In relation to that part of the husband's contract to pay 
for the suppo~t of his minor children unti~ they respectively 
I 
I 
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become of age, we also think that it wa~ not of a nature to 
be proved in bankruptcy. , 
"At comm.on law, a father is bound tp support his legiti-
mate children, and the obligation continues during their mi-
nority. We may assume this obligatioi to exist in all the 
states. In this case the decree of the court provided that t}!e 
children should remain in the custody ,f the wife, and the 
contract to contribute a certain sum yearly for the support 
of each child during his minority was 4imply a contract to 
do that which the law obliged him to do~'' · 
'< An agreement, so far as adopted by ke decree is merged 
in it, and the decree conclusively estabµshes, so long as it 
stands, that the ag-reement was free froth collusion. W al,lace 
v. Wallace, 74 N. H. 256; 13 Ann. Case 29$; Patrick v. Patrick, _ 
30 Ky. 1365; 101 s. w. 328." [ 
! 
'' It becomes as binding on the parties as any other part 
Qf the decree and can be enforced in th4 same manner as. if 
the amount had been fixed by the court Q, hearing Cavenaugh 
v. Cavenaugh, 107 Ill. Ap. 209." I 
"In the absence of fraud or collusion ~n agreement or ar-
rangement between the parties entered into before, and not 
for the purpose of facilitating· the granting of a divorce, may 
be adopted by the court in granting pemnanent alimony, if 
such agreement is just and equitable, and this will thereafter 
conclude the parties. 19 C. J. 251-252." ; 
'' The extra-territorial effect of the Jrder of the court 
modifying an order fixing the custody or'~hildren of divorced. 
pa~ents, ren~ered while th~ '.children. an4 one . of the part!es 
· resided outside of the state 1s 'that 1t s~ould m the exercise 
of customary comity of the states and N'ions, be recognized 
and enforced, and in the states of the U ·on. by force of the 
full faith a.nd credit clause of the Consti tion~so long a~ the 
circumstances attending the adoption of e order remain un-
changed.'' 
. . I . . 
"Morriel v. Morriel (Conn.), 77 A. I. $3; Ky. 332; Milner 
v. Gatlin (Ga.), 76 S. E. 860; Har4in v. Hardin (Indi-
52• ana), 81 N. E. 60; *Ex Parte Boyai 157 S. E. 25~; .An-
derson-v . .Anderson, West Va., 1811
1
~3. E. 706; Key No. 
332, on the effect of foreign judgments.' 'i 
Bates v. Boydie, 245 U. S. 520, 62 L. ~d. 444, is in point. 
It had its origin fo a divorce in Arkaisas. The husband 
I 
I 
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owned land in both Arkansas and Nebraska, and filed a bill 
for divorce. His wife filed a cross-bill. A divorce was g·ranted 
her. Under the statute of Arkansas apparently the court 
had no jurisdiction to enter a money award for alimony, 
"but was confined to an allotment of personal property and 
real estate in certain proportions''. 
By consent the court decreed that the wife recover "the 
sum of $5,111.10 in full o_f alimony and all other demands'", 
conditioned that no appeal be taken by the defendant on the 
judgment. 
'' Certain personal property, consisting of silverware and 
household furniture", was also adjudged to her and a lien 
declared on a lot in Arkansas, and certain notes and mort-
gages amounting to $2,800.00 were required to be deposited 
with the Clerk as additional security. This judgment was 
paid in full. The wife afterwards instituted a suit in Ne-
braska, elaiming that the Nebraska property had not been 
taken into account by the Arkansas court, because it had no 
jurisdiction over it, though under the Arkansas Statute she 
was entitled to one-third of the Nebraska real estate as well. 
The Nebraska C01.,rt awarded it to her. But on appeal the 
Supreme Court of the United States reversed and in con-
cluding said that the judgment of the Arkansas court was 
res adjudicata, and at pag·e 331 : 
'' The evidence, therefore, confirms the face of the decree 
that it was entered hy consent of the parties. It is admitted 
that consent would give jurisdiction to the court to render a 
money judgment for alimony. 
538 *''We, the ref ore, think that the due faith and credit 
required by the Constitution of the United States was 
1iot given to the decree.'' 
The contract in this- case was undoubtedly "embodied" in 
the decree of the Nevada Court granting the divorce. 
In Dwnbar v. D'ltnbar, 190 U~ S. 340,344, 47 L. Ed.1084, 1090, 
the U. S. Supreme Court said: 
' 
''Had the provisions of this contract, so far as contracting 
to pay money for the support of his wife is concerned, been 
embodied in the decree of divorce which the husband obtained 
from l1is wife in ·ohio on the ground of desertion, the liabilit.y 
of the husband to pay the amount as alimony, notwithstanding 
his ·discharge in bankruptcy, cannot be doubted.'" · 
I 
I 
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and under Sestaire v. Sestaire, 218 U. sJ 1, 54 L. Ed. 905, up-
doubtedly entitled to full faith and credi~ and enfo.rcement in 
other states. I, 
I 
54 * *7th. That the Remedy A.ff orded 4t LQJUJ is Wliolly Jn. 
adequate to the Exi.qencies o.f Tfiis Case Even if the 
Primary Rights Violated lVere Purely\Legal and a Remedy 
at Common Law Had Been Available.· 
I· 
This point has already been touched t' n to some extent in 
discussing the jurisdiction of equity to nforce the payment 
of annuity instalments under the first roposition (supra), 
pp. 29, et seq. We will attempt not to r,peat what was there 
said. · 
Counsel for appellee seemed to conte:µd below that if the 
ultimate relief sought could be satisfied by a pecuniary judg-
ment that conclusively e~tablished the \lack of jurisdiction 
in equity to grant relief, as if equity was powerless to award 
a pecuniary judgment alone, merely because it must be for 
money without regard to its purpose ori origin. 
An out.standing fa ult in all of the appe)lee 's grounds of de-
murrer is the assumption that the remedy afforded at law is 
adequate, i. e., judgment for money as it matures; that such 
is the only remedy sought and that thel facts stated fail to 
show a ground for equitable jurisdictioh. 
' It is not denied that the appel1ant and her children can 
now sue at law, and that each creditor! who has furnished 
services or materials under these contraits cail do the same, 
hut only by virtue of Section 5143 Virgi · ia Code. Our posi-
tion is, 1st, that that remedy is wholly j adequate under the 
facts and circumstances as shown by t~e bill, and to rely 
thereon alone would be and is destructive of all of the pur-
poses and intents of either the contracts\ or judgments there 
m question, and 2nd, even so equity is not, deprived of its pre· 
existing jurisdiction. 1 
The mere fact that there is some rem 1dy at law even for 
violation of a mere legal prima.ry right , k not determinative 
of the jurisdiction of equity. 1 
As was said by the court in F(,ose v. Nicholas, Wythe 
55• *268: 
'' A remedy cannot be said to be fully Jdequate to meet t4e 
justice and necessities of a case unless itl reaches the end in .. 
tended, and actually compels a performq,nce of the duty in 
qi1,estion. Such other rem~dy, * * * must be adequate to place 
the injured party, as nearly as the circ stances of the case 
will permit, in the position which he occ pied before the in-
' 
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-jury or omission complained of. The controlling question is 
not, has the party a remedy, but is that remedy fully com-
l'.llensurate with the necessities and rights of the party under 
all the circumst~nces of the particular case.'' _ 
_ . The only Virginia authority cited by counsel for the ap-
pellee in the court below was Campbell v. Rust, 85 Va. 653. 
The facts there furnish no parallel here. Even in that case 
the principle here announced is recognized at page 667: 
".Yet it is the general rule that courts of chancery will en-
tertain suits for specific performance, *' * * of agreements 
whenever the law courts will not afford an adequate remedy." 
None of the other cases cited by appellee in the Court be-
low, so far as we have been able to examine them, sustain the 
contention of the appellee that a mere rig·ht to sue at law 
affords such an adequate remedy as to deprive an equity 
court of jurisdiction, for instance, Richniond v. Railroad, 33 
Iowa 422, one of the cases cited by the appellee below, the 
court recognizes one of the conditions under which specific 
performance is awarded because of inadequacy of damages 
at law, and at page 480 said: 
"When the contracting party is entitled to the subject 
matter of the contract and cannot be fully compensated there-
for equity will afford relief • • • . '' 
56• *" The fact that a court of law will award damages 
in a given case does not deprive equity of jurisdiction. 
To deprive the party of an equitable remedy the damages re-
coverable at law must be a full compensation and constitute 
a_dequate relief. Equity determines that question." 
.and at page 482 says: 
'' The stoppage of trains and the building of a carriage-
way under a track we readily understand could not be com-
pensated for by any judgment rendered in an action for dam-
ages. Considerations of convenience and pleasure may have 
.. entered into the right of the plaintiff in each case.'' 
That Courts of Equity have always maintained jurisdiction 
to· grant relief in proper cases even though there is a concur-
rent remedy at law is recognized -and stated very clearly in 
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"l!'irst Group : Ancillary and Pro~1onal Remedies : The 
distinguishing characteristic of * * • this group is, that they 
determine no primary rights * * * . They are in fact, instru-
ments and means by which the court ,s enabled more con-
veniently and perfectly to adjudicate up~n the ultimate rights 
and interests of the parties, and to award the final reliefs, in 
the further judicial proceedings· to which they are auxiliary, 
and of which they are really the preliminary stage. ( Citing 
Pomeroy's Equity Jnr., Sections 171, ~316 and 1319.)" 
'' Second Group : Preventive Remedie~. * • * those by which 
a violation of a primary right is prevenf d before the threat-
ened injury is done, or by which the fur her violation is pre:--
vented after the injury hai;; been parti lly effected, so that 
_some other relief for the wrong actually accomplished can 
be granted.'' I 
"Third G'roup. Reformation and Canr1 ellation,- " ~ * the 
e~tablishment .or p~ote~tion of in~erests1 es.ta~es and p1rimary 
rights; but this obJect 1s accomplished ·indirectly. • • • they 
are to a certain extent auxiliary.• • "" Tley do not, like a spe-
cific performance, or the execution[ of a trust,•"" ""oper-
. 57*' ate directly and immediately to establish the plaintiff's 
title• * • and to confer upon him the complete dominion 
over his estate~the ultimate relief which he seeks. Their 
effect in establishing his ultimate dominion is indirect. They 
are often used as the preparatory· ste~ which enables him 
to obtain, sometimes in the same actiop, and sometimes in 
a subsequent suit, the ultimate remedy! which finally estab-
lishes his rights or obligations, or restpres him to the full 
enjoyment of his estate. The reformat~on of a policy of in-
surance is not a final remedy; but it establishes the real con-
tract, and thus enables the assured to recover the amount 
actually due according to the terms of that contract. The 
reformation of a deed does not directl restore the grantee 
to the dominion and possession of the and which had been 
omitted; but it places him in a positio · which enables him, 
if nece~rmry, to assert his dominion an recover the posses-
sion. The cancellation of a deed does ot of itself directly 
establish the plaintiff's title and put hi in possession of the 
land. but it enables him. if necessary, t assert his title and 
obtain the possession. These remedies lmay be obtained on 
behalf of either a legal or an equitable I interest by either a, 
legal or an equitable owner. The remedies constituting this 
group are the two _following: Reformdtion or re-execution 
of instruments and rescission, cancellaf on, surrender up or 
discharge of instruments.'' 
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" ( 4) Fourth Group: Remedies-by which Estates interests 
and primary rights, either Legal or Equitable, are directly 
declared, established or recovered or the enjoyment thereof 
fully restored.'' 
This discussion might be indefinitely extended far beyond 
the proper limits of this petition. We will content ourselves, 
however, merely by observing that when the rights involved 
or the necessary remedies are equitable in their nature equity 
takes jurisdiction reg·ardless of whether the primary right was 
legal or not, and exercises concurrent jurisdiction where leg·al 
rights alone are involved, but the legal remedy is inadequate; 
and by ref erring to Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Sec-
tions 1-10; 90, 91, 133, 135, 137, 138, 141, 155, 158, 160, 168, 
170, 173-175, where these questions are all elaborately dis-
cussed, and to Section 176 where in concluding Mr. 
58"" Pomeroy •says : 
-· '' Section 176. • * * The principle may be stated in its broad-
est generality, that in .. cases where the primary right, interest 
or estate * * '"' is a legal one, and a court of law can do as 
complete justice * * * as could be done by a court of equity, 
equity will not interfer~ even. with those peculiar remedies 
which are administered by it alone. * * • 
'' This pri,nciple, however, must be understood as referring 
to the original condition. of law and equity, at a period when 
equity was establishing its jurisdiction, and before the reme-
dial powers of the law courts had been extended by statutes; 
or enlarged by the gradual adoption of equitable notions; for, 
as will be more fully shown hereafter, the present power of th~ 
law courts to grant complete relief does not, in general, de-
prive equity of a jurisdiction which it had formerly acquired, 
because the law courts then possessed no such power. But 
in order that the general principle may apply, the sufficiency 
and completeness of the leg·al remedy must be certain. If it is 
doJJ,btful, equity may take cognizance • • • . '' 
The requirements which a remedy at law must fulfill in 
order to defeat even the concurrent jurisdiction in equity, arc 
thus stated by Judge Riley in Stuart v. Pennis, 91 Va. 688-
692: 
'' A true equity rule is this laid down in Story's Equity J., 
Sec. 33: 'The remedy must be plain; for if it be doubtful 
~nd obscure at law, equity will assert a jurisdiction. It must 
be adequate; for if at law it fall short of what the party is 
entitled to that founds a jurisdiction in equity. And it mnst 
I 
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be complete; that is, it must attai11i the fiull end and justice of 
the cas-e. It must. reach the whole mischief, at the pr~seilt 
whole right of the party in a perfect manner., at the present -
time and in future; otherwise, equity W[ill interfere and give 
such relief and aid as the exigency of the particular case may 
require. " : 
I 
The principles thus announced are f~lly sustained by de .. 
~isions of this court in Fickheimer iv· National exchange 
59* *Bank, 79 Va. 80, 84; Crawford v~ Thurmond,.3 Leigh. 
85, 88; Southern Railway Comp011it' v. Franklin, 96 Va. 
693; Virginia Iron, etc., Co. v. Graham 124 Va. 692~ · : ~ 
At bar we have the case of a moth r and her two sons 
who are entitled by solemn contract approved and adopted by 
the court to the monthly payment to th~ quasi trustee of the 
. sums necessary for the maintenance of I a common home for 
the three, and in addition all three are1 entitled to have the 
bills necessarily incurred in their education, whether at 
boarding schools. or at colle~~' 'pai~ reg"!llarly as they ma-
ture. The same 1s true of the1t med1callbills, on the assump;;. 
tion that the original contract was modified by the consent 
decree. On the assumption that it was! not validly· modifie·d 
they are entitled to the payment to Uris quasi trustee of 
$1,000.00 per month for the maintenanc¢ of such a home and 
. their current maintenance-bills, and in a(ldition to the prompt 
payment of their educational expenses and extraordinary 
medical and dental bills, and yet the fa4t is that this recalci-
trant father and obligor has paid none bf these maintenance 
expenses for a period of at least two iyears last past, and 
none of the educational expenses for a ~eriod of at least :five 
years, and declares his purpose never tp pay any more, and 
yet we are told that the only ·remedy Qf these people is to sue 
f~r these past-due installments for maintenance, as they ac-
crue, and that those who hereafter may be philanthropic 
enough to furnish them educational facf.·ties o. n his credi~ in 
the face of his declaration that he is n t liable for anq. will 
not pay any of them may do likewise d that ·this affords 
this wronged mother and these children a full, adequate and 
complete remedy for his wrong. 
60* *'This underlying principle wa~ recognized · by this 
court in the very recent case of 8,ringer v. Gaddy, de-
cided April 10th, 1939, dealing with restricted covenants, 2 
S. E. (2nd), p. 355, where at page 358 IChief Justice Camp-
bell says: i 
I 
"In Jenney v. llynes, 282 Mass. 182, 1 N. E. 444,447, the 
doctrine is thus stated: 
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'' 'An owner whose land is subject to equitable restrictions 
cannot violate tpem, and when suit is brought against him re-
lieve his prope~ty from the restrictions by the payment of 
damages.' '' · 
'' The assertion of an equitable right generally negatives 
the legal right to recover damages for the reason that the 
measure of damages cannot ordinarily be ascertained while 
equitable rights are fixed by law.'' 
It is inconceivable to counsel for appellant at least that 
any reasonable person acquainted with such matters could 
conclude either that the damages resulting from the delays, 
mortifications, and actual sufferings; from incomplete and 
disorganized education and training in youth incident to 
mere defaults in the time of payment of annuities, intended 
to cover rents and other costs of subsistence, and from de-
lays in payment for entrance fees, tuition, clothing and medi-
cal bills, even when liability is not denied, can be either cal-
culated or adequately compensated for. All of these ele-
ments of damage and uncertainty are incalculably enhanced 
when ultimate liability for all such items is positively :repudi-
ated as in this case, while time passes and youth grows into 
unprepared and undisciplined manhood. Flemin,q v. Peter-
son, 167 Ill. 465, 47 N. E. 355, supra. 
61~ ~How can a parent be compensated for seeing her son 
entitled to all of these benefits of incalculable value to 
her and to him alone, secured to her and to him by contract 
entered into for value .. , deprived of them and thrown upon 
the world unprepared for his station in life? How can the 
son's loss and damages be ascertained or compensated for T 
In 9 Ruling Case Law, Sec. 296, p. 481, in discussing the 
liability of a divorced father for the support of his children, 
custody was awarded the mother, with no provision for their 
support, and holding the father responsible, it is said: 
'' Assuming that there is any force in the argument based 
upon the common law doctrine referred to it has been held 
that the father by his own wrong forfeits certain of his com-
mon law rights, and that he will not be permitted to plead 
such wrong as an excuse for relieving himself from the obli-
gation to support his children. The just and more natural 
reason, however, is that it is not the policy of the law to de-
prive children of their rights on account of the dissensionR 
of their parents, for causes of which they are innocent, and 
by proceedings to which they are not parties. The legal and 
natural duty of the father to support his children is not to 
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be evaded by him on the ground of his pwn wrongdoing, or 
even of any dissensions whatsoever with his wife. A natural 
father would not think of doing so., ang an unnatural one 
should not be permitted to de so.'' ( Cit!jng Spencer v. Spen-
cer, 99 Minn. 56, 114 A. S. E. and note; Pretzinger v. Pretzin-
ger, 45 Ohio St. 452, 15 N. E. 471., 4 A. S. _JD. 542, and Evans v. 
Evans, 125 Tenn. 112, Ann. Oases 1913 O.) 
If this is the rule at common law ind<W,endent of contract -
a fort-iori should this duty not be evaded ,vhen it is hqttressed 
upon a contract for value? Such a contract should be en-
forced in the very manner provided for ~herein, otherwise it 
loses all its force and effect as a contr&ct and had as well 
be discarded. I 
62· ·we will conclude this discussion; on the irreparable 
character of the injury being inflict~d on these innocent 
boys by their father by quoting the following comment of 
Chancellor Kent, quoted with approval by this court in Hen. 
ninger v. Henninger, 90 Va. 271, 275: I 
I 
I 
"A parent who sends his son into . th¢ world uneducated 
does a great injury to mankind as well as) his own family for 
he defrauds the community of a useful citizen and bequeaths 
to it a nuisance.'' 2 Kent. Com. 195. l 
I 
We appeal to this court to save these I fine boys from the 
wrath of their father. · 
1 
• • I 
63* · •sth .. The Allegat-i_on~ as to, and the!Prayer ~or Cancel-
lation and Rescission of the Con-fJract, Evidenced by 
the Consent Decree of 8-eptemJJer, 1929, so Far as It .At-
tempted to But Did Not A.mend the Prdvisions of Both the 
Original Contract and the Nevada Deor 1 e .Adopting It, and 
for the Reinstatement of the Original ontraot in Its Ett- · 
tirety, Constituted an Additional, In ependent and Ex-
clusive Ground for Equity Jurisdiotio : 
( a.) because of the mutual mistake of t 'e parties as to the 
validity of the consent thereby evidence that it should be· 
made enforcible and self-operative as a d ree to that effect. 
( See Mans., pp. 38-43.) 
(b) because the subsequent re:r>udiation f all provisions of 
the amending contract by, and the refusal of, the appellee to 
perform any and all of its provisions con ituted such a fail-
ure of consideration as to entitle the appell t to the rescission 
and reinstatement of any mistake of the arties. 
46 Sup1·eme Uourt of Appeals of Virginia. 
(1) There can be no doubt under the allegations of the bill 
that. the amending contract was entire in that all of the pro-
visions were inter-related and inter-dependent, and were all 
contingent on valid r.onfi'rm.ation· by the court and a valid or-
der directing its performance. Escl1/ner v. Eschner, 146 Va. 
417, 422. 
(2) Nor can there be doubt that no such valid order was 
entered because this court has held that except so far as it 
altered custody it was absolutely void, ·mere brutmn f ul-men, 
and the lower court acting under direction of this court has 
likewise declared, though it is likewise true that this court 
without that question being before it said obiter dictum, that 
it having been entered by consent it constituted evidence of 
binding· contractual obligations though void. We take it that 
even thoug·h it mig·ht constitute evid,ence, and in the absence 
of evidence to the contrary mig·ht justify a finding that 
64* in fact it •was binding·, but no such issue has been pre-
sented until presented by this bill and under the allega-
tions of the bill, which on demurrer must be taken as true, 
the entire order was either the result of a mutual mistake on 
the part of both parties as to the effect thereof, or the result 
of honest mistake on the part of one and fraudulent silence 
on the part of the other, who having now obtained all the 
benefits accruing to him under it now seeks to avoid all the 
liabilities assumed by him thereunder, as well as those pre-
existing, although these imposed under the later agreement 
are immensely less than those existing· under the contract 
supposed to be modified thereby. 
None of this is denied, though it is but fair to say, that ap-
pellant does not believe the appellce intended to defraud her 
and his children when he made the modifying contract, but 
it is also true that the result of his taking· advantage of the 
subsequently realized lack of jurisdiction is the same as if 
such had been his purpose ab initio. 
The only defense offered by the appellee now is, that mis-
take though it was, it was a mistake of law and not of fact, 
and that equity can afford no relief even by rescinding a con-
tract which this court has already declared void, whereby all 
benefits accruing to appellant thereunder are voided, and the 
appellee goes free of all his obligations previously existing to 
wife and children. 
Appellant is aware tha~ while as a general rule courts of 
equity do not relieve a~a.inst mere mistakes of law, this 
rule is not without exception and this case comes within the 
exceptions well established and recognized in Virginia. 
In Webb v. City of Alexandria~ 33 Gratt. 168, this court 
said: 
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65* ~''While it is a general rule th t mistake in matter 
of law, cannot be admitted as gro , d of relief, it is not 
a rule of universal application, especially in courts of equity. 
It is not an absolute and inflexible rule, but has its exceptions; 
though such e~ceptions, in the languag~ of Judge Story are 
few, and generally stand upon some yerr. urgent pressure of 
circumstances. If the maxim is used in fhe sense of denoting 
general law, the ordinary law of the country, no excep'tion 
can be admitted to its general applicatio~; but it is otherwise 
when the word jus is used in the sense Qf denoting a private 
right. If a man through misapprehensi9n or mistake of the 
law parts with or gives up a private riglit of property, or a.~-
sumes obligations upon grounds upon which he would not have · 
acted but for such misapprehension, a ~ourt of equity may 
grant relief if under the general circum~tances of the case it 
is satJsfied tha~ the party benefited by tle mistak<: cannot in 
consmence retam the benefit of advantage so acquired. • • • 
''Exceptions to the general rule that !mistake of law fur-
nishes no ground of relief are fully recd~ized by this court , 
in the cases of Zollman v. Moore, 21 Gnatt. 313, and Bro1w1t 
v. Rice's A.dmr., 26 Gratt. 467.'' ! 
I 
In Fuller v. Troy, 169 Va. 490, a consent decree entered 
into by mistake was set aside for that I reason alone. The 
court said at page 494: . , 
"In Barton's Pleading and Practice, p~ge 447, this is said: 
'A consent decree partakes of t.he natur~ of both a contract 
and. a decree sanctioned by the court. It \is binding, however, 
only upon the consenting parties and not ,
1
on them if procured 
by fraud or mistake.' 
"In the case of Gre.Q.Q v. Slomi, 76i Va. 497, this was said: 
'If we may look outside of the decree to extrinsic testimony 
as evidence of consent, we find it very nsatisfactory. Evi-
dently, Mr. Thompkins (counsel for the · ustee at that time) 
and Judge Lybrook (Mrs. Gregg's couns 1) did not have the 
same itnder8tamdin,q of the matter. This s manifest from the 
statements they make, and a decree so p , pably unjust ought 
not to be permitted to stand on mere cons. nt unless such con-
.sent be established by the clearest an most convincing 
proof.' I 
'' The meaning and effect of the conse t decree is brought 
into auestion for the first time in the su t in judgment, and 
it is at once revealed that, viewing t as a contract, the 
66* minds of the parties have never met. They *are entirely 
at antipodes. concerning- its .meanin . '' 
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The Court there set aside and disregarded the consent de-
cree in its_ e~tirety. 
'' 'A mistake on one side may be a ground for rescinding a 
contract, or for refusing to enforce its specific performance. -
Adams Equity, page 171, citing Dulaney v. Rogers, 50 Md. 
524. ,, 
"Where there is a mistake all around as to the legal effect 
of a marriage settlement, and a family arrangement is ef-
fected, not as to the right thus mistaken, but as to the col-
lateral matter arising therefrom, such arrangement will be 
set -aside.'' 
'' But if the question be one which is any way doubtful and 
the doubtfulness of that question is made the basis of any 
arrangement or agreement especially a family one the court 
will give relief.'' 
"Adams Equity, page 189, citing LQ!wton v. Camption., 19 
Juris. 818, 23 L. J. Ch. 505; 18 Beav. 87.'' 
Both parties here clearly thought the decree valid and en-
forceable. Both were mistaken-the one got, and so far holds, 
all the benefits arising from the void order, but repudiates all 
the obligations-the other gets nothing. 
'' If a party in ignorance of a plain and settled principle 
of law, is induced to give up his property, that ignorance is 
a ground for equitable relief. Idem. citing Stone v. Godfrey, 
18 Juris. 165,425; Ashirst v. Mill, 7 Hare 502, 12 Jur. 1035." 
_ "In Bingham v. Bingham, 1 Ves. Sr.126. • • • The defend-
ant -had sold to the plaintiff an estate, which in fact belonged 
to him already, but which both partie.~ believ,ed under a mis-
take of law to belong to the defendant. The Master of the 
Rolls decreed repayment of the purchase money, saying there 
was .a plain mistake. It has been said by Lord C'ottenha:in 
that if it were necessary to consider the principle of that de-
cree it might not be easy to distinguish the case from any 
other purchase in which the vendor turns out to have no title. 
In both there is a mistake, and the effect in both is that 
67• the vendor receives and the purchaser *pays money 
- without the intended equivalent. Landsdown v. Lan...~-
down, 6 C. L. and F. 968. '' 
''One of four brothers died and his next brother and the 
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son of his elder brother had a controversY, which was heir, and 
were adv:ised by the village schoolmaste~ that the former had 
the right because lands could not ascend. He recommended 
them, however, to take further advice, but the nephew after-
wards told him that he would agree to s~_p.re the land with his 
uncle, let it be whose right it would, an~ _thereby prevent all 
disputes and law suits. The land was I accordingly divided 
and a conveyance made. But the arr~gement was after-
wards set aside at the nephew's suit • , • . It is said, too, 
· that if a party acting in ignorance of !
1 
a plain and settled 
principle of law is induced to give up a portion of his un-
disputable property to another, under th~ name of a compro-
mise, he shall.be relieved from the effectflof his mistak. e. Ci.t-
ing Naylor v. Win.ch, 1 S. & S. 555; Sau ders v. Lord Annes-
ley, 2 Sch. & L. 73, 101; Stockley v. Stoc ey~ 1 Ves. & B. 23, 
30; J or<lan v. Stephens, 51 Maine 78 ; Fteemoo v. Curtis, 51 
Maine 140, Adams. Equity 189-190. '' I 
i 
Professor Gilmore, in his lectures at the University of Vir- . 
ginia, adds this comment: - · ! 
l 
"If the law is confessedly doubtful and ignorance may 
well be supposed to exist the mistake will also be relieved 
against." , 
''The remedy which the court affords ~1 a void transaction 
is the replacement of the parties in stafo quo.'' . . 
''Equity is to have the entire transa tion rescinded., and 
if the obligor will have equity he must alro do equity. 
'' The court will remit both parties to I their original posi-
tions and will not relieve the obligor fro'11 his liability., leav-
ing him the fruits of the transaction of )Vhich he complains. 
If again, a decree be asked for the canceJlation of an invalid 
annuity deed, it must be on the terms 0£ having- an account 
takeri of all receipts· and payments on e ther side, and pay-
ment made of the balance. Adams Equi y, page 191; citing 
Br·une v. V eis, 604.'' 
It is submitted that the mistake here in question comes 
clearly within these exceptions, and pres . nts a clear case of 
, unjust enrichment. Central National B k of Richmond v. 
First and ilf ercha,nts National Bqm,k, 171 a. 289, 312. 
68* 8 (b) It is further contended., how ver, that independ~ 
ent of mistake and independent of the entirety of the 
contract, a'f!-d though unsupported by the .consent decree; the 
contract evidenced thereby was one for v lue and based on a 
surrender of existing property rights, il exchange for. pro-
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v1s10ns thereunder for her support and maintenance, and 
those of her children, and the appellee having repudiated and 
renounced all liability for that consideration the appellant is 
entitled to the cancellation of the contract evidenced thereby, 
and the restoration of the status qiio, another remedy avail-
able only in equity. 
'' The jurisdiction of equity to grant the remedy of can-
cellation exists and will always be exercised when it is neces-
sary to protect or maintain equitable primary estate_s, in- · 
terest or right. (Pomeroy Eq. Rem., Sec. 685.) * * • " 
. Such are the rights here involved. 
"Section 686. Equitable Relief ·where ·consideration of 
Conveyance Has Failed-Rescission of 'Support Deeds'.'' 
''It is, of course, the general rule that the mere failure by a 
g-rantee to perform a promise, which formed the whole or 
part of the consideration inducing an executed conveyance, 
give rise to no right" of rescission in the grantor, either at 
law or in equity, unless such promise amounts to a condition, 
and it is a rule of construction, that, in case the lang·uage or 
intention is doubtful the promise or obligation of the grantee 
will be construed to be a covenant, limiting the grantor to an 
action thereon and not a condition subsequent, with the right 
to defeat the convevance. This rule has been found to work 
a great hardship in the frequent cases where an aged person 
has conveyed all his property to a son or other relative on 
the consideration, often oral, that the grantee shall support 
and care for the g-rantor during· the remainder of the. g-rantor'~ 
life, and the grantee, while retaining the land, has abandoned 
· the performance of his obligation. Legal relief by periodic 
69* ::;uit8 for damages is ma1nifestly •i1iadequate; and many 
courts have sought to evade the operation of the rule 
and afford the gTantor some equitable relief that should in-
clude the reinvesting of his title to the land. Thus, the courts 
of Illinois, in ·a series of cases, have decreed rescission, based 
on a legal presumption of the grantee's fraudulent intention, 
at the time of procuring the conveyance, to fail in the per-
f ormanc~ of his obligation. 
"In Wisconsin and Indiana the grantee's promise, thou~h 
oral, is treated as a condition subsequent, on ·breach of which 
the grantor has the rie;ht of re-entry, and generally, the right 
to have his title quieted or the cloud cast thereon bv the 
convevance removed. In a number of other states the courts 
have not been at pains to ·bring the case within the analogy of 
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any principle of general application, b~t have granted COO· 
cellation or a reconveyance on the mere ground of the hard-
ship of the situation and the inadequacy of the legal remedy 
of damages, thus adding to the long list of constructive frauds 
a new and independent species. In still bther states equitable 
relief in this class of cases is refusedJ in obedience to the 
general rule stated at the beg·inning ef 'this paragraph.'' 
Citing inter alia Lowman v. Crawford, 
1
99 Va. 688; Wilfong 
v. Johnson, 51 W. Va. 283', 23 S. E. 730; Keister v. Cubine> 
101 Va. 768." 1 
l 
This latter rule has been uniformly r~cognized in Virginia 
where property has been conveyed or released, as here, in 
consideration of promises· to maintain and support the 
grantee; and parol evidence has been pe~mitted to contradict 
the consideration expressed on the fac~ of the conveyance. 
Here no such evidence is necessary. It is jpanif est in the trans-
action itself. i 
In Keister v. Cubine, 101 Va. 768, Judge Harrison said at 
page 770: 
i 
"The case of Wampler v. lVampler, 30 Gratt. 454, and 
Lowman v. Crawford, 99 Va. 668, 40 S. 1 E. 17, are relied on 
as decisive of the contention that, where I the consideration of 
a deed for maintenance and support has failed, the only 
remedy that can be applied is a rescisf;ion of the contract 
and a restoration 9f the grantor to his <>:'.riginal status. 
''We do not understand these cases tb establish the hard 
and fast rule contended for that in itvery case of a con-
70* veyance in consideration of mainteµance *and support, 
where the consideration fails, that rescission follow~. 
Those cases primarily establish the right! and duty of a court 
of equity to take fltrisdiction in this class of cases, because 
the remedy is manifestly ·inadequate at lI1 w. The case at bar 
is a further illustration of the wisdom f affording in such 
cases equitable relief, for it is here, if pos ible, more apparent 
that a court of law, with its more restrictid powers, could not 
do justice betw. een the parties. It does ,,,ot follow, however, 
that the same relief must be administe' ed in every case. 
Equity, having taken jurisdiction, will eal with each case 
in the light of its own peculiar circumst nces.'' 
"The power of a court of equity in · proper case to re-
scind the contract and restore the prop rty to the grantor 
would certainly include the power to affo . d a less drastic re-
lief, if the facts pointed to the latter as , ore consonant with 
justice.'' 
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. In Martin v. Hall, 115 Va. 358, a grantor for a stated con-_ 
sideration of $600.00, the receipt of which was acknowledged, 
conv:eyed a tract of land, but where it was proven by oral 
evidence that the. true consideration for the conveyance was 
"the support and maintenance of the grantor by the grantee,, 
the Court, in granting rescission, said at page 361 : 
''It will be sufficient to say that it satisfactorily shows that 
the real consideration for the conveyance sought to ·be set 
aside was tlie support atnd maintenance of the ,qr ant or for life 
by the grantee~ that the latter has not only failed to support 
and maintain the grantor, but bef <Jr,e the institution of _this 
suit, as well as in her answer to the bill and in her de.pos.ition, 
denied that she was under any legal, obligation to do so. The 
consideration of the conveyance for ~upport and maintenance 
having thus failed, the grantor was entitled under the de-
cisions· of this court in Wampler v. Wampler, 30 Gratt. 454; 
Lowman v. Crawford, 99 Va. 688, and Keister v. Cubine,· 101 
Va. 768,. to come into a court of equity because he had no ade-
qua.te remedy at law, and have the conveyance rescinded.'' 
In Blose v. ,Blose, 118 Va. 16, it was held first that parole 
evidence was admissible to contradict the recited *con-
71 • sidera#on, and to prov:e the real consideration, and when 
it appeared that support and maintenance was the co11-
sideration in fact, it was proper fo1· the court in- its discre-
tion to award either specific performance or rescission. On 
page 22, after reciting with approval Keister v. Cubine, 101 
Va. 668, 770, supra, the c~urt said: 
''The particulars in which the decree appears to us er-
roneous are in holding (1) that the complainant was not en-
titled to any relief, and (2) that the contract for the main-
tenance was conditioned upon the residence of the beneficiarie:; 
on . the' premises.' ' 
• • • • 
"The agTeement for the support of the grantors thus clearly 
appearing· as a substantial part .of the consideration for the 
conveyance, a court of equity will co'listriie it liberally in favo1· 
of the grantors, and will find some means for its enforce-
ment. If there be a doubt as to the place or mawner of per-
farmance, the doitbt will be resolved in favor of the benefici-
aries. If the relief required -is without exact precedent, the 
court can and will devise a r,emedy to fit the circumst01nCes. 
Keister v. Oubine, .<;itpra." 
I 
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The bill here in question plainly showJ a case for equitable 
relief (1st) by rescission of the contract Jvidenced by the con-
sent decree, and (2nd) reinstatement and ~pecific performance 
of the original contract and the .Nevada decree. 
72* ·That a failure of consideration'1 such as is here set 
forth should result in the cancellation of the contract 
evidencing those considerations and that I such contract is en-
tire, is implicit in the special plea of the appellee (Tr., pp. 
55-60), where at great length he sets fortth the various obli-
gations assumed by him and the benefits1. to be received, and 
how the court undertook to make certain changes as to the 
custody of the children and how their piaintenance should 
be cared for in futuro, and concluded in paragraphs 10-12 
thereof (Tr., pp. 60-61) that by virtue the~eof ''the defendant 
has now been wholly deprived of the con~ideration which in-
duced him to make said promise in both the original and 
amended contracts * * * and that such failure of considera-
tion relieves and discharges the defend~nt of any and all 
duty or obligation to perform or comply ;With said promises, 
or any of them", and in par. 12, p. 61: !"That for the rea-
sons herein set forth defendant is likewise under no duty or 
obligation, legal or contractual to the complainant, to said 
boys or to any other party or parties f6r bills incurred or 
sums expended for and on account of the support, mainte-
nance and education of said boys since S4ptember, 1934. '' 
'\Ve submit that this plea is in effect itself, 1st, an asser-
tion of the entirety of the contracts, the equiva1.ent to a 
cross-bill, praying rescission, and 2nd, I is wholly without 
merit as a defense, because it ignores the allegations of th~ 
bill that the amended contract was violat~d and voided, and 
compliance therewith made impossible by\ the course persist-
ently and consistently pursued by the appallee (a) in refusing 
to discuss with appellant any changes i circumstances, or 
in the schools to be attended by the oys; (b) in failing. 
73• to pay *for their necessary bills for uition and clothing 
and thereby making changes necessa ·y; (c) in attempt-
ing to violate both the letter and the spiri of both contracts, 
by taking both boys into his exclusive c stody and putting 
them at schools not approved by her witl but notice or even 
consultation with appellant and sending em to school at 
W a.rrenton daily to and from his own hom , presided over by 
his second wife against the known will of b th herself and the 
boys and ( d) that in so far as the actio of the court was 
concerned in altering custody and meth d of meeting the 
expenses of clothing, maintenance and edu tion such method· 
w·as adopted pursuant to suggestions ema ting fro.m the ap-
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pellee 's own counsel in his presence and was largely if not 
entirely a return to the methods proviued in the first con-
tract. 
A party to a contract cannot by his own misconduct and 
violation of a contract make exa.ct compliance therewith im-
possible, and then claim that a co~rse of conduct necessitated 
thereby released him from all past, present or future liability 
· for the consequences. 
"Where, certain terms of a contract are left to subsequent 
initial agTeements one of the parties has been held as liable 
for a breach where without reason or excuse he declines to 
enter into such a.n agreemen~. '' 13 C. J. 634. 
See a.lso Clark v. Franklin,, 7 Leigh 8; Smith v. Pacard, 94 
Va. 730, 732 . 
.Yet, because the court in this cause for valid reasons 
and by a valid order, and therefore conclusively presumed 
to be for sufficient reasons, has awarded the mother -the ex-
clusive custody of the boys, pursuant to his own initia-
74* tive he claims to have been absolved from all *obliga-
tions, contractual and otherwise. What was said by this 
Court in Hennin,qer v. Henninger, 90 Va. 721 at p. 274, in the 
absence of contract, or prior valid decree, is peculiarly appli-
cable here. · 
''It is true that while the elementary writers include among 
the duties of parents to their children that of education, it is 
a duty of imperfect obligation. Nevertheless, as Blackstone 
observes, it is a duty pointed out 'by reason, and of far the 
greatest importance of any. Chancellor Kent takes the same 
'7iew, and adds, the remark that 'a pa.rent who sends his sou 
into the world uneducated does a great injury to mankind, 
as well as to his own family, for he defrauds the community 
of a useful citizen, and bequeaths to it a nuisance.' 2 Kent. 
Comm. 195.'' 
'' It would be strange, then, if the effect of a decree, grant- -
ing a divorce, and assigning the custody of the infant chil-
dren to a suitable person, were held to relieve the offending 
parent of a duty he owes both to his off spring and to society, 
when he has the means to fulfill it. If this were the effect of 
- the decree, the off ender would take advantage of his own 
-wrong, and the interference of the law, intended for the bene-
fjt of the children, might work an entirely different result.'' 
' 
i 
Ruth L. Buchanan, v. J. J. Buchanan. ·. 55, 
75• •9t~ .. That the AP_pellee ls Estopp~d from De'fllJJ1hl,g Lia• 
- · bility Under Either One Or the Other of the Con .. 
I 
tracts. · · ; 
1 
FJ;h~ acquiesce~ce of the appellee, p~n1ente lite) in the 
vahd1ty of the Judgments of the Fauqmer Court 8ntered 
either with the consent. of both parties br at the instance of 
appellee 's own counsel, am.ending the ptovisions of both the 
original and the amended contracts and accepting the benefits , 
thereof whereby both the appellant as a \quasi trustee therein 
and those who furnished materials or $ervices for the sup-
port, maintenance and education of the\ children in reliance· 
thereon, were thereby induced to change ~heir position·s in re-
lation thereto, constitutes an equitable estoppel against the 
appellee to deny responsibility for such! indebtedness. Bfrd 
v. Pa. Ratilroad Company, 151 Va. 954, 961, and cases there 
cited, Nagle v. Sayres, 150 Va. 508,. 513.\ · 
In the latter case this court quoting from Arwood v. HiU's 
.Admr., 135 Va. 235, 243, said : ! 
i 
i 
'' A party cannot, either in the cours¢ of litigation or in 
dealings in pais, occupy inconsistent positions. Upon that 
rule election is founded; a man shall noft be allowed, in the 
language of the Scotch law '~o approb4te and reprobate'. 
'.And where a man has an election between several incon-
sistent courses of action·, he will be con~ed to that course 
which he first adopts; the election, if mhde with knowledge 
of the facts, is itself binding, it cannot be withdrawn with-· 
out due consent; it cannot be withdraw* though it has not 
been acted upon by another by any chang~ of position. Bige-
low on Estoppel, page 733.' '' I . 
".A party is forbidden to assume suc,essive positions fu 
the course of a suit or series· of suits, · reference to the 
same fact or state of facts, which are in onsistent with each 
other and mutually contradictory. C. ~ . Ry. Co. v. Rison, 
99 Va. 31." 
Citations along this Jine might be cite , indefinitely. 
76• *10th. That to Adjust the Ri_qhts of ll Parties Arisihig 
Under Either of These Contracts .As Finally Estab ... 
u.~hed Will Req,u,i(e a; M'l.dtiplicity of uits. Eqwity 10a;n, 
Do All These Things .in a Single 8'1.(/it. 
In discussing this question Mr. Pomerey in his ''Equity 
Jmisprudence", Section 245, defines the ra.rying conditions 
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which would vest a court of equity with jurisdiction to avoid 
a multiplicity. o.f suits and states as a third group the follow-
ing: · 
'' 3. Where a number of persons have separate and i·ndi-
vidual claims and :'rights of action against the same party, 
A, but all arise from some common ca use, are governed by 
the same legal rule, and, involve similar fa9ts, and the whole 
matter might be settled in a single suit brought by all of these 
persons uniting as co-plaintiffs, or one of the persons suing 
on, behalf of the other, or even by one person siting for him-
self alone. 
Again in Section 255 he says : 
"Third and Fourth Classes-In pursuing this inquiry•~• 
the third and fourth of my classes may with advantage be 
considered together. In the third a number of persons have 
separate and distinct interests, but still united by some com-
mon tie, against one determined party, and these interests 
may perhaps be enforced by one equitable suit brought by 
all the persons joining as co-plaintiffs, or by one suing on 
behalf of himself, and all the others, or even by one suing 
for himself alone. The fourth is the exact converse of the 
third. One determined party has a general right against a 
number of persons, common to all in some of its features, 
but still affecting each individually • • •. It is plain 
77-.s that the same •fundamental questions must arise in both 
of these classes. The first and most important ques-
tion which meets us is, What must be the character and es~ 
sential elements, and the external form of the common right, 
claim or interest held by the number of persons against the 
single party in the third class, and by the single party against 
the number of persons in the fourth class, in order that a 
court of equity may acquire or exercise jurisdiction for the 
purpose of preventing a multiplicity of suits, and may de-
termine the rights of all and give complete relief by one de-
cree? Is it necessary that the commo~ bond, element or fea-
ture should inhere in the very rights, interests or claims 
themselves which.subsist between the body of persons on the 
one side and the single party on the other, and should affect 
the nature and form of those rig·hts, interests or claims to 
such an extent that they create some positive and rec~gnized 
existing legal relation or privity between the individual mem-
bers of the group of persons, as well as between each of them 
and the single determined party to whom they stand in an 
adversary position? Or is it enough that the common bond 
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or element consists solely in the f~ct thp..t all the rights, in-
terests, or claims subsisting between the body of persons and 
the single party have arisen from the s<itme source, from the 
same event, or the same transaction,, an~ the fact that they 
all in1.wlve and depend upon sirriilar ques~ions of, fact, and the 
same _qitestions of law, so that while thei same positive legal 
relation exists between the single determined party on the 
one side and each individual of the body of persons on the 
other, no such legal relation exists between the individual 
members themselves of that body! as !. among themselves 
their respec_ tive rights, interests, and cla1rs against the com. -
mon adversary party, otherwise than abo estated, are wholly 
separate and distinct. This question lie at the foundation 
of the whole discussion. Others have lJ.ee~ suggested, and 
have been considered by the courts, but \they are all finally 
resolved into this, and all depend upon ils final solution for 
their answer; It is in the solution of this most import,ant 
question, and in _its final application to 1. particular circum-
stances, that most of the conflict of opinion among the Ameri-
can courts especially has arisen. I shalf endeavor to pres~nt 
all these conflicting views briefly but faitly, and to suggest 
my own opinion concerning their correct~ess and the weight 




78* ""In Section 268 he ~ays : I 
"From a careful comparison of the aqtual decisions em-
braced in the third and fourth classes, and which are quoted 
under the foregoing paragraphs, the fol16wing propositions 
are submitted as established by principle I and by aut4ority, 
and as constituting settled rules concern~ng this branch of 
the equitable jurisdiction. In that particular family of suits, 
wl;iether brought on behalf of a numerous body against a single 
party, or by a single party against a nu erous body, which 
are strictly and technically 'bills of peac ' in order that a 
court of equity may grant the relief an thus exercise its 
jurisdiction on the ground of preventing . a multiplicity of 
suits, there does and must exist among th . individuals com-
posing the numerous body, or between each of them· and their 
single adversary a common right, a comm ity of interest in 
the subject-matter of the controversy, or a ommon title from 
which all their separa,te claims and all th.e quP-stions at issue 
arise." 
"Section 273. Third Class-The cases constituting this 
~lass must be separated into several differ nt groups, all de-
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pending, however, upon the same principle. The jurisdiction 
is exercised in suits broug·ht by numerous persons to estab-
lish their separate claims against a single party, where these 
claims, although separate, aU arise from a common title, .and 
there is a common right or common interest in the subject-
matter; · in suits by numerous 'individual proprietors of sepa-
rate tracts of land to restrain and abate a private. nuisance 
or continuous trespass which injuriously affects each pro-
prietor; in suits by numerous separate judgment creditors 
to reach the property of and enforce their judgment against 
the same fraudulent debtor; in suits by numerous owners of 
separate and distinct lots of land to set aside or restrain the 
collection of an illegal assessment for local improvements 
laid by a city, town or other municipal corporation, and 
. made a lien on their respective lots; and in suits by numerous 
.taxpayers of a town, city, county or other district to restrain 
or set aside an illegal general tax, whether person or made 
.a lien upon their respective property, or an illegal proceed-
'ing of the local officials, whereby a public debt would be 
created a.nd taxation would be increased.'' 
The controversy here stated comes clearly within Mr. 
Pomeroy 's third class. The rights of the various cred-
79* itors *while in a sense several all arise from a common 
"title" "rio·ht" and "interest'' in the primaru riO'ht , e · .r o , 
the subject-matter of this suit, to-wit: "the contract" to be 
enforced whether that contract is the original or amended 
one under either of which, if established, they have certain 
equitable rights in common, under the allegations of the 
bill. 
In the court below the appellee cited only Elder v. Cribson, 
155 S. E. 622 (W. Va.), a bill to enjoin several suits at law 
already instituted a.gainst an administrator by several in-
dividuals who, while they were heirs or devisees of the de-
cedent, claimed separate title to separate specific articles 
of personal property in the possession of the adminis,trator, 
but whose titles arose not by descent from the decedent, or 
under the will needing construction, but under sepa-ra.te and 
.distinct claims arising aliunde, each of whicl1 claims were also 
denied by each of the other distributees. The court properly 
denied jurisdiction because the administrator who claimed 
title to all was not a disinterested stakeholder, and none of 
the claimants traced their claims back to a common primary 
right, title or interest, but each depended primarily and wholly 
on its own distinct facts. The court also denied a claim to 
assert jurisdiction by regarding the bill as a request for 
equitable aid in administering an es.tate under the direction 
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of a court of equity, holding that while ian administrator may 
have such aid when the affairs of his dfcedent are '' so much 
involved ~hat ~e cannot safely ~~inster .the estate except un ... 
der the direction of the court, ,x. * ~ but the case here presents 
no such complication * • * now requis~e to equity jurisdic .. 
tion under our statutory regulation of the administration of 
estates, citing Page v. Huddleson! 98 W. Va. 104, 108, 
80* 126 S. E. *579, wherein the statutory reg11lations were 
held, in view of their constitutiont\-1 and legislative his-
tory, to co.nf er "exclitsive jurisdiction" ir: such matters on the 
county courts. 
It is sufficient to say that the statutoiy provisions in Vir-
ginia in. that regard have never been co strued as applicable 
to the quasi :fiduciary relationship her, shown, nor as de .. 
priving equity of a jurisdiction exercised by it immemorially. 
Such a holding would run counter to the\ rule that.-conferr~g 
statutory jurisdiction over matters alr~ady within the. cog-
nizance of equity does not in the absence of express words 
or necessary implication defeat such ju~isdiction as hereto• 
fore pointed out. There are certainly lo express words to· 
that effect. So far as inference is conce:irned it is ~ecessarily 
to the contrary under Section 5411, wh~ch requires, the ac-
count of any fiduciary settled in a chandery cause to be cer-
tified and recorded by the "clerk of the court wherein the 
:fiduciary qualified'', as soon as may be af~er final decree. Even 
if the statute is so construed it could have no application 
here for there is no requirement in our \ :fiduciary statute in 
respect to constructive or quasi trustee .. In addition to the 
rights and duties of a :fiduciary imposed under each of the 
contracts aforesaid on .the appellant theyl· and her difficulties 
have been mag·nified at the instigation of the appeJlee by 
having the sole and exclusive custody of the two sons con-
ferred on her by the court under the el1 licit condition that 
the costs and expenses incident thereto ould be met by the 
a ppellee under and by virtue of the co tracts and decrees 
. evidencing the same. 
81 * *The real reason for denying ju "sdiction in the W. 
Va .. case, though not stated, is imp ·cit therein, to-wit: 
that the cases were all within the conaur ent jurisdiction of 
both law and equity, and the law jurisdic ion having already 
been invoked equity would not thereaft r interfere .with a 
court of co-ordinate jurisdiction. This w 1s the principle un-
der which jurisdiction in such a case wa ! denied in Hoge v. 
Fidelity L. <f; T. Co., 103 Va. 1, where, w ile recognizing the 
principle that equity jurisdiction was ot impaired by a 
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"But it has ·no application to a case where the jurisdiction 
of the court of law, and the court of equity is concurrent and 
where the litigant· has been first impleaded in a court of law, 
and the machinery of that court is as adequate to afford the 
defendant ~ full and unembarrassed defense as a court of 
equity would be." 
None of· these conditions apply here, but the contrary. 
It is the same principle announced much more recently 
by this court in Nicholas v. Nicholas, 169 Va. 399, .where re-
peating what.was saia in Filler v. Tyler, 91 Va. 458, it is said 
at p. 404: 
"Oourts of equity, having such jurisdiction before the 
. en~ctment of the statute • • • still retain it althou.gh the stat-
. ute·:·may furnish a complete and adequate remedy at law. 
Courts of equity, having once acquired jurisdiction, never 
lose"i\.because jurisdiction of the same matters are given to 
law J!ourts, unless the statute giving such jurisdiction uses 
prohibitory Qr restrictive words. 1 Barton's Ch. Pr. 60, 61. 
See als·o Beverly v. Rhodes, 86 Va. 415, 10 .S. E. 572; Shield 
v. Bro1Wri, 166 Va. 596, 186i8. E. 33, 34; Hoge v. Fidelity Loan 
and Trus~ Co., 103 Va. 1, 48 S. E. 494." 
s2• •11. This Is a Proper Case for a Declaratory Judg-
ment. 
In the court below the appellee cited several cases to the 
point that our declaratory judgment law conferred no new 
jurisdiction on the courts. If this statement is confined to 
equity courts we would take no exception to it. It does con-
fer a ~ew jurisdiction on law courts. E'quity courts have 
always exercised such jurisdiction where a necessity therefor 
existed or was even threatened, -qnder its preventative juris-
diction usually denominated'' quia timet''. Construing wills, 
quieting titles, declaring rights accrued or accruing, enjoin-
ing their violation and aiding, advising and assisting fiduci-
aries in the enforcement and performance of their trusts arc 
but instances of this jurisdiction. 
'' Courts of equity have for centuries rendered declaratory 
-judgments. Barchards Declaratory .Judgments 293. '' 
''The power granted. by declaratory judgment-statutes is 
more strictly a direction to use an existing power than an 
authorization of new power. Idem 137." 
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''It is both historically and traditionally a power exercised 
primarily by courts of equity and evenl .when exercised by 
law co:urts is larg·ely equitable in its nat~re~ Idem 137-138." 
~Ir. Pomeroy in his work on "Equitaple Remedies"; and 
discussing his Fourth Group to which h:e assigns :a,emedies 
by Which Estates, Interests and Pri~ry Rights, Either 
Legal or Equitable are Dire~tly Declated, Established or 
R,ecovered or the Enjoyment Thereof Jr*lly Restored'', and 
which he further divides into three class~s, says of the first 
class in :Section 6 they: : 
83* ., 'are primarily adapted to purely I 1eg·al interests, the 
common law gives similar relief by ~eans of appropriate 
legal actions. The jurisdiction of equity wa.s based _wholly, 
upon the superiority of the equitable 1ethods and proce-
dure; • * • These remedies all belong to t~e 'concurrent juris-
diction' in the strict definition of that term.'' 
I 
And as to the second ~lass, Section 7, h~ says : 
'' In all the remedies belonging to this ~lass, some general 
right, wliich may be either legal or equitaple., is declared and 
established. The class includes suits to establish a will, suits 
to construe a will, and the bills of peace ~nd bills quia timet 
for the purpose of quieting title, which belong to the original 
general jurisdiction of equity. Some of the remedies of this 
class undoubtedly depend upon what th~ early chancellors 
called the 'jurisdiction quia timet'. Sine~ the conception of 
a. qwia timet jurisdiction is so broad, and runs through so 
many different branches of the remedial jurisprudence, I have 
not adopted it as a. basis of classification. [1he object of suits 
to establish and to construe wills is plainly the establishment 
of a general right; and the same is no less \true of those suits 
to quiet title, bills of peace, and the like, ,hicli belong to the 
original jurisd>iction of eq1tity." · 
Of class three of the fourth group he sa s : 
'' • • • of this class as distinguished rom those of the 
preceding one, the direct object of the re edy is to declare 
a;n,d establish some vart-icular estate, inter st or right, either 
legal or equtitable, in the property which" i the subject mat-
ter. • • • Some of these remedies also ave been . said to 
depend upon the quia timet jurisdiction.'' 
He assigns to a fifth class : 
'' Remedies by which Equitable Obligatio s are Specifically 
and Directly enforced.'' 
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and says ( Section 9) : 
'' are all purely equitable, and the rights of the complainant 
and obligations of the defendant which are enforced by their 
means are also equitable. They belong·, therefore, to the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of _equity. 
84i!I: *"Their distinctive object is to specifically enforce 
the complainant's equitable right, and to compel the 
defendant to specifically perform the actual equitable obli.qa-
tion which rests u.pon him. This group as a whole, contains 
the specific performance of contracts * * * the specific en-
forcement of trusts, express and irnplied; and the specific 
e11forcement of obligations arising from :fiduciary relations 
analogous to trusts. * "" * the broad scope of this class of 
remedies, perhaps the most characteristic of the whole equity 
system, is thus described in another place : '4. REMEDIES 
OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, of . those by which the 
party violating his primary right is compelled to do the very 
acts which his duty wnd the plaintiff's primary right acquire 
from hini * * * . · 
• "• 4t * 'Specific performance' is often spoken of as though 
it was confined to the case of executory contracts; but in 
reality it is constantly employed in the enforcement of rig·hts 
and duties arising- fro~ relations between specific persons 
which do not result from contracts, as, for example, between 
ce.~tui que t1~ustent and their trustees, wards and their 
guardians, or administrators, and the like. In these latter 
cases, of an executory contract at the suit of· a vendor, the 
form and nature of the. final relief is often the same as that 
of accounting·, pecuniary compensation or restoration.'' 
It is, of course, esseniial to specific performance that the 
thing to be done or performed or the right to be enforced, 
must be first ascertained and declared, to be followed by the 
direction '' to do the very acts which his duty and the plain-
tiff's primary right required from him", even "though the 
f 01·m and nature of the final relief is often the same as that 
of accounting, pecuniary compensa.tion or restoration. 
These authorities clearly show that declaratory judgments 
have always been within the competence of equity, and that 
the declaratory·judgmcnt statute cloes not diminish that juris-
diction. 
85=» *12th. If Even Only One of the Foregoing Grou,mls for 
Eqitita.ble Interference Exists Then Equity Having 
Obtained J'Urisdiction. TVill Go Ahead and Afford Full and 
Complete Relief Accordin.Q to Equitable Principles Eve'lt 
~Phou .. qh P'ltrely Legal Relief Is .Aff o,rded .. 
Ruth L. Buchanan, 'V. J. Buchanan. 63 
It is surely unneces~ary to cite authorities to sustain this 
position. I 
II. THE COURT ALSO ERRED rnl REFUSING PEN-
DENTE LITE ORDERS FOR MliNTENANCE 
AND ATTORNEY'S F:¢ES. 
. '1 
It is also respectfully urged that the !decree of the Court 
below entered on the 28 day of Novem~r, 1938, refusing to . 
make pendente lite orders for maintenance and support and 
education of the two boys, and for atto~·ney's fees, wa.s er-
roneous because such expenses are just1 as essential to the 
proper maintenance a.nd education of t)?-ese infant children 
in conformity with the terms of the contrrct as are the actual 
maintenance· and educational expenses th:emselv~s, especially 
where, as here, all liability has been re~diated by the con-
tractor. The analogy furnished by separate main~enance 
cases between husband and wife, independent of statute, and 
independent of ~ontract, and independent! of divorce, and the 
case at bar furnishes ample precedent for such a course. 
Pitroell v. Purcell, 4 H. & M. 507; Harr-is!, v. Harris, 31 Grat. 
13; .Anderson v. Shuf ert, 181 U. S. 575; 4~ L. Ed. 1009; Bray 
v. Landergren, 161 Va. 699. Equity court~ have always exer-
cised this jurisdiction when necessity tperefor arises and 
also because, as stated in Pomeroy's Eqlity Jurisprudence, 
Vol. 3, Sec. 1064: 
I 
"Wherever there.is any bona fide doubt ~s to the true inean .. 
ing a.nd intent of provisions of the instrµment creating the 
trust, or as to the particular course which he ought to pursue, 
the trustee is always entitled to maintaii a suit, in equity, 
at the expense of the trust estate." 1 
86* ' *CONCLUSION. 
It is confidently asserted that in the · ght of these au-
thorities the court below erred to the gre t prejudice of the 
appellant and her children, and those w o have furnished 
the services and materials, the means an money which, un-
der either contract, it was the duty of th i appellant to have 
, furnished, which duty up to this time he · as evaded so sue- • 
cessfully, both in refusing allowances fo.r , suit money and 
maintenance, pendente lite, and in dism.is ·ng the bill . 
.Your petitioner the ref ore respectfully rays that the rec-
ord in B'uchanan v. Buchanan-, # 1885, be · spected with and 
as a part of the transcript herewith pres nted; that she be 
awarded an appeal from said final decree 'f April 7th, 1939, 
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ag well as that. of November 28th, 1938, that the saine be 
placed upon the privileged docket for an early hearing to 
the end that speedy justice so long delayed may be awarded 
her and her children, and that afte,r hearing both the said 
decrees be reversed and annulled, and the cause remanded 
to the circuit court with appropriate instructions. .She also 
prays that her counsel be afforded an opportunity to support 
this petiti!on for an appeal by oral argum~nt, and when al-
low~d that it be treated as her opening brief. · 
,Counsel for the appellant further avers that the foregoing 
petition will be filed with Hon. George L. Browning, Asso-
ciate Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, at 
· Orange, Virginia, and that a copy of the foregoing peti-
87* tion was on the 23rd •day of ,June, 1939, mailed to Mr. 
Thomas B. Gay, Counsel of record for John R. Buch-
anan, at Richmond, Virginia.· 
Respectfully submitted, 
RUTH LESTER BUCHANAN, 
By JOHN S. BARBOUR, 
JOHN S. BARBOUR, 
Attorney for Petitioner. 
Counsel. 
The und·ersigned, John S. Barbour, an Attorney duly li-
censed and practicing in the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia, hereby certifies that in his opinion there is erro1~ 
in the decrees complained of in the· foregoing petition, and 
that the same should be reviewed and reversed. 
JOHN S. B~OUR. 
Received 6-24-39. 
G. L.B. 
Appeal allowed. Bond $1,000.00. 
GEORGE L. BROWNING. 
9-6-39.· 
. Received Sept. 7, 1939. 
:M. B. w. 
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In the ·Circuit Court of Fauqui~r County. 
Among the records and proceedings of said Court, are th.a 
·following: · ' 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that at th~ Third .September 
Rules, 1938, came the plaintiff Ruth Lesteir Buchanan, and filed 
her bill in chancery in the Clerk's Office o~ said Court, against 
John R. Buchanan, in the following words and :figures : 
- I 
page 2 ~ To: The Honorable, J. R. H. ilexander, Judge of 
· the Circuit Court of Fauquie~ County, Virginia. 
I -
Your complainant, Ruth Lester Buc,1anan, shows unto 
_your Honor the following facts : . 
' -
I 
1. On January 15th, 1915, she interma;rried with John R •. 
Buchanan, hereinafter ref erred to as th¢ defendant, now a 
resident of .Fauquier 8ounty, Virginia.! 
· 2. Three children · were born of said \ marriage, to-wit: 
Helen Warren Buchanan, twenty-one yeal"s of age and mar-
ried; James A.. Buchanan, IV, nineteen I years of age, and 
John R. Buchanan, J' r ., now · 16 years of ~ge. 
3. The plaintiff is now a resident of the District of Co-
lumbia. ! 
4. Long prior to May 18th, 1931, and ! while she and the 
·said defendant were both residents of Fa*quier County, Vir.: 
ginia, difference arose between them in corsequence of which 
they were living apart. The defendant had deserted and 
left her with the said children in her cu tody in the matri-
monial domicile, Levy Manor in Fauquie . County, Virginia, 
the property of the defendant. On May . 8th, 1931, she and 
the defendant by contract in writing, un er seal, a copy of 
i\rhich is among· the files of your Honor's Court, in a. certain 
habeaB corpus proceeding, therein pendi g, styled John R. 
Buchanan v. Ruth Lester Buchanan, and "f hich is hereby re .. 
ferred to and asked to be read as a part1_of this bill, under 
which he the said John R. Buchanan mutu~lly covenanted and 
· agreed as follows: I 
By paragraph 1 that your complainant bould occupy said 
mansion house and curtilage for five years with said children, 
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and the defendant should pay for all repairs to said house 
and taxes on saia property. 
page 3 ~ By parag·raph 2 he agreed to pay complainant in 
monthly installments the sum of $1,500.00 per month 
on the first day of each month, commencing on June 1st, 1931, 
to be used by her at her discretion in the maintenance of said 
home, as a home for herself and children, including the pur-
chase of supplies and food-stuffs; the employment of neces-
sary help; the purchase of necessary clothing, ordinary 
dental and medical bills, incurred by her in their behalf; feed 
for the horses of complainant and her children, and further 
that after the expiration of said period of five yea.rs the said 
sum was to be applied by her for the support and maintenance 
of said children. The defendant thereby agreed to pay in ad-
dition all bills incurred by her for the board and tuition of 
said children in connection with their education, either at 
boarding schools or at college, and all extraordinary medical 
bills. Provided further that in the event either of said chil-
dren should cease to reside with and make their home with 
complainant the said payaments of $1,500.00 should be pro-
portionately reduced. , 
Since June, 1933, and until her majority and marriage the 
daughter has lived with the defendant. 
Under the third paragraph the defendant agreed to and 
did pay to complainant the sum of $25,000.00 in cash, · and 
agreed to. and ~id execute to her his certain promissory notes, 
benring even date therewith, for the aggregate sum of $125,- . 
000.00, payable on or before five years after date, with in-
terest from date at the rate of six per cent per annum, pay-
able quarterly. 
By paragraph 4 complainant agreed to execute such con-
veyance as was necessary to vest in defendant the absolute 
fee simple title to certain valuable property in Canada, with 
which stipulation she complied. 
page 4 ~ -By paragraph 5 the defendant agreed to assume 
and to pay within thirty days certain outstanding 
bills to various merchants, trademen, etc., incurred by her 
in the prior support of herself and children, and she believes 
that the same have been paid. 
By paragraph 6 the right was reserved to the said def end-
ant to occupy Leny Manor her matrimonial home for a pe-
riod of one week in each month, to-wit: from the 15th day 
of each month to and including the 21st day thereof, during 
which periods the complainant ag-reed to absent herself from 
her said home and during the vacations, Summer and Xmas, 
while the said children were home, the defendant should have 
I 
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the right to occupy the said home with! said children for at 
least six weeks of the Summer vacatio~ and one-half of the 
Xmas vacation at such times as should.lbe ·mututaUy agreed 
upon between them, during which peripd complainant also 
agreed to absent herself from said home, with a further pro .. 
vision that should he not desire to occupy said home at any 
of the time above mentioned that he should give the complain ... 
ant reasonable notice to that effect. ; 
·By paragraph 7 of said agreement it: was further agreed 
between the parties that the complaina~t when absent from 
the home should have the right to take with her for her use a 
certain automobile and a chauffeur for ~ts operation. 
By parag·raph 8 thereof it was agreed! that commencing in 
the Fall of 1931 his daughter and elder son, t~-wit: the said 
James A.. Buchanan, IV. should be plac*d in such boarding 
school as should be mutually agreed u on by the parties,. 
and in the event of their inability to agr e upon such schools 
that the school or schools should be selected by 
page 5 ~ some party to be agreed upon by the parties. 
By paragraph 10 the defertdant reserves the 
right to sell the home property througll the trustees under 
the will of his deceased father, under apd by virtue of the 
provisions of which he had the right tq occupy said home, 
and ag-reed in the event of such sale duri~g the period of five 
yl3ars to immediately provide in lieu the1,eof a. suitable home 
in the District of Columbia, Maryland br Virginia for the 
use and occupancy of the complainant· ahd her children for 
the remainder of said period of :five yeatis. 
5. A. few days after the said contract\ was signed,~ seale9-
and delivered, to-wit: on or about May I 20th, 1931, the de .. 
f endant went to the State of Nevada and there filed against 
the complainant in a Reno Court of ge I eral and equitable 
jurisdiction a bill for divorce, containing false allegations of 
a residence and domicile in the State f Nevada, and of 
cruelty on the part of the complainant t wards him. With 
his bill he exhibited a copy of the said :contract above set 
forth and alleged its justness; that said oTeement was fair, 
just and equitable in all respects; was no made for the pur-
pose of expediting or facilitating a divor e, but for the sole 
and only purpose of settling· their respect ve property rights, 
making provision for the future suppor;t and maintenance 
of the plaintiff, and of said minor child*en, and for agree-
ing as between said parties with respec~ to ,the custody of 
said minor children, and alleged: 
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'' And plaintiff is desir"ous of having the oourt adopt, ap-
prove and cpnfi.rm the same, and by reference made a part 
of the decree * • ·• to th0i same extent as thoug·h said agree-
ment were fully set forth in said decree.'' · 
page 6 ~ and prayed that an absolute divorce be granted and 
'' for a further order adopting, approving and con-
firming the written memorandum of agTeement between the 
parties • • • and that '' the same may be adopted as the 
.order of this court concerning the future support and main-
tenance of· the defendant and of the minor children of plaintiff 
and defendant and the award of custody made therein.'' 
Complainant without ever being in Nevada, through her 
counsel, filed an answer to said bill denying the allegation 
of a domicile and residence in Reno but admitted the mar-
riage and birth of the children, as alleged, made no reference · 
to the agreement and denied his allegations of cruelty and 
prayed that the defendant take nothing, and that she be dis-
missed. · 
On July 27th, 1931, the ca rise was brought on for trial with-
out a jury. This complainant introduced no evidence. The 
Oourt upon the sole testimony of· the plaintiff therein and a 
boarding · house keeper found and adjudged that the said. 
- John R. Buchanan had been domiciled in the State of Nevada· 
for six weeks prior thereto ; that the complainant had treated 
defendant with extreme cruelty and entered a. decree of ab-
solute divorce, and further "ORDERED ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that the agreement dated the 18th day of May, 
1931-settling and adjusting their respective property rights, 
and providing for the future support and maintenance of 
the defendant, your complainant, and of the minor children 
of the parties hereto, and providing for the custody of said 
minor children-be, and the same is hereby adopted, ap-
·proved and confirmed to the same extent as though fully 
set forth herein'', all of which will more fully appear from 
a copy of said pleadings now in the file of the court in the 
habeas corpus proceeding aforesaid, and asked to be read 
herewith. Immediately thereafter the defendant 
page 7 ~ returned to the State of Virginia and has remained 
·a resident therein ever since. ·· 
6. This said contract and decree concerning property rights 
,and money payments aforesaid was duly carried out and 
-performed by both parties thereto until and including May, 
: ·1933~ 
7. On June 1st, 1933, defendant defaulted in the payment 
of the $1,500.00 installment then due under the provisions 
i 
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of paragraph 6 of said contract. On ~une 27th, 1933, he 
filed in your Honor's court a petition ~lleging the divorce 
above mentioned; that the contract af9resaid was ma.de a 
part of the decree of divorce, but deniC¥1 its enforceability, 
though incorporated therein at his inst~nce on the ground 
that the decree with reference to the s$e was invalid, null 
and void, because the court did not have jurisdiction of the 
subject matter. 
The said petition further falsely alleged that your com-
plainant had broken the said contract~1 by diverting the 
$1,500.00 installments to her individual use with the result 
that the children bad been insufficiently cl thed and nourished 
and their pleasures neglected; that yof complainant was 
unfit to have the care and rearing of sai children, and that 
their best interests demanded that they e taken away from 
their mother and placed under surroutjdings which would 
tend to develop their characters; tha.t ~hey were very un-
happy; that your complainant's life w~s not conducive to 
-their happiness or contentment; that t'fo of them had at-
tained the age where they should be allow~d to make their own · 
choice as to their manner and method of Fving; that none of 
said children wi~hed or desir_ed to be unper the control a!ld 
custody of their mother; that complafnant unnecessarily 
absented herself from her home on many oc.casions and 
prayed for inquiry into the matter of the custody and care 
of the above named children; tqat said children be 
page 8 ~ turned over to him to care for, I and that the court 
might impose whatever oblig·a1ions, terms or re-
strictions upon him looking to the best i"terests of the said 
children that it might deem proper, and ;further prayed for 
a writ of habeas corvus ad s·ubjiciendu.m,I and that the court 
make such order or decree as in its judgmelrit will be most con-
ducive to the well being of the said child en. · 
8. Your complainant filed an answer to that petition deny .. 
ing all of its allegations reflecting upon h r, and while deny .. 
ing the validity of the Nevada divorce n the ground that 
the court was without jurisdiction "in t t neither the said 
defendant nor this respondent was eve domiciled in the 
State of Nevada", insisted on the validi y of said contract 
as adopted and ratified by the Nevada Coµrt. 
9. Before the case thus made by this pl~ading was brought 
to trial, she, subject to the approval of the hourt in said cause, 
agreed with the defendants to the modifi ations of the said 
contract in certain particulars. 
The modifications of said contract so a reed on as afore-
said, subject to the approval of the court, nd which approval 
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in its entirety was au essential and necessary element thereof 
were as follows: 
Paragraph 1 thereof was to be so amended that this com-
plainant was to surrender her right to the occupancy of the 
Mansion House in Fauquier County as of the first day of 
Jan nary, 1934. 
Paragraph 2 thereof was to be so amended that the said 
def ei1dant should be released from the payment of the 
$1,500.00 installments therein provided for, and in lieu thereof 
be assumed responsibility and liability for the payment, arid 
to agree with this complainant to pay promptly as they ma-
tured all bills incurred, or to be incurred, for the 
page 9 ~ proper clothing, support, maintenance and educa-" 
tion of the infant children, in accordance with their 
station in life, including· their traveling· expenses to and from 
said schools and colleges, and to and from their respective 
parents, and thereby release this complainant from the lia-
bilities she assumed under paragraph two of the original 
contract. 
Paragraph three was to be so amended that the defendant 
should pay the interest on the promissory notes therein men-
tioned monthly instead of quarterly, and the principal of said 
notes to be paid in cash at maturity, provided that at !:?UCh 
maturity and at the option of the said defendant, expressed· 
in writing at least thirty qays before maturity, they might 
be extended for a further period of three years on the same 
security, provided the principal thereof was curtailed to at 
least the sum of $100,000.00. 
Paragraphs three and four were not amended. 
Paragraph six was to be annulled and in lieu thereof the 
parties agreed that during the infancy of the children and 
during all. vacations the complainant and defendant should 
each have the care and custody~of said children for one-half 
of the various holidays alternating as to which parent should 
have the children for the first half of each vacation. 
Paragraph seven was not amended and paragraph eight 
~ was to be annulled, and in lieu thereof commencing in the 
1Fall of.1933 the daughter should be placed in the school she 
was then attending, and continued therein until she was pre-
pared for colleg·e, and should thereafter be placed in such 
college as she should select, and the two sons should be placed 
-in the schools that they then attended or such other school as 
the parents should agree on, until they were ready 
page 10 } ·for college, respectively, after which they should 
be placed in such colleges a.~ they the sons should 
. . I 
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s~lect a:fter consulting ~ith their respJctive parents; that 
beginning on November 1st, 1933, and diring· the infancy of 
any 'of said children, and in lieu of the *onthly payment or 
$1,500.00 above mentioned the said defe1}dant should pay to 
this complainant the sum of $375.00 per mpnth on the :first· day ' 
of each and every month towards the ma\ntenance of a home 
suitable for herself and children other than the said Leny 
Manor and in addition to pay certain outstanding bills of the 
· plaintiff incurred for her and their suppolrt and maintenance. 
That the said agreed modi:fica tions should be submitted to 
the court for its approval, and if approved a consent decree 
should be ente:red by t~e court ratifying land confirming the 
same, and ordering and directing the perfprmance of the said 
contract as so modified,_ and that the queijtion of the validity 
of the Nevada divorce should be passed on by the court on its 
merits, independent of agreement. 1 
i 
iO. The original agreement and the said proposed amend" 
ments Were all reported to your Honor's! Court in said pro~ 
ceeding on the 29th day of September, 19p3, at a hearing on 
said petition and answer, evidence offeretl by the respective 
parties, including the contract of May 18th, 19·31, aforesaid, 
and decree of the N~v~da Court entered dn July 27th, grant-
ing the divorce, oi1 consideration whereof\ the Court held the 
Nevada decree of divorce to have been rendered under con-
ditions making it valid in the State of Ne~ada and entitled to 
recognition in this jurisdiction which was: thereby "accorded 
it by the court", and by co1_1sent of parties jthe court approved 
all of said proposed amendmen~s and directed that the said 
contract be so amended in all i respects aforesaid 
page 11 ~ and decreed further '' and as ~nµended said con-
tract is h~reby ratified and confjirmed, and the said 
pa.rties thereto are directed to · perf ormfthe same." That 
order also directed by like consent thats id cause be placed 
on the stet docket of the court until the f rther order of the 
court; all of which will more fully and a length appear by 
the record and proceedings of your Ho or's Court which 
are hereby referred to and asked to be re,d as a part of this 
hill. 
11. Your complainant alleg~s that said original agreement 
and the said modi:fi~ations thereby evidenced constituted an 
entire and indivisible agreement and that the principle and 
controlling consideration therefor movingj to your complain-
ant was a valid ratification of said contract, as modified, 
by the Court and its judgment that the, parties should be 
"directed to perform the same", and th t ~ithout compli-
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ance with this stipulation and agreement and its ratification 
as aforesaid by the court that she never would have agreed 
thereto. 
12. That almost immediately after said judgment was en-
tered, to-wit: on the .... day of October, 193:3, the said de-
fendant remarried· and departed on an extensive honeymoon, 
leaving said children as contemplated in the custody of your 
complainant. That though he made the monetary payments 
to her as contemplated thereby he ever thereafter refused to 
discuss with your petitioner any ..questio}! touching what 
schools they should attend, or the courses to be followed 
therein. 
13. That the said defendant thereafter constantly showed 
himself disregardful of his obligations to pay for the tuition, 
education and proper maintenance of his two sons under said 
modifications of said ag-reement and judgment in 
page 12 ~ this: that he has repeatedly subjected them to 
· great mortification and shame by reason of his fail-
ure to meet their tuition bills at maturity, failed to respond to 
letters from his children and from the school authorities call-
ing his attention to his delinquency in that regard, to the ex-
tent that during the 1933-1934 school term his sons were de-
nied credit in the school stores for supplies, necessitie8, and 
conveniences, that other boys in their station in life attending· 
said schools were usually permitted and expected to have, 
and thev were threatened with denial of scholastic scores 
and ho1iors won by them, and he also failed and refused to 
meet their necessary dental and medical bills all to the great 
shame, mortification, mental suffering and injurv of the said 
boys as well as your complainant. · 
This course was carried to such an extent that your com-
plainant was compelled to give assurances as to the ultimate 
payment of tl1ese bills in order to continue them at such 
schools, and thereafter the defendant refused to discuss with 
the complainant any future plans for their education and 
claimed he would onlv do so before vour Honor. Some of the 
bills incurred during"'that period are still unpaid as will more 
fully appear from the proceedings and evidence, and orders 
entered in said ha.bea.s corpus proceedings now among the 
records of yom· Honor's Court. 
14. Tbe situation became such that in the course of events 
it was essential that arrangements should be made for the 
entrv of the elder son at some school other than the one l1e 
had ~been attending, while continuing John R. Buchanan, ,Jr., 
the younger at Fessenden, where he was already entered. 
i 
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- - Your complainant in the Sllll11mer and early Fall 
page 13 ~ of 1934 attempted to take thi~ matter up with the 
defendant and to discuss the J same with him, but 
he failed and refused to make to her any response to her 
suggestions in that regard. Your contplahiant was thus 
forced to proceed to make tentative arrangements herself, for 
the entry of James a.t the Hill School at Pottstown, Pa., which 
·she communicated to the said defendant, through his elder 
son, James. The defendant. led both of his children, and 
through them your complainant, to beli¢ve that he had ac- · 
~uiesced in the arrangements that she had so arrived at. 
15. At the last moment, however, wit~out the knowledge 
.or conse~1t of your complainant;· and wij:hout notice to her, 
he undertook to require the children, wto were then in his 
home on a visit, under the terms of th~ said modified con-
tract,· t.o attend a dar sch?ol -at W arretjton1 as day p~1pils, from his home as theu residence, well knowmg that this ar-
rangement would not be satisfactory t<~ your complainant, 
and was contrary to the terms of the· sai~ agreement, and to 
. the best interest of both of said children, [with the result that 
these infant children voluntarily and without her knowledge 
left their father's home in the rain, wh~re he was holding 
them under confinement, rather than to l attend said school. 
They went in a bedraggled and unkept condition to the home 
of a neighbor, expressing- their distress\ and dissatisfaction 
with the arrangement proposed by their father. This neigh-
bor, after furnishing them dry clothing add baths; telephoned -
·complainant of their presence and condition, and she promptly 
·drove to this home found her sons, and they appealed to her 
to save them from these plans. After co~sulting counsel and 
others, in whose judgment she had confidence, she deemed it 
to be her duty, and to their best interest, in the exercise of 
the rights accruing to her under the judgment of 
page 14 ~ the court afore said and the citcumstances to pro-
tect them. She took the mat!r up with the au-
·
thorities of the schools, respectively, and ucceeded in getting 
the authorities of the Hill School to c sent to the entry 
therein of James R. Buchanan, IV., with ut the prepayment 
of tuition, as required of other pupils, pon her assurance 
that she would present the facts to the coU;rt, and use her best 
endeavors to secure an order from the Qourt ratifying her 
action and requiring the said John R Bu~hanan to make the 
requisite payments, and John R. Buchanan;, Jr., w1=1s continued 
at Fessenden, where· he had previously b;een entered by the 
defendant with the initial consent of bo11b complainant· and 
defendant. Each remained' at such schqols for the 1934-5 
session, and the court by its order of June 15, 1935, herein-
I 
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after recited, having, at the suggestion of counsel for the 
defendant, awarded the custody of both boys to her and di-
rected the complainant to pay her monthly stated sums 
deemed by the court sufficient to meet all of their expenses 
with which decree he was then complying she entered both 
boys at the Hill School in the Fall of 1935, and they continued 
thereat through the years 1935-6, 1936-7 and 1937-8. 
16. Under the trying: conditions existing in the Fall of 
1934, and having no other recourse, and complying with the 
assurances given the Hill School aforesaid, your complainant 
· on November 24th, 1934, filed in your Honor's Court a peti-
tion setting· out all of the matters and things hereinbefore 
recited, including the original petition of the said John R. 
Buchanan, the modifications made under orders therein, the 
failure and refusal of the said defendant to comply there-
with, in the respects stated, and the position in 
page 15 ~ which she was placed by such conduct on his part, 
as well as other derelictions showing the necessity 
for some action by this court, and that the said defendant was 
in receipt of a princely income, arising from an estate of 
about a million and half dollars left by his father, about $500,-
000.00 of which belonged to him outright and abouf $1,000,-
000.00 of which was left for his benefit for life with remainder 
to his and her children, who would ultimately inherit the 
principal, in reg·ard to which provisions the will of the father 
of the said defendant explained that "the trusts created in 
and by this paragraph of this my will are created by me for 
the express purpose of protecting my children and descendants 
from want and inconvenience by reason of the vicissitudes of 
life so far as reasonable foresight can prevent it'', which alle-
gations were and are true. In said petition she prayed that the 
said defendant be summoned to answer it; that the proceed-
ings instituted by him, and the order of the court thereon 
first above mentioned) might be restored to the active docket; 
that such petition be filed and treated as a cross complaint 
therein, and that your Honor should hear such evidence as 
might be presented on either side touching the charges of the 
petition; and that a proper order be entered making more 
flexible the provisions of said decree for the custody of said 
children during their vacations, directions by your Honor 
for their proper education and training, and that said defend-
ant be required to adopt a course to secure the prompt pay-
ment by him of all proper obligations and expenses incident 
to the proper education, training, clothing and maintenance 
of his said children, as contemplated by said contract as modi-
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tive, '' and that he be requirJd to pay proper at• 
page 16-~ torney's fees incurred by yotr· petitioner in con-
nection with this petition.'' 
· 17. This petition was filed in your Honor's Court on No .. 
vember 26th, 1934, by leave of the Court. I The said defendant 
by. counsel appeare~ and waived servi~e of process. The 
said former proceedmg· was directed by your Honor to be 
restored to the active docket, and the defendant was directed 
to answer the same. 1 
18. The defendant filed an answer to~ s·aid petition which 
he designated as "an answer and cross petition", admitted 
the truth of many of the allegations, enied some and at-
tempted to excuse some. By consent of parties the cause 
was set for hearing in vacation in chaihbers on Thursday, 
March 21st, 1935. I 
19. The said matter was heard pursu~nt to this order at 
Warrenton, commencing on Thursday, M,r~h 21st, 1935. Evi-
dence ore ten us was taken before your Honor on March 21st, 
22nd, and 23rd, during which time: and by consent of all par-
tifs, your Honor talked with all three of ~aid children out of 
the presence of their parents and having heard all of the 
evidence offered by any party, and argmrlent of counsel, took 
the same under consideration until J u~e 15th, 1935, when 
your Honor entered an order in the following _words and 
figures: I 
"First. That each of said children are pf sufficient age and 
discretion to have, and do have such fixed views and prefer. 
ences as to whic.h of their said parents th~y respectively pre:.. 
fer to be in the primary custody of, tojwhich preferences, 
though not wholly controlling the Court th nks should be given 
due consideration and the da,hter Polly prefer;. 
page 17 ~ ring when not in school to res de with her father 
• * * and the two sons * • preferring under 
the same conditions to be in the custody ol their mother; and 
the court being further of opinion that n 11.· ther parent is un-
fitted for such custody and no sufficient re son appearing why 
such preferences of said children shoul not prevail; and 
the court being further of the opinion th t the best interest 
of each of said children, as well as of thrir parents, will be 
promoted thereby, doth adjudge, and order the custody of the 
person and care of the education of said children, respectively, 
be and the same is so awarded, but withl the duty enjoined 
on each parent to do nothing nor to perijnit anything to be 
done reasonably calculated to foster any rejudice or ill will 
on the part of either of said children t , the other parent, 
or to dissatisfy either child with the cus ody as hereby de-
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clared; and with the further duty on each custodian to permit 
either of said children in this custody respectively to visit 
the other parent at such reasonable and proper times and 
for such reasonable a11d proper periods as either of said 
children may wish, so long as the other parent is willing to 
receive such child or children for such visits. 
''Second: Tfott * "' • the best interest of all parties, in-
cluding· said children, will be promoted b) requir 
page 18 ~ ing a st~ted sum to be paid to Ruth Lester Buch-
. a.nan by said John R. Buchanan to be expended by 
her at her discretion in the preparatory school education of 
their two said boys committed to her custody,. but in view 
of the probable reduction in the income of said John R. 
Buchanan arising from the trust fund held by the National 
Savings and Trust Company and H. Prescott Gately, Trus-
, tees, un~er his father's will for the -next year or so, that the 
expenses in connection with the tuition of said boys could be 
curtailed to some extent without detriment to said boys, it 
is further ordered that in addition to the specific sums di-
rected -to be paid by him to the said Ruth Lester Buchanan 
by the order entered herein on the 29th day of September, 
1.933, that on the 1st day of July, 1935, said John R. Buchanan 
shall pay and is hereby ordered to pay to the said Ruth Lester 
Buchanan the sum of $375.00 and shall on the 1st day of each 
and every month thereafter and until the further order of 
the court pay to her the like sum of $375.00 to be held and 
applied by her at her discretion in providing proper tuition 
and all scholastic expens~s incident thereto for her two sons 
at such schools as she may select, and she shall also be di-
rected to pay all usual but not extraordinary medical and 
, physicians bills incurred for said children as well 
page 19 ~ as all bills incurred by her for the proper clothing 
of them according to their and their father's sta-
tion in life, except that traveling expenses incident to any 
visits that the said children may make in going from the place 
of residence of their custodian to the place of residence of 
-their other parent shall be borne by the parent so to be visited. 
· "Third. *' * • that the said John R. Buchanan is responsible 
and is required to pay all outstanding bills, properly incurred 
since September, 1933, whether by the said John R. Buchanan 
or by R.uth Lester Buchanan, or otherwise, in connection 
with the education of the two bovs and their attendance at 
the Fessenden or Hill School, respectively, and all bills like-
wise incurred since November 1, 1933, for their clothing, as 
well as all medical, hospital, dental, physicians, surgeons and 
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preserving the health of said boys to the\ extent not already --
paid by the said John R. Buchanan, but the court not being 
sufficiently advised as to the amounts of su~h bills outstanding, 
and to whom they are due, and reserving to itself the ques-
tion as to whether said bills so incurred shall be required to 
be paid at once or shall be amortized ovet a given period, in 
· the future, doth order that Wallace N. Tiffany, who 
page 20 ~ is hereby appointed a Special: Commissioner for 
that purpose, is directed to i~quire into and re-
port to the court the amoµnt of all such bUls so outstanding, 
by whom they were originally incurred, ~nd to whom they 
shall be paid, but before proceeding to sta,ite said' accounts he 
shall give to the parties to this proceeding, to-wit: John R. 
Buchanan and Ruth Lester Buchanan, at 1 least ten days no-
tice • • •. , 
''Fourth • •. * that to the extent hereby indicated, but to 
that extent only, the order entered herein Ion the 29th day o:f 
September, 1933, is modified and the parties hereto are di-
rected to perform the same as so modifiedl • • * 
I 
I 
* * • * ~ 
I 
"Sixth.** • that said John R. Buchana111 shall pay to John 
S. Barbour, Attorney, for the petitioner~, all courts costs 
and suit expens~s incurred in this cause~ including notary 
public and stenographer's fees incident to or in the course 
of the trial of this case, which costs and expenses the Com-
missioner aforesaid is also directed to rebort, and ~ addi-
tion thereto shall pay to him a fee of $500.00 for services ren:-
dered by him herein on behalf of Ruth L~ster Buchanan as 
next friend of her ·infant children. • * • i 
'' Seventh. '"' * «< nothing herein containedi shall be construed 
as preventing either party from applying to this court after 
· the lapse of twelve months for further relief: based on a change 
of conditions hereafter arising o.i the necessity for 
page 21 ~ sending said boys to institutio s of higher scho-
. lastic learning after the compl tion of their pre-
paratory school education, or the necessit for incurring or 
having incurred ·on behalf of said childrien extraordinary 
medical, surgical or dental bills, or by re~son. of the antici-
pated reduction of the income of John R. Buehanan above men-
tioned, not being· realized to the extent indicated by the evi-
dence." • • • ; · 
in explanation of the provisions made iri the second para-
graph of said order of June 15th, 1935, which varies from 
the provisions of the co.nsent decree of. Sepiember 29th, 1933, 
as well as the prayer of the petition of No ember, 1934, it is 
but proper to say that such variation was made not at the 
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- instance of counsel for complainant but at the instance and 
sug·gestion of counsel for defendant, as shown by your 
Honor's certificate of a portion of his closing argument, in-
cluded in the record, in which he among other things said to 
your Honor: 
'' As to the custody of Jimmy, he has stated on the stand 
that he wants to live with his mother. He is sixteen years 
old and I think his wishes should be controlling in the matter 
and he should be in the sole custody of his mother. It is a 
question whether in his own welfare that custodianship should 
be accounted for periodically to you and his education be sub-
ject to your personal supervision. His father feels that Jim 
should receive more discipline than he has been getting. His 
father feels the management could be improved. His father 
would prefer to have the schooling in some good 
page 22 ~ military school, for instance the Virginia Military 
Institute. That is merely a suggestion for your 
Honor's consideration; but I do feel that Jim's wishes should 
be controlling here and his mother should have the sole cus-
tody. 
"Your Honor talked with Jack this morning and I think the 
thing that we want to do, and the other side may agree, but 
as far as we are concerned we would like to have the cus-
tody of Jack determined by your Honor in whatever you 
think is for Jack's best interest. I have come to the con-
clusion it should be a sole custodianship, one parent or the 
other, and should be accounted for to Your Honor. These 
parents have reached that stage, and I have. seen many couples 
reach it, where they can not be together without fighting. 
It is unfortunate but it is a fact to be faced. Whoever has 
Jack should account to this Court and take the advice and 
guidance of this Court in the way he is brought up. 
'' As for the two boys I feel that the system under which 
these parties have been going on having bills and send them 
to schools, and Mrs. Buchanan thinks they should have so 
and so. Mr. Buchanan thinks he can't afford it; and I think 
it would serve to avoid friction if Your Honor would fix for 
both of the boys in a definite monthly allowance direct to 
the mother and certainly in Jim's case to his mother, and if 
- Jack is with his mother, certainly to his mother. 
page 23 ~ That will keep these two people apart and remove 
grounds of friction. After I finish the financial 
part of this I will leave that to your Honor as to the amount 
of the allowance. · 
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''Now I would like to .urge on your !Honor to consider a. 
revision of the. whole financial situatio~ between these pa·r· 
ties on a basis as equitable to all of tpem as Your Honor 
can ascertain. * * • If you will agree rwith my ~nalysis of 
this income situation that the $4,500.00 afir:p.ony to Mrs. Buch· 
anan be eliminated entirely and in lieu i thereof be paid her 
a fixed sum each month for the support and maintenance and 
education of the two boys or one boy, whichever your Honor 
determines. The way this income is now J I should say $100.00 
a month should do it. It will not send t~m to Hill but it will 
send them to a lot of good schools. It 'fill send them to the 
Military Institute. Your Honor will cleteirmine what you think 
is an equitable disposition of that. J 
'' These are my suggestions, which I u ge upon Your Hon-
or's consideration • * * because Your onor, unless a solu-
tion which is reasonable can be arrang·ed here, these parties 
are going to be right back again, if not ha this court, in some 
other court. Get some way that the trust company can make 
settlement direct to Mrs. BucDranan and that they 
page 24 r don't have to talk about anytping. She has sole 
control of certain children anlMr. Buchanan has 
sole control of the daughter, and therefore remoye all grounds 
for friction .. Get away from these unfort nate points of fric-
tion that have been going on for years. 't 
· 20. Though the said defendant expressed an intention to 
apply for a writ of error no bills. of excePjtion were ever filed, 
and Walter N. Tiffany the .Special Com:q:iissioner. appointed 
by said order to make report of the matt~rs therein directed, 
after giving notice of the time and plac~ of hearing, which 
was attended by the said John R. Buch~nan, and his coun-
sel, Messrs. Robertson and Gay, as well as by your petitioner, 
and her children, and counsel, the said Cbmmissioner on the 
11th day of September, 1935, filed his rep rt therein, and the 
evidence taken by him, and reported the aid J olm R., Buch-
anan liable under said order for the foll wing bills incident 
to the support, maintenance and educati n of said boys: 
'' The Fessenden School, West Newton, M ss. $2,010.29 
The Hill School, Pottstown, Pa. 1,644.87 
Mr. Jasper J. Stahl, The Hill School 60.75 
The Athletic Supply Stores, Pottstown, P . 73.10 
Dr. Charles D. Cole, Washington I 95.00 
Dr. Arthur L. Morse, Boston ' 350.00 
Ruth L. Buchanan · 577.95 
"The aforesaid bills are payable to th parties in whose 
names they stand above." 
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page 25 r He also reported that there were costs to the 
amount of $73.49 unpaid, exclusive of the fee of 
$500.00 allowed petitioner's Attorney''. 
All of the bills thus indicated are properly chargeable to 
the defendant whether incurred under the original contract 
of May 18th, 1931, or the consent order of September 29th, 
1933. 
The said John R. Buchanan excepted to but one item of 
this report out of the $5,550.35 reported, that of the Hill 
School in the sum of $1,644.77, and then only upon the ground 
that it was excessive and unreasonable, in view of the finan-
cial condition of the said defendant; was for a somewhat 
larger sum than the school had previously agreed to take said 
boy for, and had been incurred over his protest. 
These exceptions were overruled and this report was con-
firmed on October 15th, 1935, and the said John It. Buchanan 
was directed to pay to the several parties the several sums 
shown above but he has never done so. 
21. The said defendant did however comply promptly with 
that part of the judgment of June 15th, 1935, requiring the 
payment of the additional sums of $375.00 per month, in con-
s_equence of which she met all bills accruing between July 
1st, 1935, and ·April 1st, 1937, when he cease such payments, 
but never complied with the order of October 15th last above 
recited. On ;N' ovember 15th, 1935, he served notice on the 
complainant's counsel that on the 25th day of November, · 
1935, he would ask leave to file a bill of Review to the decrees 
in the said proceeding then '' pending in the Circuit Court 
for Fauquier County", but no such petition was presented 
to the court until the . . . . . . . . day of Decembert 
page 26 ~ 1935, when he did move the court for leave to file 
a Bill of Review, and for the first time filed a pro-
posed bill with said motion, at which time your complainant, -
through her attorney, filed her objections in writing to the 
granting of such leave. The Court not being then advised .of 
its opinion and desiring, to hear argument thereon did at 
Warrenton in January, 1936, hear such argument and took 
the same under further consideration until October 27th, 1936, 
when it entered its judgment in that regard, as aforesaid, and 
denied leave to file said Bill of Review, to which action of 
the court the defendant again excepted for reasons stated, 
but no bill of exception was ever presented and no petitiou 
·for. an appeal, nor for a swpersedea.c; to said judgment was 
ever filed in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, but 
h,e continued his default only in respect to the sums directed 
to be paid under the order of October 27th, 1935, for the past 
I 
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due bills. The said defendant continui thereafter to pay 
to your complainant the specific sums \directed to be paid 
her under the orders aforesaid of Septerliber, 1933, and June 
15th, 1935, as they matured up to and ijncluding the install-
ments maturing· on March 1st, 1937, fro1' which she was able 
to maintain the home and pay all maintenance and scholastic 
expenses and medical bills subsequentlr incurred up until 
April 1st, 1937, but the defendant made; default in the pay-
ment of both installments under said decr~e maturing on April · 
1st, 1937, and declared his purpose not to pay further, since 
which time none of such bills have been j1 paid except such as 
she has been compelled to advance from her personal funds. 
22. Your petitioner thereafter applieq to your Honor for 
a rule against the defendant to show cause why he should 
not be attached for his cont~pt in that regard, 
page 27 ~ which was awarded, and at a Hearing on May 14th, 
1937, the court entered an orcllir attaching him for 
his contempt in that regard and directed the Sheriff of Fau-
quier County to forthwith take into his Fustody th~ said de-
fendant until ''he shall perform all and r:,ing-ular the matters 
and thing·s required of him, in and by fie orders and judgo-
ments aforesaid, in so far as they req ire the payment of 
the two sums of $375.00 each * * * on A ril 1st, 1937, and on 
the first day of each and every month ensuing thereafter pend-
ing compliance with this order", but sus~ended the executign 
of the said judgment pending application to the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, for a.writ of error, which ap-
plication was subsequently made, and a wirit of error awarded, 
and by judgment of said court entered on the . . . . . . day of 
January, 1938, that court held the judbients aforesaid of 
September 29th, 1933, and June 15th, 1985, in so far as they 
modified the monetary payments prior ~hereto between the 
parties, or required the payment of specffic sums by the said 
John R. Buchanan to this complainant n days stated wer~ 
null and void, but that they were valid i so far as they dealt 
with the custody of the said children b t did not pass upon 
the validity of the said judgments in an other respects, nor 
those of October, 1935, beyond holding hat the consent de-
cree of September 29th, 1933, constitute evidence of binding 
contractual obligations, and reversed sa..d judgment of 1\fay 
14, 1937, which only became final on June 8th, 1938, when her 
petition to rehear seasonably filed was r~fused. 
23. Under these circumstances your~1complainant in her 
own rig·ht, and as custodian of said chi dren, with the duty 
imposed on her under and b . virtue of the valid 
page 28 ~ decisions aforesaid of this c lurt, and of the Su-
preme Court of Appeals sho s she is not certain 
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of her own right, duties and obligations in the premises as 
affecting· herself and/ or her said children, or her former hus-
band, and she needs the guidance, direction and protection 
of a court of equity and conscience in all of these respects. 
24. She is advised and upon advice of counsel, charge .that 
the agreement of May 18th, -1931, aforesaid, between herself 
and her husband, was a subsisting and binding contract be-
tween herself and her said husband, apd that as recognized 
and decreed by the Nevada Court, at his special instance and 
- request, it was a binding adjudication in respect to said con-
tract, and as such entitled to full faith and credit in this state 
and before its courts, under the Constitution of the United 
States, as well as under the rules of- comity, and as a valid 
contract is entitled to specific performance under the laws 
of Vir~inia, independent of the ~,ederal Constitutional pro-
vision m that respect, or the rule of comity, by virtue of its 
own provisions as a valid contract entered into by the parties 
.for valuable considerations moving to and from each, and for 
the mutual and common benefit of each, and is still so bind-
ing except to the extent that it may have been validly amended 
_ by the consent decree aforesaid of September 29th, 1933, 
which the Supreme Court of Appeals has held is evidence of 
binding c<;>ntractual obligations, but the latter agreement so 
evidenced she is also advised was an entire contract, entered 
into for the benefit of each of said children, as well as of 
the parties named therein, one of the essential and vital ele-
ments of which was its .ratification in its entirety by a valid 
order of court, and a valid direction t4erein iin-· 
page 29 ~ posing on. her husband, as well as herself, the de-
cretal obligation to perform it under the order and 
supervision of the court, another of which was its perform-
ance. 
25. She· shows further tlJat she gave her consent to the 
entry of said decree in the utmost good faith and under the . 
firm conviction induced by advice of her counsel to that ef-
fect that said decree was valid and binding and enforcible 
by the court in its entirety at the instance of either party 
thereto or any beneficiary thereunder, and she believes and 
charges that the defendant also consented to said decree un-
der the same conviction, and belief, and with no intention t.o 
work a fraud upon her and his children. 
26. She shows further that it was only after the said de-
fendant had failed and refused to comply with said supposedly 
a.mended contract in certain vital respec.ts set out in para-
graph 16 hereof, and the pleading therein referred to, and· 
while he continued to comply with other provisions thereof, 
that she, acting on the belief aforesaid of' the binding force- ' 
i 
! 
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of said decree in its entirety, :filed her ~etition of November 
26th, 1934, on behalf of herself and her said children, and 
those creditors who had extended credit for necessities for 
their proper education, maintenance and/support on the faith 
of said original contr~ct, as modified thereby, praying '' a 
proper order * * * therein making more ~exible the proyisions 
of said decree for the custody of said children during their 
vacations, clirections by your Honor f ori their proper educa .. 
tion and training, to the end that he be j required to adopt" a. 
definite course calculated to secure the fulfillment of said 
contract in its spirit and letter and the i prompt payment by 
him of all proper obligations and expenses incident 
page 30 ~ to the proper education, training, clothing and main-
tenance of his said children, abcording to their sta-
tions in life, present and prospective''l and for attorney's 
fees. She shows that the defendant acti~ under the same be· 
lief, filed his answer and _cross-bill theretp, denying only some 
of the breaches alleged, admitting other~, and attempting to 
qualify or justify others to a greater or l~f?S extent, and falsely 
alle~ing ~ther breac~es on ·he.r p~rt i!l.gffo.eral ~erms wi~h~ut 
spec1:ficat10ns, and his :financial mab1hty to "live on his m .. 
come", and his opinion that the plaintiffiwas emotionally and 
mentally unbalanced, and wound up bYj praying that he be 
allowed to present such evidence touching the claims and 
charges he makes, and that upon a heariµg on the entire mat-
ter the court may afford him the '.' relief prayed for". · 
27. Up to that point neither party ha~ doubted the validity 
or binding effect of the consent decree I of September; 1933, 
in so far as it was based on consent as ~ell as so far as, in-
dependent of consent, it recognized the v~lidity of the Nevada 
decree, or the power of the cot;l.l't to enfiorce it. It was only 
after the hearing thus prayed for by tije defendant, as well 
as by complainant and extending from March 21st to March 
23rd, 1935, and only after the court, at j the request of coun-
sel for the defendant, made in def endar,t 's presence, deter-
mined to vary the terms of the consent t:ecree as to the cus-
tody of the children, by giving the entire ustody of the daugh-
ter and control of her education to the defendant, of which 
he availed himself, and by giving the r,ke custody of both 
boys to the mother, and requiring him to pay stated sums 
monthly thereafter to the plaintiff to b. expended by her at 
her discretion in providing pipper tuition and pay-
page 31 ~ ing all bills incurred for their support according 
to their stations in life, as suggested by counsel 
for defendants, only fixing the sums somewhat in excess of 
those so suggested by him, and long affur the defendant had 
-0mployed additional counsel, and had theteafter complied 
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for several months with the decree of June, 1935, a11d after 
such additional counsel had attended the hearings before Com-
missioner Tiffany and had excepted to his report on 
other grounds and sought unsuccessfully to prevents its con-
firmation as aft>resaid, that neither the defendant or any of 
his co~nsel, ex'pre.ssed any doubt as to the binding authority 
of said orders in any respect. 
2_8. It is shown that the provision of this decree of June 
2ith, 1935, for the payment of specific sums of $375.00 
monthly to the mother to meet the expense of the boys in-
cident to their maintenance an~ clothing is but a reversion 
to the plan underlying the original contract of 1931, wherein 
the defendant agreed to pay to the plaintiff specific sums at 
the rate of $500.00 per month· to be applied at her discre-
tion for the maintenance, support and clothing of each child 
remaining with her aggregating $1,500.00 per month for the 
three, with proportionate reductions if anyone or more ceased 
to so live with her and was the result of his failure to comply 
with the modification thereof under the consent decree of Sep-
tember, 1933. The latter provision, however, was much more 
favorable· to the defendant than the former. not only in the 
lesser amount of the payments required under the decrees 
of September, 1933, and 1935, singly or in combin~tion, which 
aggregated but $750.00 instead of $1,000.00 under the former, 
while this combined amount of $750.00 was to cover all of 
his liabilities for the future not only for all the expenses con-
templated by the original contract, but in addition 
page 32 ~ insured the father against all expenses incident to 
their education which under the original contract 
of 1931, and the Nevada decree as well as under the consent 
decree, the defendant was to pay in addition to the sums re-
quired to be paid for mere subsistence and maintenance of a 
home, which she under both decrees was to be provided with 
by him for herself and children eyen after she left '' .r Jeuy 
Manor" the matrimonial home.· 
The provision of the order of June 24th, 1935, holding him 
responsible for all unpaid educational expenses incurred be-
tween 1933 and the entry of the order of June 24th, 1935, 
were in entire conformity with the original contract of 1931, 
and the consent order of September, 1933, and only departs 
from the original contract and adheres to the provisions of 
the consent decree in charging him with unpaid clothing bills· 
incurred between November, 1933, to July 1st, 1935. 
29. As further evidence of the ~continued confidence and 
honest belief of defendant, and of all of his counsel in the 
validity of the consent decree and the jurisdiction of the 
court to make it, it is shown that though he excepted to the 
I 
Ruth L. Buchanan, v. J, R.IBu~hanan. 85 
report of Commissioner, Tiffany, it was lonly in respect to a 
single item therein, that of the Hill Schoo~ and that only upon, 
the, ground that in his effort to force th'.e boys to return to 
his custody in defiance of the provisions / of the original con-
tract of 1931, confirmed by the N evadai Court, and of 1 he 
modification thereof confirmed and orde~ed to be performed 
by the consent decree of 193S of-your Ho~or, he had forbidden 
the Hill School to receive them after they had" been entered 
therein, and second, because the charge therefor was at a· 
higher rate than a previous /offer made by that 
page 33 ~ school which he had rejected, ,nd further that not-
withstanding· his subsequent cl,aim that said decree 
was void, he continued thereafter to comf orm to all of the 
provisions ot the consent decree, and all I of the modifications 
thereof, made at the sug·gestion of his counsel in March, 1935., 
and embodied pursuant thereto in th_e ~rder of June 24th, 
1935, until long after his petition to rehQar was filed and de-
nied, and up until April 1st, 1937, when lie first made default 
therein. His only default prior to that time was in his fail-
ure to pay the various sums decree<;l in f'vor of third parties-· 
for the past. due bills em~raced in .. th~ ~ec ee of October, 19~5, 
none of which he had disputed hab1hty for except the Hill 
School bill. · 
30. The purpose in thus calling attention to the repeated 
and long continued acquiescence of the defendant in perform-
ing these decrees based on and springing!from the agr~ement 
to modify the contract of 1931, and the donsent order for its 
performance, is not to assert or contendj in disregard of the 
final order of the Supreme Court of Appeals that those orders 
were valid in their entirety, but to shot that to the extent 
those orders were void, the contract eviqlenced by it, and of 
which the provision that thP con rt shoul<il direct its perform-
ance as a part thereof and require its forcement by sum-
mary proceedings, was an essential a vital part of the 
contract evidenced thereby without whi h none of its pro-
visions would have been consented to, was also void, and -
constituted such a material mistake of la and fact, and that 
his final repudiation thereof in its entir ty constituted such 
a failure of consideration as to vitiate in '.its entiretv the con-
sent decree of September 1st, 1933, and I ·aves standing in its 
entirety the original contract of. May, 1 31, .which said mi_R-
take of law and fact was mutual and so c ntinued on the part 
of all of the parties up· until lA.pril 1st, 1937, and 
page 34 ~ on the part of {his plaintiff until the final deter-
. mination of that fact by the! Supreme Court of 
Appeals on· June 18th, 1938; · 
:n. The complainant shows that pen mg this litigation, 
86 Supreme Uour.t of Appeals of Virginia. 
and in reliance on the validity of all of said orders, judg-
ments and decrees of the circuit court of Fauquier County, 
aforesaid, and since the cessation by the said defendant of 
all payments under any of them, except payment of the. in-
stallment of interest on the $125,000.00 of notes, executed by 
him under the original agTeement of May, 1931, in the sum 
of $625.00 made monthly under the amendment made by the 
consent decree of September, 1933, instead of quarterly, in 
the sum of $1,875.00, as pro-yided under the original agree-
ment as confirmed by the Nevada Court, she has between 
April 1st, 1937, and Sept. 1st, 1938, incurred debts for her 
children, or made advancements from her own funds for 
necessary expenses incident to the support, maintenance and 
education of her two sons, in the following amounts: 
Bills outstanding, past due, and unpaid fo those fur-
nishing the goods or services, $3,077.85 
Sums paid from her personal funds for the same 
purpose $3,224.13 
All as specified in the itemized statement thereof herewith 
:filed marked exhibits" A" and" B" respectively. And there 
is due her under the agreement evidenced by the consent de-
cree of September, 19:33, for the purpose of maintaining a 
home for herself and her sons as thereby contemplated at the 
rate of $375.00 per month, the additional sum of $6,750.00 as of. 
July 1st, 1938, if the agreement" thereby evidenced is a sub-
sisting and valid and enforceable agreement, making a total 
of $9,974.13 plus interest thereon due her for indebtedness 
incurred and bills paid by her under the provisions 
page 35 ~ of said decree, and its subsequent modi_fications as 
incident to the ch~nge of custody under the orders 
of June 24th and October 29th, 1935, aboye mentioned, and 
exclusive of the bills incurred, and· being incurred, since, for 
their proper maintenance, education and support, and as-
suming that the consent decree of 1933 did constitute a valid 
and enforcible novation of said original contract of May, 1931, 
in all its pecuniary aspects as well as in regard to custody. 
32. Complainant is further advised, however, and on in-
formation and belief charge that a doubt exists as to wliet.her 
by reason of the matters and things aforesaid, the mutual 
mistakes and misapprehensions both of law and facts, and 
the mixed questions of law and fact under which the agree-
ment aforesaid of ,September, 1933, was entered into and the 
failure of the considerations which induced the complainant 
to enter into the same, said ag·reement can now be enforced 
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in its entirety, or whether it and the said decree are void iri 
their entirety, the result is that the rigijts and liabilities of 
all parties revert to. and must be settleq. under and accord ... 
ing· to the provisions of the original conti1act of May, 1931, a~ 
ratified, confirmed, ordered and decreed qy the Nevada Court 
of July, 1931, or independent of that decree should it be 
held that the Nevada decree is null and \void in any respect 
for lack of jurisdiction of the subject m~tter. 
33. She shows further that the item of $6,750.00, last above 
mentioned, should be increased to the s/;;m of $48,625;00 in 
event the consent decree is held invalid ~nd not enforceable, 
and the original contract not novated o·r \amended thereby,-
that being the remaining aggregate of t~e monthly amounts 
of $1,000.00 per month accruing to her r· der the contract of 
May, 1931, from June, 1933, t July 1st, 1937, dur· 
page 36 r ing which period the daughte I did not reside with 
her, whereby the $1,500.00 p3lYIDents were reduc-
ible to $1,000.00 per month, after giving the defendant credit 
for the payment of $375.00 per month from November 1st, 
1933, to March 1st, 1937, for the same puf' pose under the con-
sent decree aforesaid. See exhibit "C' l filed herewith. In 
this connection the complainant shows .t.haf though ,in her 
original answer to the petition of the defendant for a writ 
of habeas corpus she d~nied the validity bf said decree of the 
Nevada court in so far as it purportedjto divorce her from 
the defendant for lack of jurisdiction of the res, and though 
that portion of the order of your Honor' . Court giving recog-
nition of the validity of said decree does !not purport to have 
been and was not enterP.d by consent, th~t owinp: to the fact 
that subsequent thereto her former husband and the father 
of her children, had contracted a subse uent marriage, that 
' she has no desire to further question th validity of the Ne .. 
vada decree in that respect. . 
34. Your complainant shows further at under any view 
that may be taken of the facts aforesai that in addition to 
the liabilities incurred by her under the ircumstances afore-
said, and as -set out in paragraphs 3 :.33 aforesaid, and 
whether the unpaid bills should be pai to her and she be 
permitted and required to pay them to t e creditors to whom 
they are justly due or whether the def hdant should be re~ 
' quired to pay them to the parties to who they are now due, 
that in addition thereto, and independent thereof, the bills 
aforesaid, specified in paragraph 20, fbr which judgments 
were entered on the 29th day of October! 1935, are now good 
and valid debts of the said defendant, a d that he should be 
required to pay them and disch~rge he from the moral, if 
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_ not the legal, obligations which she assumed in re-
page 37 ~ spect thereto in order to continue the proper edu-
. cation, maintenance and care _of his and her chil-
dren, all as contemplated by all of said contracts, however 
evidenced,, all of which as your complainant is advised, be-
lieve and charge were entered into, not only for the benefit 
of the parties thereto and their children, but for the benefit 
and protection c;>f all persons who should thereafter render 
the services to their said children contemplated by said con-
tracts. ·. · 
35. Complainant further shows that owing to the delay 
heretofore incurred by those who have supplied her and her 
-said wards with the necessary facilities for the proper edu-
cation, maintenance and support of her said children, that 
her resources as well as her credit has been exhausted, all 
of which have been used for such purposes that it is extremely 
doubtful if she can in the future succeed in having her said 
sons' necessary expenses · met by mere promises and repre-
sentations on her part, based on her1 faith in the ultimate 
vindication of her point bf view, as heretofore sustained by 
this court; that she has no source of income except the monthly . 
payments of interest made her by the defendant, and the in-
come arising from a remnant of about $5,000.00 of the $25,-
000.00 in cash paid her by the defendant at the signing of 
the contract of May, 1931; that such income is wholly insuf-
ficient to meet the bills necessary to be incurred at this · a 
most important and crucial period in the life of each of her 
sons and that unless required to pay these current bills, as 
hereafter incurred, incident to the proper education, main-
tenance and support of said children in accordance with their 
stations in life, pendente lite, the specific sums requisite for 
maintenance of their and her home in addition to such specific 
sums as may be reasonably necessary for those 
'page 38 ~ purposes, she will find it impossible to continue 
their education, all to their irremediable injury 
and damage throughout their respective lives. 
She shows, however, that she is. continuing and will con-
tinue her efforts to provide for their proper education, main-
tenance and support, on the faitlt of the defendant's ultimate 
liability therefore, either to tliose furnishing the same Qr to 
her, and that though under the existing circumstances the 
Hill school has refused to extend further credit on that basis, 
she has· succeeded in having the Episcopal High School in· 
Fairfax County, Virginia, accept one of her sons, J olm R. 
Buchanan, ,Jr., as a; pupil for the coming school term, and 
James A. Buchanan IV being ready for college and desiring 
to do so was entered at Tri-State College, Angola, Indiana, 
i 
I 
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by complainant and· she has borrowed · e funds necessary 
to make her initial payments. She show that the complain~ 
ant has refused to pay either to her or tp the proper school 
and college authorities any of said expenses. What these e~-
penses will aggregate eventually beyon4 the sums already 
paid by her she cannot now specifically ~tate, but whatever 
they may amount to she shows that he is ~able ther-efo·re and 
should be required to pay._ 1 
36. The complainant shows further thit an actual contro-
versy exists touching all of the matters! aforesaid, between 
her and the said defendant, John R. Bu!anan, and be~ween 
him and her said children, and betweeu im and the various 
creditors aforesaid, whose debts afore aid have not been 
paid, as to the facts aild extent of hisjliability to her, his 
children aforesaid, and to each of the crecif tors aforesaid; that 
neither she nor they have any adequate remedy at law; that 
· even if adequate remedies at law exist that it would 
pagP 39 ~ require a multiplicity of suits at law,- and" suits in 
. equity to ascertain the respec ·ve duties and obli-
gations of the parties aforesaid, wheth under the law or 
by virtue of said contracts, decrees and o ders aforesaid, and 
that her and· their only adequate reme y is in a court of 
equity where matters of this kind are Pjeculiarly cognizable 
and relievable. 1 
She therefore prays on behalf of herse~ and all other per-
. sons interested in said contracts, and any/modifications there-
of, evidenced by said orders and dectees .aforesaid, the 
rights, duties and obligations of all par11ies thereto, or aris-. 
ing·'thereunder, who may come into this f:uit and make them-
.selves parties thereto and contribute tot e costs hereof, that 
the said defendant, John R. Buchanan, e made a party de-
fendant hereto and summoned to answ r the same, an an-
swer under oath being waived; that saii infant children be 
taken under the care, supervision and protection of this 
court, and that she be accorded the right o apply to the court 
from time to time for such care, prote tion and guidance; 
that this court determine which of said ntracts and agree-
ments or what parts of either contain a d embody the pres-
ent and subsisting contracts, or evidenc the same, between 
the parties, and the extent to which the or either of them 
have been validly amended, and that the said John R. Buch .. 
a nan be required to specifically perform the same as so as-
certained in its entirety, including the payments of said notes 
aggregating $125,000.00, and that he be jr~quired to provide 
for the proper care and maintenance a d education of the 
children committed to her care and cust ¢ly, as aforesaid, all 
to the end that the said cl.efendant may be required to per-
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/ form all his obligations to her and her said chil· 
/
, page 40 ~ dren; to her and their said creditors whether aris-
ing under said original contract or any modifica-
tioi1s thereof, or by operation of law; that a declaratory judg·-
ment be entered fixing· the rights, duties and obligations of 
all the parties, the one to the other, past and future; that the 
same as so ascertained be declared a valid lien on all of his 
property, real and personal, and ~specially on all of his right, 
title and interest in the Leny Manor property, as well as in 
any other real estate of which his father died seised and pos-
sessed and in which he has an interest; that from time to time, 
and as necessity therefore arises compliance with such judg, 
ment be required and enforced by appropriate orders and pro-
ceedings, and pending final ascertainment and adjudication 
of such rights, duties and obligations, that the said defendant 
be required to pay to the complainant at specific times spe-
cific sums sufficient to enable her, under the directions of the 
court to provide for the adequate and proper education, main-
tenance and support of her said children and to provide for 
the maintenance of a home for herself and said children in 
accordance with their station in life, present and prospective, 
_ all as contemplated in said contracts, or arising under the 
law, that all necessary inquiries, accounts and reports be taken 
and reported to your Honor; that proper attorney's fees be 
allowed complainant's attorney, and necessary expenses in-
cident to the proper support, protection and education of said 
childTen; and that all other relief, g·eneral and special may be 
granted unto the complainant and her said wards and she 
·win as in duty bound forever pray, etc. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RUTH L. BUCHANAN, 
By Her Counsel. 
page 41 ~ Together with three exhibits therewith, in the 
following words and figures : 
EXHIBIT '' A''. 
BILLS INCIJRRED FOR THE SUPPOR.T AND MAINTE-
NANCE OF JOHN R. BUCHANAN, JR., AND JAMES 
A. BUCHANAN IV-OUTSTANDING SEPTEMBER 
1ST, 1938. 
Dr. Russell Fields, acct. James, bill rendered July 
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Dr. Charles D. Cole, acct. Jrunes and a a$, bill ren-
dered June 1st, 1938, I 
Dr. B. Edwin Erickson, bill for straigh~ening jaw 
and teeth for Jim, $600.00 less $580.00 paid by 
Mrs. Ruth -Lester Buchanan I 
Drs. Grover, Christie and Merritt, account rendered 
July 1, 1938, for James Buchanan i · · 
Dr. Lee McCarthy, bill rendered February 1, 1938, 
Dr. Thomas Butterworth, bill rendered l[May 31st, 
1938, for James A. Buchanan 
The Hill School, Pottstown, Pa., James A. Buch-
anan, IV., $1,239.90, John R. Buchanall, Jr., $1,-
267.92 as per bill rendered June 24, 1~38, 
Robert S. Cowperthwaite tutoring chatges, John 
C. Buchanan in latin ·1 
Dr. William Cabell Moore, bill rendered April 1st, 
1938, for Jack, examination of blood, rte. 
J olm Allan Talbot, bill rendered May lsit 1938, for 
James Buchanan, consulta,tions f 
The Quality Drug Shoppe, bill rendei'edl March 1, 
1938, for James A. Buchanan I 
· Dr. Louis Markowitz, profess·kmal serv-
page 42 }. ices, bill rendered April 1, 938, 
Julius Garfinckel and Co. bill rendered 
Jan., 1938, for clothing, etc., on accoun of boys 
Dr. William B. Marbury, bill rendered une 24th, 
1938, James broken leg 
George W. Hitner, bill rendered April j5th, 1938, 
for tutoring· James A. Buchanan 
Dr. J. W. Burke, professional services rendered 





















MEMORANDUM OF BILLS PAID B ·MRS. RUTH LES-
TER BUCHANAN FROM HER P . RSONAL FUNDS 
SHfCE_ APRIL 1, 1937, TO JUNE 27 .H, 1938. 
1937 
April 1st. Jolm R. Buchanan, allowance 
April 1 Rt. .Tames A. Buchanan, allowanc 
April 6th. Earle Cleaners, boys -suit 
April 6th. James A. Buchanan, tickets 
April 8th. lames A. Buchanan, shoes 
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April 20. James A. Buchanan, Hill's School expenses 
as per slip 
April 20. James A. Buchanan, Jack and Jim's ex-
penses Hill School 
April 26·. Hill School, on boy's tuition 
April 26, Dr. Edwin Erickson, total of bill $600.00, 
(Amt. of bill unpaid $20.00), amount 
page 43 ~ paid, 
April 26, Dr. I. Lewis Sandler-X-Ray 
. . treatment, Jim 
April 26. Julius Garfinkle, clothing for boys 
April 26. Dr. W. Cabell Moore, doctor's services 
April 26. The Hill School, J. R. B. $17 .35; J. A. B. 
$8.65 . 
April 28. J. A. Buchanan, May Allowance 
April 28. J. R. Buchanan, May Allowance 
May 5th. John R. Buchanan shoes for improving 
toe nail 
May 13th. James A. Buchanan, miscellaneous 
. May 28th. James A. Buchanan, IV, as per slips 
June 5tk Dr. Lewis I. Sandler, X-Ray, Jim 
June 5th. Drs. Grover, Christie & Merri~~' X-Ray 
Jim's ankle .. · 
June 5th. Dr. William Cabell Moore, March and 
April, Jim 
June 5th. James A. Buchanan 
June 5th. John R. Buchanan, allowance 
June 5th. James A. Buchanan~ allowance 
_ J uµe 20th. James A. Buchanan, expenses as per 
slip 
July 1st. James A. Buchanan, allowance-July 
July 1st. John R. Buchanan, allowance-July 
Jaj.y 1st. James A. Buchanan, current expenses, 
clothes 
June 30th. Earle Cleaners, cleaning for boys 
July 12th. Julius Garfinkle, Jack's suit 
July 12th. Dr. Sandler, last X-Ray for Jim 
July 12th. James A. Buchanan, expenses as per slip 
·July 13th. Earle Cleaners, boys clothing as per slip 
July 14th. Cash, Jim's shoes half-soled 
page 44} July 14th. John R. Buchanan, sport shirt· 
· July 14th. Jack's shoes and socks, cash 
Aug·. 1st. James A. Buchanan, allowance for August 
Aug. 1st. John R. Buchanan, allowance for August 
Aug. 1st. E. L. Kinstliug, Jack's board 
Aug. 12th. James A. Buchanan, as per slip 
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, I . 
Aug. 23rd. Woodward and Lothrop, shirts for Jim 
Aug. 23rd. Irvings, trousers for Jim I · 
Aug. 25th. Jam.es A. Buchanan, school etpenses 
Aug. 25th. Dr. Lee McCarthy, services fo!r Jim 
Aug. 27th. Dr. Russell Fields, Jim's exp~ses 
Sept. 6th. James A. Buchanan, as per slips Jack & 
Jim's lunches, when they went I back to 
s~o~ i 
Sept. 2nd. James A. Buchanan, IV. as p~r slips 
Oct. 6th. James · A. Buchanan, IV. allowapce 
Oct. 6th, John R. Buchanan, allowance I 
Oct. 8th, A. G. Spalding, 5 shirts, Jack I 
Oct. 8th Hay, Harber Club, racket, etc. 
1 Oct. 8th. D. I. S. McReynolds, Jim's cut llbow 
Oct. 8th. Dr. Russell Fields X-Ray, Jim 
Oct. 8th. Dr. Lee McCarthy, bill rende ,ed Aug. 
27th, paid October 8th, 1937 t 
Oct. 16th. James A. Buchanan, school ex enses 
Oct. 17th. Jack's shoes, cash 
Nov. 2nd. James A. Buchanan, .November allowance 
Nov. 2nd~:~:n R. Buchanan, Jr.,·Novembe~r allow:-
Nov. 11th James A. Buchanan, school exp nses 
Nov. 23rd. John R. Buchanan,"Thanksgiv g 
Nov. 23rd. James A. Buchanan, Thanks-, 
page 45 ~ giving 
Dec. 6th. James A. Buchanan, Hill ex-
penses Jim & Jack . 1 
Dec: 6th. James A. Buchanan, December ~llowance 
Dec. 6th. John R. Buchanan, December a · owance 
Dec. 6th. James A. Buchanan, expenses I 
Dec. 23rd. Earle Cleaners 
Dec. 30th. Mrs. Shippen, Jack's daneing brass 
19as I 
,Jan. 15, Dr. Robert L. Schaffer, bill rende~ed Jan. 
15, 1938, for James A. Buchanan IV. op-
eration 
1 
Jan. 8th. Allentown Hospital Association, ill ren-
dered Jan. 8th, 1938, for James . Buch-
anan, IV. 
Jan. 15th Allentown Hospital Association, ill ren-
dered Jan. 15th, 1938, for James . Buch-
anan, IV. 
Jan. 18th. Allentown Hospital, medical e penses, 
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. Jan. 4th. James A. Buchanan, railroad fare school, 
etc. 
Jan. 4th. John R. Buchanan, allowance, January 
Jan. 4th. James A. Buchanan, allowance, January 
Jan. 4th. Lester Hett, boys present to their cousin 
balanced by money paid out of Mrs. Buch-
anan's acct. 
Jan. 5th, John R. Buchanan, rain coat 
1938 
Jan~ 5th. John R. Buchanan, clothes as per slip 
Jan. 28th James A. Buchanan, cash 
Jan. 28th James A. Buchanan, school expenses plus 
allowance 
page 46 ~ Feb. 3rd James A. Buchanan, expenses 
at school, Fe by. 
Feb. 26th James A. Buchanan~ expreses at school 
F1eb. 26th John R. Buchanan, February allowanoe 
Feb. 26th James A. Buchanan, February allowance 
Mar. 6th James A. Buchanan, railroad fare, etc. 
Mar. 19th James A. Buchanan school expenses 
Mar. 10th Stattcr-damage to car, motorcycle ac-
cident 
Mar. 23rd .Suit for Jack 
June 11th Jim to Tri""State College, Argola, Ind. 
school and travelling expenses 
April 1st James A. Buchanan, expenses as per slips 
Aptil 1st J. R. Buchanan expenses as per slips 
4"pril 2nd Saltz Brothers, shoes, Jack 
4"priJ, 3rd J. A. Buchanan, railroad fare, as per slips 
Aptil 3rd. A. S. Spalding·, Jack's athletic shoes and 
socks 
April 5th J. A. Buchanan, as per slips 
April 5th J. A. Buchanan, April allowance, Jim and 
Jack 
April 8th'J. A. Buchanan, Jr. fare returning· from 
_ sister's wedding 
April 22 J. A. Buchanan, school expenses as per 
slips 
May 1st J. A. Buchanan, May allowance both. J)oys 
May 7th ,J. A. Buchanan, expenses as per slip 
June 1st J. A. Buchanan, new allowance, clothing etc 
J:une 1st J. R. Buchanan, new allowance, clothing· " 
June 1st J. A. Buchanan, school expenses end of term 
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June 16th John R. Buchanan, Jr. Garden City with 
Kinsolvings (Fauquier Bank ch k) 
July 1st J. A. Buchanan, allowance, Jim t Tri-State 
College clothing and all els~ Argola 
page 47 .} Ind. excepting schooling, r.r
1
1 fare- etc. 
· June 27th J. R. Buchanan., Jr. allowance 
Jack at Mr. Tompkin's Camp same as 
above ( check written early due oo leaving 
for camp) [ 
June 27th Tri-State. College, 4 classes rt $13.75 
Books and supplies, 14.20 
June 27th C. V. Tompkins, J ack--cam special 
offer I · 
June 28th Mrs. William Marbury, Jack's railroad 
fare and camp j 
June 28th C. V. Tompkin Golf fee Jack 1 
July 25th J. A. Buchanan allowance for August 
July 29th J. A. Buchanan, 5 weeks board and back 
board 
paid for Jim Tri-State College 
Aug·. 1st John R. Buchanam Jr. allowanf 
Aug. 1st W. E. Lester, money advanced Ji for his 
fare to Tri-State College Indian, 
Aug. 12 J. R. Buchana-, Jr Jack's birthlay 
Aug·. 15th Charles Tompkin, Jack's upper irth and 
bus fare camp 
Aug. 19th J. A. -Buchanan, allowance, S pt., 
Ayg. 25th Episcopal High School, enrolltnent for 
Jack, 1938, 1939 I 
Aug·. 26th A. G. Spalding, trousers etc. J1rck . 
Sept. 1st J. R. Buchanan, Jr. allowance, 
Sept. 7th J. A. Buchanan, board and expe ses Tri-
State as per slips 
Sept. 8th Julius Garfinkle clothes, Jack., to be de-




















Total, ........................... 3,224.13 
page 48 ~ MONEY STILL NECESSA Y TO PAY OUT, 
Sept. 1, '38, BUT NOT THE PAID 
Tri-State College-Jim's 2nd term at least one-
half I, · 
Tri-State College-books and supplies 
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( o~e:--half payable on entrance) 
R.· R. Fare, Indiana, Jim, Board Jim around $10.00 




STATEMENT OF LIABILITIES OF JOHN R. BUCH-
ANAN iUNDER HIS CONTRACTS WITH RU.TH LES-
TER BUCHAN.AN IN CONNECTIO;N WITH THE SUP-
PORT, MAINTENANCE AND EDUCATION OF HIS 
SONS · 
# 
Bills allowed as shown by· Special Commissioner's Report 
filed September 11th, 1935, and directed to be paid by de-
cree of October 15th, 1935, as follows:. 
The Fessenden School, 
The Hill School 
Jasper J. Stahl, 
· Athletic Supply Stores 
Dr. William Cabell Moore 
Dr. Charles D. Cole 
.Dr. Arthur L. Morse 
Ruth Lester Buchanan 
John S. Barbour, Atty's fees 











page 49 ~ with interest from October 15th, 1935. 
Amount of Bills incurred by Mrs. Buch-
anan for the support and maintenance of John 
R. Buchanan, and James A. Buchanan, IV. and 
$5,399.69 
1 outstanding, September 1st, 1938 3,077.85 
Amount of bills paid by Mrs. Ruth Lester Buch-
anan from her personal funds since April 1st, 
1937, for the same purpose, to September 1st, 
1938 3,224.13 
Monthly installments due Mrs. Ruth Lester Buch~ 
anan for maintenance of home for boys froin · 
April 1st, 1937, to September 1st, 1938, ijt $375.00 
· per month, under consent decree of September, 
1933, 6,750.00 
Total, .............................. $18,451.67 
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(Note: If consent decree of Septem er, 1933, 
is not binding this item should be at th rate of 
$1,000.00 per month from June, 1933, to f ept. 1st, , 
t~!~ $315.oo ·p~; ~~~th· r;~~ · N ~v.; 1933: }~· M~;~i; · $64•000·00 
1st, 1937, ......................... r ........ 15,375.00 
Balance with interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48,625.00 
And also on the same day filed her no ice of motion to re-
quire payments, etc., in these words : 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on tJ:~e 26th day of Sep-
tember next at the Court House at vVar!renton, Virginia, at 
ten o'clock A. M., or as soon thereafter as the at-
page 50 ~ tention of the Judg·e of the Ci~cuit Court' for Fau-
quier County, can be obtained, !I shall move him to 
enter an order in the above entitled causeJ recently instituted, 
now pending in said court, requiring- you! to pay to her or to 
such other depository as the. Court ma. y ~e· sig-nate at specific 
times specific sums sufficient to enable er under the direc-
tion of the court to provide for the adequ te and proper edu-
cation, maintenance and support of your and her infant chil-
dren, JAMES A. BUCHANAN, IV an:JOHN R. BUCH-
ANAN, Jr., and the costs and expenses i cident to the insti-
tution and conduct of said suit includin proper attorney's 
fees, pending a final judgment and decrie in said suit. · 
I 
And on 28 November, 1938, the defenqant's opposition to 
said notice was filed in these words : I 
I 
As_ grounds of his opposition to the ,Cpmplainant 's appli-
cation for an order requiring the Defendant "to pay • • e 
at specific times specific sums sufficient o enable her under 
the direction of the Court to provide fo the adequate and 
proper education, maintenance and sup~ rt of (the) infant. 
children, James A. Buchanan, IV, and ohn R. Buchanan, 
Jr., and the costs and expenses incident t : the institution and 
conduct of said suit, including proper atto ney's fees, pending 
a final judgment and decree in said suit", .he defendant, John 
R. Buchanan, comes and says : 
1. That the matters and things involve in said applicatio.µ 
have heretofore and finally been adjudica ed adversely to the 
Complainant in the final decision and j dgrnent of the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia ren ered on March 10, ' 
1938, in the case of Buchanan v. Bucha an, which said de-
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cision and judgment now constitutes an absolute 
pag·e 51 ~ bar to such application and relief sought therein. 
2. That Complainant is now and forever 
estopped and precluded by the aforesaid final decision and 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia from attempting 
to compel the Defendant to pay periodic sums for the edu-
cation, support an<l maintenance of the said James A. Buch-
anan, IV, and John R. Buchanan, Jr., as requested in said 
application. 
3. That under the facts and circumstances set forth in the 
Bill of Complaint, this Honorable Court has no power or 
jurisdiction to award the i·elief prayed in said application, 
and any order or decree directing the Def enclant to make the 
payments' requested would be null and void. 
And in said Court on 12 October, 1938: 
This day came the plaintiff and the defendant by their re-
spective counsel, and upon the plaintiff's written motion that 
pending a final judgment and de~re~ in this suit, the def end-
ant be required to pay to the plaintiff or to such other de-
pository as the Court may designate, at ·specific times spe-
cific sums sufficient to enable her under the direction of the 
Court to provide for the adequate and proper education, 
maintenance and support of the infant children of the partie~ 
to this suit, which mot.ion the defendant by counsel resisted 
and filed in writing its grounds of opposition thereto, to the 
filing'\ of which grounds of defense plaintiff objected and 
moved it be stricken from the record, and the Court having 
heard argument au<l being· now advised of its opinion, doth 
deny the said motion on the ground stated in the third ground 
of the defendant's oppositio1~ thereto; 
And being of opinion that the first and second 
pag·e 52 ~ grounds upon which the said defendant opposed 
. said motion are insufficient in law, doth sustain 
the motion of plaintiff by counsel to strike the same, to which 
action of the Court in denying her motion upon the g·rounds 
assigned in the defendant's third ground of opposition, plain-
tiff by counsel duly objected and excepted; and to which ac-
tion of the Court in holding insufficient in law his first and 
second grounds of opposition to said motion, the defendant 
by counsel also objected and excepted. 
And on the 28 November, 1938, the defendant filed his de-
murrer to said bill, in these words : 
The defendant, ,John R. Buchanan, says that the Bill of 
. 
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Complaint in this action is not sufficient i law, and as grounds 
of said demurrer assigns the following~ 
I 
I. That a court of equity has no juris4l-iction over the mat. 
ters and things set forth in the Bill of Cpmplaint and the re--
lief sought therein, which are properly Fognizable only_ in a 
court of law. I 
2. That the only relief ultimately sought in the Bill of Com .. 
plaint is the recovery of money alleged to be due under a 
certain contract of M:ay 18, 1931, as o~~ginally executed, or 
as such .contract was subsequently amen ed by consent of the 
parties on September 29, 1933, and tha accordingly equity 
lacks jurisdiction become complainant h. s a plain, adequate 
and complete remedy at law. 
3. That equity lacks jurisdiction to ~ecree specific per-
formance of said alleged contract of M:aw 18, 1931, either in 
its origfoal form or as the same may ha~e been subsequently 
amended by consent of the p4rties on September 
page 53 ~ 29, 1933, which said contract ( so far as the relief 
sought by the complainant is !oncerned) provideR 
only for the payment of money. 
4. That to the extent the Bill of Compl int seeks to recover 
sums of money alleged to be due "by 'operation of la.w',. 
rather than under said contract, it asserfs a cause of action 
which is not properly cognizable in a cpurt of equity, and 
which may be maintained, if at all, onl~ in a court of law 
where a plain, adequate and complete rerpedy exists. 
5. That the Bill of Complaint fails to sTuow or state a caus~ · 
o( action wherein relief may properly be! sought or obtained 
under the Virginia Declaratory ,Judgment Act ( Code Sections 
6140 (a) et seq.), and that, in any event, no relief may prop-
erly be soug·ht or obtained under the De~laratory .Judgm·ent 
Act because the complainant has a plain, adequate and corn. 
plete remedy at law. 
6. That said Declaratory Judgment A may not properly 
be utilized under the facts and circumsta ces set forth in the 
Bill of Complaint as a means or device r obtaining acces:-t 
to a court of equity and to eauitable rem dies. 
7. That the Bill of Complaint iR mul ifarious in that it 
attempts to combine the claim of the co plainant set forth 
therein with the separate and independ nt daims of "all 
other persons interested in said contract :1 * • who may come 
into this suit and make themselves parti s thereto and con-
tribute to the costs thereof'', although i : appears from the 
matters and thing·s therein that there is o common interest 
between the complainant and the alleged other creditors of 
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the defendant, or among said alleged creditors themselves, 
and that the rights of each of such alleged creditors, if any, 
are dependent upon issues /of fact and law which 
page 54 ~ are separate, distinct and different from the issues 
of fact and law involved in the rights, if any, of 
complainant and the other alleged creditors. 
8. That in view of the matters and things set forth in the 
Bill of ·Complaint, the complainant has no right at law or in 
equity to assert that the amended contract of September 29, 
1933, is vitiated in its entirety, and that she is now entitled to 
claim under the contract of May 18, 1931, in its original form, 
because (a) the amended contract is a written agreement set 
forth in the decree of September 29, 1933, and it hppears from 
such contract as exhibited \vith the Bill of Complaint that it 
contains no provisions for its ratification by "a valid order 
of court ~ • * imposing· on the defendant the decretal obliga-
tion to perform it", nor any provision for its termination in 
the event the decree of court directing its performance were 
subsequently held void; (b) the Bill of Complnint fails to 
show or allege that the defendant ever agreed, orally or other-
wise, that the contract as amended on Reptember 29, 1933, 
should contain a provision for its ratification l~y ·' a valid or-
·der of court * * * imposing on the defendant the tlecretal ob-
- ligation to perform it'', or that said contract was subject to be 
terminated or altered in the event the decree of eourt cli-
1·ecting its performance were subsequently held void, and 
( c) even if such a collateral or additional agreement were 
orally made by the parties and property alleged in the Bill 
of Complaint, the written evidence of the amended contract 
speaks for itself, and it is not permissible, by parol evidence 
or otherwise, to read into such amended contract a condi-
tion or provision for the termination or alteration thereof 
which is not set forth and included in the contraet itself. 
. 9. That the complainant may predicate no right 
page 55 ~ or claim, in equity or at law, upon the ground that 
she made a mistake of law as to the power and 
jurisdiction of the Court to render the decree of September 
29, 1933, or to enforce the, provisions thereof respecting t11e 
payment of money by the defendant. · 
10. That the matters and things set forth in said Bill of 
Complaint fail to state or sl10w a valid cause of action at law 
or equity. 
WHER,EFORE, defendant respectfully prays that the Bill 
· of Complaint be dismissed, with his costs by him in this be-
half expended. 
. -- . -r 
i 
t
i ' . 
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And on the same day the defendant file his special plea, in 
these words : 
1 As a special plea to the Bill of Oompla,· t exhibited again.st 
him in this cause, the defendant, John . Buchanan, comes 
and says: · 
1. That the contract of ]\fay 18, 1931,I ( set forth in said 
Bill of Complaint) provides in substancei: (a) that for five 
years complainant was to have the right to occupy Leny · 
1\. fan or "together with the said children 'I'; (b) that so long 
as the children (during their minority) m•de their home with 
the complainant, the defendant agreed to rpay her the sum of 
$1,500. per month, to be used by her for tre maintenance of a 
home and for the support and maintena ce of the children, 
except for certain extraordinary expense mentioned therein; 
( c) that in the event either or any of the children ceased to 
make their home with complailnant, said monthly 
page 56 ~ payment was to be reduced proportionately, (d) 
that during the five-year perio~ mentioned defend-
ant was to have the right to occupy Leny :Manor with the chil-
dren tor one week in each month except ~uring vacation pe-
riods, when he was entitled to occupy the same for one-half of 
the time with the children; ( e) that defet1 ant agreed to pay 
compJainant .$25,000. in cash, to execute a d deliver to her an 
additional $125,000. of notes secured by , deed of trust on 
valuable real.estate in ·washington, D. O.,!and to pay certain 
of her bills aggreg·ating· $10,458.29; and (f~ that in considera-
tion of the payment of said cash and the deFvery of said notes, 
complainant released def enclant ''of. all cl~ims on her part of 
every kind and character, whether ·for stipport and mainte-
nance or otherwise,'' and she accepted an received said cash 
and said notes "in full satisfaction of all "ght, title, interest, 
property or estate, whether by way of do er or otherwise, in 
and to the property, real, personal or mix d," of the defend-
acl. ! 
2. That the contract. of May 18, 1931, (hereinafter some-
times referred to as the "original contra t "), was amended 
by agTeement of the parties on September 29, 1933, following 
the institution of the habeas corpus proc · edings by the de-
fendant in wI1ich he charged the compla nant with having 
violated the provisions of the original c ! ntract; that the 
pertinent provisions of the contract as mended ( which is . 
evidenced by the consent decree of Septe · ber 29, 1933, ex-
hibited with and made a part of the Bill of Complaint herein) 
are: (a) that 5~omplainant surrendered h r right to occupy 
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Leny l\iano1· with the children; (b) that the defendant was 
released from all obligation to pay her $1,500, per month, 
and in lieu thereof he assumed sole liability for the payment 
of '' all bills incurred or to be incurred for the 
pag·e 57 ~ proper clothing, support, maintenance and educa-
tion of the infant children of the parties hereto in 
accordance with their station in life, including· their traveling 
expenses to and from schools and colleges, and to and from 
their parents a.s hereinafter provided'' ; ( c) that each of tl1e 
pa•rents should have '' the custody and control of said children 
for one-half of the various holidays and vacations, alternat-
ing as to which parent should have the said childern for the 
first half of each vacation"; ( d) that the two sons should 
"be placed in the schools they now (then) attend, or such 
other school as the parents may ag·ree on, until they are ready 
for college, respectively, after which they shall .be placed 
at such college as they may respectively desire, after con-
sulting with their respective parents''; ( e) that '' during 
the infancy of any of said children'' defendant should pay 
the complainant $375. per month '' towards the establishment 
of a home suitable for herself and children, other than the 
said Leny Manor''; ( f) that the defendant should pay a cer-
tain open account indebtedness incurred by the complainant, 
amounting to $2,968; and (g:) that interest on the $125,000. 
notes should be paid monthly instead of quarterly. 
3. That the provisions of botl1 the original and amended 
contracts are plainly separable into (a) those pertaining to 
the custody~ support, maintenance and education of the chil-
dren, and (b) those pertaining to the support and mainte-
nance and property rig·hts of the Complainant; and that the 
complainant, in her own rig·ht, has no right, title or interest 
in or to any part of the payments of $1,500. per month and 
$375. per month formerly agreed to be made by the defendant 
in the original and amended contracts, respectively, or in the 
other provisions thereof for the support, mainte-
page 58 ~ nance and education of the children. 
4. That in September of 1934, and while in the 
custody and control of the defendant under the provisions of 
the amended contract of September 29, 1933, James A. Buch-
anan and .John R. Buchanan, Jr., the defendant's two sons. 
rebelled against his proposal to send them to the Stuyvesant 
School in ·warrenton (rather than to the expensive Hill and 
Fessenden Schools, where neither of said boys had been do-
ing· well), and ran away from the suitable home provided for 
tl1em by the defendant and went to the home of the complain-
ant; that thereafter the complainant, in deference to the 
I 
I 
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wisl1es of these boys and without the conjeut and over the ob-
jection of tlie defendant, entered James A. Buchanan in the 
Hill School and John R. Buchanan, J ., in the Fessenden 
School, for the session 1934-1935, whichl schoo]s they there-
upon attended; that neither of these boy~ has ever lived with, 
or in any way recognized the right of pustody and control . 
of the defendant, their father, since theYr ran away from his 
home in September, 1934, as aforesaid; and that the conduct 
of the complainant and said boys, as hf ein set forth, con-
stituted a violation and complete disreg rd of the rights of 
the defendant set forth in said amended contract of Septem-
ber 29, 1933, as well as of his rights as a parent under and 
by virtue of the laws of the State of Vir t, • nia. 
5. That on November 26, 1.934, the conaplainant, suing ''in 
her own right and as next friend of her liwo sons, James 1.\.. 
Buchanan and John R. Buchanan, Jr.,'' fil~d a petition against 
defendant which resulted in the decree of this Court of June 
24, 1935, which decree is set forth in Pa~raph 19 of the Bill 
of Complaint; that in such decree, and fithout the consent 
of the defendant, this Court undertook t~ alter and change a 
number of the material provis ons of the amended 
page 59 ~ contract of September 29, 193. , to-wit: The pro-
visions of said contract as to the custody and con-
trol of the children were abrogated cniµrely, and although 
finding that ''neither parent is unfitted'j for the custody of 
H1e c.hildren, the exclusive custody and [ control of the two 
boys was awarded to the complainant, mid, instead of there-
upon discharging- the defendant from all ~urther obligation to 
support and maintain such boys, tho Cotlrt further- required 
of him a monthly payment to complaina:bt for such purpose 
of $375. in addition to a like sum agree4 to be paid by him 
in the amended contract of September 2,, 1933. 
6. That, as is set forth in said decree June 24, 1935, the 
two boys, through the complainant as ne t friend, had joined 
in the filing of the petition of November 2 , 1934, against this 
defendant, their father, appeared in cot t and stated their 
preference and desire to leave him, and ! to live solely with 
the complainant. · ! . 
7. That the Supreme Court of Appeal 1f1 of. Virginia, in the 
case of Buchanan v. Buchanan, involving, the parties hereto, 
held on June 8, 1938, that so much of th 'decree of June 24, 
1935, as purported to require the paymc t of an additional 
sum of $375. per month was void, alth gh the provisions 
of such decree which related to the custod and control of the 
children were held to be valid. 
8. That accordingly and by virtue of t e foregoing action 
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and conduct of th~ complainant and said boys, and by the 
decree of June 24, 1935, entered and obtained at their request, 
the defendant has been denied and wholly deprived of all 
right to the custody and control of his two i:;ons, contrary to 
law and in spite of and contrary to the promises and cove-
nants made by the Complainant in both the original 
· page 60 ~ contract of_ May 18, 1931, and the amended contract 
. of September 29, 19·33. 
9. That the promises of the Defendant, in both the original 
and amended contracts, to make the designated payments for 
the provision of a home for the children and to provide for 
their support and maintenance, were mutually dependent 
. upon the promises of the Complainant, likewise set forth in 
both the original and amended contracts, that the Defendant 
should have the custody and control of said children as speci-
fied in said contracts; that under no circumstances would 
Defendant have promised to contribute towards the mainte. 
nance of a ]:iome for J;hese boys with the Complainant and to 
support and maintain them, as set forth in both the original 
and amended contracts, if he had not been Mcorded in said 
contracts the right specified therein to their custody, control 
and companionship; and that the consideration for said prom-
ises by the Defendant were the promises by the Complainant 
that he should have such custody, control and companionship, 
free from harassment, litigation and further controversy. 
10. That by virtue of the foregoing, and without fault on 
his part, the Defendant. has now been wholly deprived of 
the consideration which induced him to make said promises, 
in both _the original and amended contracts, to contribute to-
wards a home for and to support and maintain his two sons, 
whose exclusive custody and control has been solely vested 
in and exercised by the Complainant at all times since Sep-
tember, 1934; and that such failure or consideration relieves 
and discharges the Defendant of any and all duty or obliga-
tion to perform or comply with said promises, or any of them. 
11. That in the absence of a binding contract, a father's 
duty to support and maintain his infant children is based 
upon his correlative right to their custody, control, 
page 61 ~ companionship ancl services; that a father who is 
fit and proper person also has the legal right to 
support and maintain such children in his own home, and he 
cannot lawfully be com1Jelled ag·ainst his will to support and 
maintain them elsewhere; and that accordingly, the defendant, 
who bas been adjudged by this Court to be a fit and proper 
person for the custody of his children, is under no duty, legal 
or contractu~l, to support and maintain or in any way con-
I 
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tribute to the support, maintenance an education of these 
two boys, who have wilfully a.bandoneq and renounced the 
Defendant, and his home, and who have lbeen in the exclusive 
custody and control of the Complainaiit at all times since 
September, 1934. I 
12. That for the reasons herein set forth, Defendant is like-
wise under no duty or obligation, legal dr contractual, to the 
Complainant, to said boys, or to any ot~er party or parties 
for bills incurred or sums expended for ~nd on account of the 
support, maintenance and educa.tion of said boys since Sep ... 
tember, 1934. I 
WHEREFORE, Devenda.nt respectfuIDy shows that Com-
plainant is entitled to recover nothing frpm him under or by 
virtue of her said Bill of Complaint; tlliat the matters and 
things hereinabove set forth in this Spec} al Plea constitute a 
complete and absolute defense and bar to the claims asserted 
by the Complainant; that the said Bill of Complaint should 
be dismissed, with· his proper costs in t1!is behalf expended; 
and all of this the said Defendant is rea y to verify. 
.And in said Court on 28 N oveinber, 19,8. 
This day came a.gain the parties by th~ir respective attor-
neys, and the defendant, by \his attorneys, pre-
page 62 J sented and asked leave to :file1 a demurrer to the bill of complaint and a spectal plea setting up 
certain defenses thereto, upon consideration of which mo-
tion it is · I 
ORDERED that the demurrer and special plea of the~de-
f endant so tendered be, and the same herJby are, filed herein. 
And on motion by the plaintiff said de~urrer and plea are 
set down to be argued, which argument i fixed by the Court 
on the 19th day of December, 1938. 
I 
, I 
And on 7 April, 1939, the plaintiff filed ' er amended bill in 
, these words : i 
NOW COMES the complainant and a ks leave to amend 
her Bill, filed in this Court on the . . . . day of September, 
1938, in the following respects : 
That the following allegation be 
of the Bill at the end thereof: 
to paragraph 30 
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"Your Complainant is further informed, believes and 
charges that independent of the mistakes hereinbefore charged 
in respect to the true effect and operation of the agreement 
evidenced by the consent decree aforesaid of September 29th, 
19~3, purporting to modify the original agreement of May 
.18th, 1931, and the decree of the Nevada Court in that regard 
as hereinbefore alleged, that the repeated failure and refusal 
of the said defendant to perform the said contract as so 
amended, as hereinbefore alleged, ]1as amounted 
page 63 ~ to a repudiation thereof and has constituted such 
a failure of the consideration thereof as to neces-
sitate the cancellation and rescission thereof, and to entitle 
.her and her said children to have the same cancelled, re-
scinded and set aside in its entirety, and to have the said 
contract of May 18th, 1931, and tl1e decree of the Nevada 
Court in that r.espcct restored in their entirety.'' 
and that the prayer of said Bill be amended by inserting there-
in on the 33rd page thereof, after the words "validly 
amended'' and before the word ''and'' 
'' and even though validly amended that the Court rescind 
- and annul the said contract evidenced by the consent decree 
of S.eptember 29th, 1933, in so far as it purports· to am·end the 
said contract of May 18th, 1931, aforesaid, and the decree 
of the Nevada Court in that regard and that the latter be re..: 
instated and restored in its entjrety.'' 
She prays that the said original Bill as so amended be 
treated as this her amended ·Bill with the same· force and 
· effect as if herein repeated at length, and she will ever pray, 
etc. 
And on the same dav the defendant filed his amendment to 
. · his demurrer filed on 28 November, 1938, in these words: 
· Now comes the .defendant, by his attorneys, and 
page 64 ~ asks leave to file an amended demurrer to the com-
plainant's bill of complaint this day amended by 
leave of Court, by adding to his demurrer heretofore filed in 
this cause the following additional grounds thereof, to-wit: 
"8 (a). That even if the defendant failed to perform the 
alleged contract evidenced by the consent decree of Septem-
ber 29; 1933, in the manner and to the extent set forth in. the 
amended bill of complaint, such alleged failure of performance 
would not empower a GOurt of equity to 'reinstate and restore 
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in Its entirety' the former contract bet en. the complainant 
and defendant dated May 18, 1931, bee use the subsequent' 
agreement and contract between said p~rties evidenced by· 
the consent decree of September 29, 193.3, superseded in all 
respects said contract of May 18, 1931, became the only con-
tract between such parties, and the rights of the plaintiff, if 
any, arise and must be enforced, if a.t fll, according to its 
terms and c,onditions. '' i 
And in said Court on said 7 April, 19~9. · 
This cause came on again this day to bJ further heard upon 
the bill of complaint and th_e defendant'a demurrer thereto, 
and the Court having heard the argumen~ of counsel and be-
ing now advised of its opinion that the Jbill of complaint is 
insufficient in law and that the defendant
1
's demurrer thereto 
should the ref ore be sustained, it is : 
AD;J"!JDGED, ORDERED a;11d. ~ECR~~D !hat the bill of 
complarnt heretofore filed herem 1s msuffi,ient m law, that the 
defendant's demurrer thereto be sustain~d and that the said 
bill of complaint be dismissed at the plaintiff's costs, to which 
action of the Court the compfainant, by counsel, 
page 65 ~ duly objected and excepted, ~nd thereupon ten-
dered in open court and asked leave to file an 
• amendment in writing to Paragraph 30 I and to the prayer 
of her bill of complaint, which motion is granted and the com-· 
plainant 's amendment to Paragraph 30 ~f the said bill and 
to the prayer thereof is accordingly filed \and made a part of 
the r:ecord herein. I 
Whereupon the defendant, by his attqrneys, tendered in 
open court and asked leave to file an amendment in writing 
to his demurrer lrnre~of ore filed herein, ijy adding thereto a 
new ground thereof designated "8 (a) ,i'' which motion is 
.granted and the written amendment to s id demurrer is ac-
cording-ly filed and made a part of the rec rd herein; and the 
Court having· heard the argument of cou sel thereon and be-
ing· now advised of its opinion that the ·11 of complaint, as 
amended, is insufficient in law, and th the defendant's 
amended demurrer thereto should be · sus a.ined, it is 
ADJUDGED, ORDERED and DECR ED that the bill of 
complaint as amended is insufficient in la , that the def end-
ant's amended demurrer thereto be sust ined, and that the 
said amended bill of complaint be likewi e dismissed at the 
plaintiff's costs; to which action of the Co rt the complainant, 
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by counsel, duly objected a.nd e:;cepted upon the ground tha.t 
none o,f the grounds of demurrer specified are well taken. 
I hereby certify that the foregoing· pages contain the en-
tire record of the Chancery Cause lately pending in the Cir-
cuit Court of Fauquier County, ·styled, Ruth Lester Buchanan 
v. John R. Buchanan, as requested by the Attorney for the 
plaintiff. 
I further certify that the notice required by Section 6339 
of the Code of Virginia has been given. 
·Fee for record $35.40. 
Teste: 
T. E. BARTENST:HJIN, 
Clerk 'Ci;·cuit Court Fauquier County, Va. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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